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A CRITICAL TREATMENT OF SOME CONCEPTUALIZATIONS  
OF IDEOLOGY  
IN BEHAVIORAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

THEODORE R. MALLOCH JR.

Department of Political Science

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
University of Toronto

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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

PROGRAM OF THE FINAL ORAL EXAMINATION  
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

OF

THEODORE ROOSEVELT MALLOCH

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A CRITICAL TREATMENT OF SOME CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF IDEOLOGY

IN BEHAVIORAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

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## ABSTRACT

Ideological thinking has been, and remains one of the most persistent and elusive modes of thought. From the original use of "ideology" by DeStutt de Tracy, through inversion by Marx, into the current period, ideology has been found an attractive and useful concept. Its popularity in modern social science is incontestable. Yet, there continues to be an ever growing ambiguity hovering over and around the concept.

Contemporary research in political behavior has borrowed the concept and tried to make it a tool for empirical measurement. In this attempt, the concept has been ill-defined and, at times, seemingly used as a blanket term for all that would not easily fit under other categories. This overgeneralizing tendency is accompanied by a measure of vagueness. No distinction is made between philosophy and ideology, religion and ideology, or myth and ideology. Ideology rather serves as a cultural backdrop, becoming at times an almost empty term.

Certain behavioral scientists have sought to retain some of the old flavor of the concept of ideology as a global system, while trying at the same time to submit it to modern scientific exactness, as if ideology were an observable, quantifiable phenomenon.

Ideologies are normative for the behaviorists, and therefore somehow resemble political philosophy. Ideology is seen as a causal factor in a specific behavior pattern. Ideology, therefore, becomes relevant for its effects, not in and of itself. Since ideological behavior is not neutral, because its claims are extremely difficult to verify, it is often conceived of as dangerous and backward.

It is my thesis in approaching this subject, that, if one accepts uncritically the behavioral concepts of ideology, the history of political philosophy becomes only a history of ideas: in reality it is reduced to the history of ideology.

Because theory does not enjoy great favor in the modern period, political philosophy takes on a dubious ring, as if it were akin to ideological rationalization.

After sketching out a brief history of the concept of ideology, six different behavioral studies of ideology (Sutton, Lane, Campbell, Converse, Apter, and Putnam) are described. Critical comments are then formulated, from within the perspective of the normative philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, on: problems of conceptualization (lack of reference to objective reality, obscurity, and static quality of behavioral models), and on the underlying "fact-value dichotomy" and the assumption of value neutrality in behavioral political science.

My conclusion suggests that many of the behavioral concepts of ideology have interesting features, but that they have a tendency to ignore and foreclose a number of important political and ontological questions.

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GRADUATE STUDIES

Studies in Modern Political Theory

C. Bay

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"Ego in hoc notus sum, et ad hoc veni  
ut veritatem attestaremur."

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## Introduction

Ideological thinking has been, and remains, one of the most persistent and elusive modes of thought. From the initial use of "ideology" by Destutt de Tracy, even before in the "idols" of Francis Bacon, through inversion by Marx, into the current period, ideology has been found an attractive and useful concept. Its popularity in modern social science is incontestable. Yet, there continues to be an ambiguity hovering over and around the concept.

Contemporary research in political behavior has borrowed the concept and tried to make it a tool for empirical measurement. In this attempt the concept has been ill-defined and, at times, seemingly used as a blanket term for all that would not easily fit under other categories. This overgeneralizing tendency is accompanied by a measure of vagueness. No distinction is made between philosophy and ideology, religion and ideology, or myth and ideology. Ideology rather serves as a cultural backdrop, becoming at times an almost empty term.

Behavioral political scientists have sought to retain some of the old flavor of the concept of ideology as an overriding belief system, while trying at the same time to submit it to modern scientific exactness, as if ideology were an observable, quantifiable phenomenon. Ideologies are normative for the behavioralists, and therefore somehow resemble political philosophy. Ideology is seen as a

causal factor in a specific behavior pattern. Ideology, therefore, becomes relevant only for its effects, not in and of itself. Since ideological behavior is not neutral, because its claims are extremely difficult to verify, it is often conceived of as dangerous and backward. Political scientists of a behaviorist bent at times seem to deny the need for ideology. In this sense they are receptive to the "end of ideology" arguments which were promoted by a group of writers known as the "end-of-ideologists."

It is my suggestion in approaching this subject, that, if one accepts uncritically the behavioral concepts of ideology, the history of political philosophy becomes only a history of ideas: in reality it is reduced to the history of ideology. Because theory does not enjoy great favor in the modern period, political philosophy takes on a dubious ring, as if it were akin to ideological rationalization.

There are numerous criticisms that can be made of the behavioral concepts of ideology. This objective can best be accomplished by letting a number of significant behavioral representatives present their concepts. I have chosen to consider six contributors to the behavioral conceptualization of ideology in political science. All six are alive at this writing and continue to publish on other subjects in the discipline. Those included are:

- (1) Francis X. Sutton
- (2) Robert E. Lane
- (3) Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse
- (4) David E. Apter
- (5) Robert D. Putnam

There is, I admit, some degree of subjective choice involved in the selection of those under consideration. My rationale for dealing with each author is a combination of prominent status, the importance of specific works, and their agreement with the goals of behavioral science, which each of these authors has stated. I have selected these authors because there exist interesting and unique aspects to the research of each. In fact, one of my reasons for choosing this group of authors is to view the many ways behavioral political science has dealt with the concept of ideology over the period of the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. I have picked these authors then, because of differences in approach, as well as to view the product of behavioral research as a whole. Of those chosen, one conceptualization stresses psychological-cultural strain, another looks at political personality, another contrasts political apathy over against ideology, another focuses on the functional value of ideology, and the most recent contribution attempts to quantify ideological styles of political elites. Looking at this group of writings allows a fairly inclusive look at the behavioral con-

ceptualization of ideology.

There is also a commonality in the behavioral study of ideology, which aside from the important differences, which I am less interested in demonstrating here, allows us to discuss the authors first, in separate descriptive chapters, and then, together as part of a larger paradigm in political science. That commonality is simply a definite similarity of approach, both in theoretical outlook and in methodology.

Another reason for choosing these writings is that a chronological order can be noted. I begin with the 1956 work by Sutton, et al. Lane's major study was written in 1962. Campbell and Converse have been active together since 1960, with the most important article by Converse appearing in 1964. Apter's most relevant contributions span the period 1964-68. Putnam's recent publications of 1973-76 are perhaps the latest in the development of behavioral studies of ideology. I want the reader to note that with historical progression the concept has become the attention of increased sophistication in the writing of behavioral political scientists.

I have attempted to look at many important works by behavioral authors but of necessity have restricted my research. It is certainly the case that other authors have written about ideology from a political behavioralist perspective, including Dahl, Deutsch, Rokeach, and Easton, to name only a few. I have tried to choose for my research some key contributions that could be considered



representative of the behavioral approach, realizing that the literature on the concept of ideology is massive, if not unmanageable. In summary, I have chosen the authors included in this study for the following reasons: chronology; significance in the discipline, or of a specific work; and certain distinctives, which evidence the different ways behavioral political scientists have developed their concepts of ideology.

The approach in the first part of the research is to take the form of descriptive analyses of the concept of ideology as developed in the primary works of those listed above. I want to let the authors selected speak for themselves. Only by understanding the concept as developed by some of its promoters can rational criticisms be offered in the third part of this work. My plan is devised to be flexible enough to accommodate those writers under consideration. The framework used is both formal enough to order my analyses, and adaptive enough to see the contours of each author's work. In detail, (1) each author's definition will be examined and categorized according to the elements contained therein; (2) the general research scheme or operation and the relation of ideology to political behavior will be suggested, so as to place the work of each specific author in proper context; (3) ideology has been conceived as being either a truth value or a functional value; each author's theoretical conceptualization of ideology will be delineated and elaborated; (4) each author's use of

the concept of ideology will be examined for consistency and indebtedness to others (i.e., from whom did each author draw on for his particular conceptualization); and (5) each author's concept of ideology will be looked at in order to understand its relation to and valuation of science; especially in regard to the supposed neutrality and objectivity of science.

I will devote an initial chapter to the history of the concept of ideology, and thus give an overview of the problems that I will concentrate on in the remainder of the research. Part two, the next five chapters, will contain the analyses of works by the authors I have named. The third part of the research will entail normative criticisms of the conceptualization of ideology as developed by certain behavioral political scientists. The criticisms will take two parts; each to which a chapter will be employed. Reference in these chapters will focus on the descriptive analyses carried out in chapters two through six. Chapter seven will deal with "problems of conceptualization" - lack of reference to objective reality, obscurity, and static quality of behavioral models. Chapter eight will formulate a criticism of the underlying "fact-value dichotomy" and the assumption of value neutrality. The final chapter nine, will sum up my research and will suggest my provisional conclusion.

My own paradigm, in both the descriptive analyses and the normative criticisms, uses two reference points. The framework is generally dependent on the Christian philosophy developed by Herman Dooyeweerd,<sup>1</sup> while some of the guiding political theory is drawn from the thought of Eric Voegelin.<sup>2</sup>

NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup>See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, v. 1-4; Philadelphia: Reformed and Presbyterian Publishing Company, 1953; and In The Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Philosophical Thought, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1960.

<sup>2</sup>See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952; Order and History, v. 104, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956-75; Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968; Enlightenment to Revolution, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY

A History of the Concept of Ideology: A Sketch

Commentators on the concept of ideology, from the recent past to the present, can be said to agree at least on two sentiments; that "ideology" is a major force, and most certainly a bone of contention. Clifford Geertz suggests that "it is one of the minor ironies of modern intellectual history that the term 'ideology' has itself become thoroughly ideologized."<sup>1</sup> The subject area of ideology is filled with confusion because the concept itself has known so many different constructions since its introduction. Definitions of ideology are legion.<sup>2</sup> It is not an understatement to comment that "few concepts widely used in social science have been more variously construed than ideology."<sup>3</sup>

Since "ideology" is one of the most disputed concepts in the entire language of politics, and since it is "one of the most frequently cited and inadequately understood subjects of empirical political inquiry,"<sup>4</sup> perhaps it is best to take the long view in order to understand the variegated history of this most perplexing concept. For, despite its many ills, "ideology" remains a useful and prominent implement for the political theorist

and scientist alike. According to Arne Naess, "the opinion seems to prevail that the term is quite capable of bearing much of the burden of meaning in the exchange of serious opinion and in the dissemination of information."<sup>5</sup>

One of the problems plaguing the subject area of ideology is the failure on the part of many commentators to make a proper distinction between the concept of ideology, the term itself, and the phenomena addressed as ideological. For the purpose of this study, which is primarily concerned with the theoretical conceptions of ideology used in behavioral political science, "concept" is meant to imply the mentally conceived image of an idea; its use is in essence theoretical, although empirical implications are evident. When speaking of the simple, expressive use of the word ideology, "term" will be used. I suggest that the use of the term ideology, in most circumstances, relates to a particular theoretical construction, one conception of which is "behavioral" in design. The "phenomenon" of ideology is an observable and therefore notable thing that political scientists, as well as others, wish to speak about. Concepts, then, organize and delimit phenomena; they further promote systematization and explanation. Political theory generally, and behavioral political theory specifically, are among other things, sets of interrelated concepts. In simplest terms, concepts are defined within theoretical

systems. Concepts are mental, whereas the phenomena they designate are objects and activities having form and substance.

Even if we approach the concept of ideology with some measure of regret, realizing that it has suffered by loose usage of the term, noting that it has been a "sponge term" in our language sometimes meaning nothing in particular and almost anything in general, damage may not be altogether irreparable. Clarity can certainly be sought after. If multitudinous usage be any valid criterion for looking into the concept of ideology, this alone should establish the need for more research resembling this present undertaking.<sup>6</sup>

It could be suggested that in the beginning ideology existed; however, scholars have not been willing to go so far. The ingredients that make up the word "ideology," "idea" and "logos" come from the ancient Greek.<sup>7</sup> It was in the eighteenth century however that the word as we know it today first surfaced in the work of the "philosophe" Destutt de Tracy.<sup>8</sup> Historically then, the concept of ideology arose in Western Europe in a period of conflict when religious, political, and economic controversies engaged the attention of a growing portion of the public. The term was coined by a group of post-Enlightenment thinkers in France who accepted the designation "Ideologues" to suggest the sensationalist philosophy, psychology, and political theory they were developing.

Proceeding from the Enlightenment, the philosophy of the circle around Tracy<sup>9</sup> proclaimed theories of sensationalism in opposition to religious and ecclesiastical dogma and doctrines of innate ideas. The method of the *Idéologues* was an analysis of ideas through sensation which lead to a philosophical concern centered in the physical sciences. From this natural or physical bias, we were told, would flow the foundation for infallible moral and political sciences.

The elaborate writings of Tracy, Cabanis, Volney, Condillac, and Condorcet were vindications of the Enlightenment philosophy. They sought the demise of scholasticism, and a priori reasoning in general. The scholastics whom they criticized held to a traditional theology of innate ideas rather than observable fact, which made God rather than man the object of philosophy. The *Idéologues* set out to destroy absolute principles, abstract notions, metaphysics, and ontology. Only after such attacks, it was believed, could the new style of reason come to reign as a guide to all action: only by procedures of observing facts and following the dictates of the senses could one find hope to enter the highest stage of intellectual progress. This new sense of reason sought the elimination of revelation as a source of "principles". The sensationalist view of man insisted that the proper focus of science is on method.

Eager to make their point, the *Ideologues* promoted their ideas in a zealous effort as if promoting religious faith.<sup>10</sup> The reaction that ensued was short but effective. For the *Ideologues* had managed to collide with an institution which had endured for centuries. The papal apologists and traditional philosophers sought to refute new ideals based on the new conception of reason as unsuitable guides for man's direction.

It was Napoleon Bonaparte, however, who most effectively ridiculed the "*Ideologues*" and "*ideology*." Decrying the notions of the "*philosophes*" with an indignant passion, Napoleon came to see these free-thinkers as meddling in politics, irreligious, and dissident against what he considered the sanctity and glory of France. So their voices were silenced: "long before the Napoleonic venture had died, *Ideology* as a philosophy had perished under the scorn of dictatorship and the purge of reaction."<sup>11</sup>

It is interesting to note that in the face of a hostile censor, Tracy sent his philosophical tracts to President Thomas Jefferson, a friend through Lafayette, to be published. Tracy is said to have felt that the United States of America was realizing the Principles of *Ideology* which he had developed. Noteworthy in this regard are the comments and questions of John Adams in a letter to Thomas Jefferson on December 16, 1816:

Three volumes of *ideology*! Pray explain to me the neological title! What does it mean? When Bonaparte used it, I was delighted with it, upon



the common principle of delight in everything we cannot understand. Does it mean idiotism? The science of non compos mentuism? The science of lunacy? The theory of delirium? Or does it mean the science of self-love?<sup>12</sup>

On the soil of revolutionary America the spell of ideological theorizing fell on listening ears. But it was also challenged in the Napoleonic sense as zealous "lunacy."

The terms "Ideologue" and "ideology" had suffered severely from the sharp reaction of Napoleonic Royalists and religious apologists and were forgotten for numerous decades. When the terms reemerged in the writings of Karl Marx, they continued to bear the stigma of contempt associated with the historical setting in which they suffered their demise. Ideology had become a defensive term, so that "the familiar parodic paradigm applies: I have a social philosophy; you have political opinions; he has an ideology."<sup>13</sup> In this sense, ideology had gained what can only be called a negative connotation, "approximating 'deceit' or 'self-deceit' or, at any rate, signifying an 'interested' or 'subjective' approach to 'reality,' an attitude going off at a tangent in relation to 'truth.'"<sup>14</sup>

The contemptuous use of the epithet "Ideologue" by Napoleon was taken up by Marx and Engels and reinforced with new significance. For in Marx's writings "ideology" was at last given a place in a systematic philosophy. The term was resurrected within a new conceptual framework.

It was Friedrich Engels who first spoke of the "false consciousness" of those whose ideas were shaped by class

interest and economic realities. Marx and Engels further refined the term and concept in The German Ideology and The Communist Manifesto, applying both to the "bourgeois" way of thinking. Marx's ascertainment of man's social nature led to a development of a new scientific approach to the analysis of the sources of ideas. It is in this sense that the concept of ideology acquired a new meaning.

According to Marx's view, ideology is determined not by natural organization but by the dynamics of social relations. These relations engender a difference in the position of classes and simultaneously in the content and forms of spiritual production corresponding to their interests. Marx states in The Communist Manifesto:

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?... What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual production changes its character as material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class.<sup>15</sup>

George Lichtheim suggests that the Marxian concept of ideology produces an explosive mixture in its fusion of "two different principles: Hegel's insight into the transitory character of successive manifestations of spirit, and Feuerbach's material inversion of Hegel, with its stress on the this-worldly natural existence."<sup>16</sup>

The historical materialism of Marx's sociological thought held that the whole structure of society is

conditioned by productive forces. Superstructures themselves evidence "ideologies" which condition and influence ideas. "Ideology" is used to refer to a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community. In The German Ideology, a statement of historical materialism, Marx insists that the real basis of ideology is the division between mental and material labour in the separation of town and country. Marx states, "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is (at first) directly interwoven with the material activity and the mental intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appears at this state as the direct efflux of their material behavior."<sup>18</sup>

One can say that Marx was willing to approach the concept from a "we-they," "cops and robbers" dichotomy.<sup>19</sup> Contemporary Marxist thought continues to suggest "they" have political philosophy while any other system of thought is purely ideological. It is characteristic of this type of conceptualization that "we have cherished values, they have dogma; we have founding fathers and leaders, they have false prophets and tyrants; we are steadfast and true in our principles, they are fanatics."<sup>20</sup>

Marx, more so than any other political theorist, even those who coined the term, made the concept of ideology important in social theory. It is noteworthy that all

modern attempts to analyze social dependence of thought, or to empirically locate ideological modes of thought, are indebted to the contribution of Marx. However, if Marx (and later Marxists, who "have either used the term much as he did, or have explained their uses of it by contrasting them with his")<sup>21</sup> had lent a powerful impetus to the scientific study of ideology, he had also originated numerous problems which plague us into the modern period. "Marx's tarnished image of ideology as deceptive or hypocritical ideas"<sup>22</sup> meant that ideology would appeal to the base and deep instincts of mass man, to their emotions, fears and hopes, and ultimately their hatreds. Marx's use of the term as a comprehensive and universal cultural phenomena for all those who do not understand or act on his interpretation of the development of history does almost irreparable damage to the concept's limits and boundaries in scientific discourse.

"In Marx's view, only Marxist social theory, based on a true understanding of history appears free from ideological distortion."<sup>23</sup> Marx states plainly: "If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-processes as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process."<sup>24</sup> Correct political views become in a very special sense the ally of the proletariat. Marx leaves the concept of ideology fully ideologized, yet

with much ambivalence. Ideology implies falsity and therefore the "alienation" of truth, and yet in a second way ideology is implicitly approved, if, of course, it is Marxist.<sup>25</sup> This inherent difficulty in Marx's use of the concept of ideology is reflected in comments of even the most recent contributors. I do not mean to imply that Marx was a relativist, since as a Hegelian he believed -- the end of history is possible; in that sense, the end of history is the end of the dialectic, therefore absolute truth is possible.

Because the term "ideology" is not easily used summarily as a concept of approbation or implying adverse judgment, it is sometimes suggested that a more neutral connotation allows its usage in a scientific matter. However, the social sciences have yet to fully develop a genuinely non-evaluative conception of ideology. This thorny problem is often referred to as "Mannheim's Paradox." Briefly stated it holds that objectivity is impossible in any given social analysis. Thought is bound to the existential life conditions of the thinker. This is particularly true when the subject matter is the study of ideology. As Geertz suggests:

escape from Mannheim's Paradox lies, therefore, in the perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing more adroitly with meaning. Bluntly, we need a more exact apprehension of our object of study. . . .<sup>26</sup>

Such an apparatus is yet to be discovered.

Much attention has been paid to the concept of ideology in German philosophic circles. Of important merit are the elaborations by Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim and

others in the so called "sociology of knowledge" school. Mannheim in his Ideology and Utopia<sup>27</sup> set the stage for modern contributors to the concept of ideology. He wanted to distinguish two styles of thinking, "ideological" and "utopian," and in so doing tried to transcend the partialities of conditioned ideas. Desiring to save the Marxists against the charge that their own doctrine was no less than ideological, as being also the expression of a class-consciousness, he drew the contrast between the bourgeois "ideology" that guards the capitalist status quo and the Marxist "utopianism" that projects a new social order. For Mannheim all knowledge is "relational," therefore knowledge itself must be seen in relation to the social and historical milieu in which it is generated.

Mannheim arrives at a historical-social relativism concerning the validity of knowledge - which he calls "relationism" - while he confers a sort of objectivity upon the forces which are assumed to determine valuations.<sup>28</sup>

By further universalizing the concept of ideology, Mannheim accentuates the problem of boundaries and definition beyond that of the Marxists, who never admit their system is ideological, but rather tend to see it as scientific.

The sociology of knowledge came into being when philosophers of knowledge and sociologists began to share the view that even "truths" in a given society were to be held socially accountable, or determined by social standing.

Mannheim points to the breakdown of the Middle Ages inasmuch as "the conception of order in the world of objects which had been guaranteed by the dominance of the church became problematical, and there remained no alternative but to turn about and to take the opposite road, and, with the subject as the point of departure, to determine the nature and value of the human cognitive act, attempting thereby to find an anchorage for objective existence in the knowing subject."<sup>29</sup> Mannheim's admitted starting point is Nietzsche: "I have forgotten why I ever began..." There is no goal. The optimum is adaptation."<sup>30</sup> By aligning himself with Nietzsche, Mannheim accepts not only nihilism but also the necessary transformation of certain values. In Mannheim's words, "Even when one takes a purely causal and functional point of view one discovers only afterwards what sense there was originally concealed in the ontology on which one proceeded."<sup>31</sup> All ideas are related in a commanding way to the historical situation from which they arose. Robert Merton suggests that the following paradigm controls the sociology of knowledge:

- 1) Where is the existential basis of mental productions located?
- 2) What mental productions are being sociologically analyzed? (ideologies)
- 3) How are mental productions related to the existential basis?
- 4) Why? Are manifest and latent functions imputed to these existentially conditioned mental productions?
- 5) When do the imputed relations of the existential base and knowledge obtain? (historicist theories)<sup>32</sup>

The emergence of this special school of theorists developing a special field of sociology, "Wissenssoziologie,"

in the early part of the twentieth century set the stage for all further developments in the history of the concept of ideology. In a sense, the work of Mannheim is the point of departure for all of the behavioral political scientists under consideration in the bulk of this research. For modern academics have seized upon the analytical schemes of the sociology of knowledge, which appear to order the chaos of the numerous cultural conflicts and contending points of view besieging contemporary society. An assimilation of a good deal of what goes as the sociology of knowledge into the various and assorted academic fields of inquiry has taken place in recent decades.

The relevant point for agreement among many sociologists and political scientists concerns relations between knowledge and the existential factors in society or culture at large. The thesis is that "thought has an existential basis insofar as it is not immanently determined and insofar as one or another of its aspects can be derived from extracognitive factors."<sup>33</sup>

Scheler's and Mannheim's delimitation of the sociology of knowledge also continues the philosophical tradition of German idealism. The emphasis on social existence has its roots in Kant's epistemology, while the preoccupation with thought reflects the concerns of Hegel; and not to be neglected is the significance of Dilthey's methodological considerations which affect the subject matter for all social sciences. Gunter Remmling, one current-day repre-



sentative of this tradition, suggests that the sociology of knowledge is not to be misconstrued as the history of ideas in social context but rather "is the analysis of the functioning interrelations of social processes and structures on the one hand and the patterns of intellectual life, including the modes of knowing, on the other."<sup>34</sup>

The sociological contribution of Mannheim to the concept of ideology is essentially the synthesis of two components. Genetically, both idealism and Marxism, spirit and society actuate Mannheim's influential contribution.<sup>35</sup> Beginning with facts, the sociologist of knowledge follows the Weberian dictates of reliable inquiry in providing something that goes beyond a summary, that "aims at providing an objective account of why and how human beings come to believe as they do."<sup>36</sup> Mannheim states that "the concept of 'ideology' reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensely interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconsciousness of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it."<sup>37</sup> The major methodological premise is that thought products are extrinsic phenomena which are directly related to facets of social reality.

This postulate leads to an acceptance of historicism rooted in the historical consciousness of Herder and in the romantic movement. Adrian Cunningham suggests that ideology itself is part of "a range of terms" like "Weltanschauung" and "Spirit of the Age," which arise from the discovery, concomitant with romanticism, that we inhabit, as Wordsworth said, "a world we both see and half create - that we invest the world with meanings rather than read them off from it; that collectively and individually we construct our reality."<sup>38</sup>

It is therefore finally in Mannheim that the concept of ideology is widened to refer to all thinking of social actors. For Mannheim, the conditions of life in a particular place and time create thought.

Ideology is, from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge, the investigation of the social uses of ideas for the purpose of convincing or coercing men into actions having ultimate political and economic consequences.<sup>39</sup>

In brief, ideology for Mannheim expresses the instance when interests connect to a specific view of reality.

Mannheim offers two meanings of ideology. Ideology is particular "when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent."

Ideology is total "when the ideology of an age or a concrete historio-social group, e.g. of a class, ...concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group is suggested."<sup>40</sup> Both of these meanings fall back on the

subject and make "ideas" a function of him who holds them and of his social milieu. We can agree with Reimling when he asserts that the efforts of the sociologists of knowledge

at conceptual clarification and methodological systematization led them to narrow the search for the tendons connecting existence and thought to the investigation of relations between social existence and knowledge.<sup>41</sup>

Mannheim's sociology of knowledge results in a thoroughgoing historical and philosophical relativism. Accepting "perspectivism," or the "self relativization of thought," early in his career Mannheim sought ends to make it less absolutist in his writings on total and partial ideology, where he developed the theories of a free and unobstructed intelligentsia.<sup>42</sup>

Mannheim's discussion of the social characteristics of the intelligentsia is inseparable from his general quest for some kind of "objective" social and political knowledge within the framework of a relativistic theory of knowledge.<sup>43</sup>

Criticisms of Mannheim's concept of ideology are numerous. Two important suggestions run throughout most of the commentaries. The first is the problem of historical evidence, which leads Richard Cox to assert that there is

a profound disproportion between the bold sweep of Mannheim's thesis and the quality of concrete historical evidence he presents to support it. Indeed, it seems to me that

his insistence on the intrinsic importance of achieving a sense of historical "perspective" leads almost paradoxically, yet inevitably, to a fundamental depreciation of the problem of historical accuracy.<sup>44</sup>

The second, and by far the most profound of the criticisms, centers around the implications of Mannheim's relativism. As we recall, Mannheim was most scornful of anyone who would claim his own beliefs and theories to be valid for all times.

Such calm Olympian detachment, says Mannheim, is delusory and pitiable. The thinker is, willy-nilly, bound by frames of reference that are determined by his social location. Mental contents are related to social structure as branch is related to root.<sup>45</sup>

The insistence that there can be no universal standards of truth leads to a conclusion that all criteria are interest-bound, and therefore partial. Walter Benjamin's "argumenti causa" compresses this epistemological thesis into one sentence, "S-1: all empirical propositions about social life are (a) perspectively conditioned, and (b) therefore lack objectivity; but it is also the case that: S-2: S-1 is an empirical proposition about social life."<sup>46</sup>

It is one thing to say, like Mannheim, that the human function of thought is conditioned; it is another to say that hence criteria are also time-bound. This is one distinction between the "classical mind," which accepted criteria, and the "modern mind," which knows "values," that are also the creation of the human per-

sonality. Without some standard by which a correct judgment can be made -- a rule, or measure for distinguishing between true and false, perfect or imperfect -- it is difficult to make arguments or give justifications that have meaning.

The nonevaluative concept of ideology engulfs Mannheim in the ultimate ambiguity and ends in what can only be called "Mannheim's Paradox." It leads Geertz to a comparison with Zeno's paradox, for "where, if anywhere, ideology leaves off and science begins has been the Sphinx's Riddle of much of modern sociological thought and the rustless weapon of its enemies."<sup>47</sup>

Mannheim's position is that of the classic skeptic; as a consistent relativist he must renounce all standards of truth while at the same time trying to convince his listeners that his own theory has validity. Such a position is ruled absurd by the very doctrine it strives to propound. There is an inconsistency in Mannheim's thought. As T.B. Bottomore suggests, "self-contradiction is not avoided by limiting the range of the principle of sociology in such a way as to exclude propositions of natural science or mathematics, for the sociology of knowledge is neither a natural science nor a branch of mathematics."<sup>48</sup> The sociology of knowledge is a socially bound theory itself.

Mannheim's work on ideology in a sense becomes "a conceptual tool for 'explaining' all prior philosophy."<sup>49</sup> Because it is the latest and historically most fundamental

notation in the development of the concept of ideology, its impact on later social science is most illuminating.

Benjamin suggests that

it remained for later generations of scholars to particularize his doctrines and apply them to the specialized problems of each social science, often in such a way that their antecedents appeared only in shadow. The questions Mannheim posed and answered have given shape and outline to the protracted and virulent methodological debates that have divided scholars ever since.<sup>50</sup>

It is the "end of ideology" movement<sup>51</sup> which first made use of Mannheim's newly renovated concept of ideology. The similarity between the theses of the "end of ideology," ideology being replaced by the political sociology of the technocrat, and those of Mannheim is quite remarkable. It is characteristic of recent developments that the long usage of the concept of ideology has come to be employed in an effort to focus on quantitative aspects of social and political reality, and especially, "behavior." It is only in contemplating the history of the concept of ideology that we can hope to overcome the pitfalls that have plagued those who in the past tried to make use of the slippery concept. We can agree with Lichtheim that "an understanding of what is involved in the concept of ideology is thus at the same time an exercise in that historical imagination which enables us to see our predecessors as men engaged in enterprise whose outcome still concerns us."<sup>52</sup>

#### Ideology and the Modern Period: The End of Ideology

The period of the late fifties and early sixties gave rise to an entire literature grown up around the

question whether ideology had or had not come to an "end." The groundwork of Marx and Mannheim underlies the writing of all the "end-of-ideologists." They, however, go Marx one better by insisting that Marxism itself is ideology par excellence. "They not only regard ideological doctrines as wrong headed; they also object to their employment as vehicles for the formation, guidance, and control of social behavior."<sup>53</sup>

In order to speculate on the "end of ideology," there first had to be broad agreement that there was a point in history when ideological fervor was at its height. Intellectual historians are in accord that the period from the seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century in Europe could be described as the "age of ideology." It was during these centuries that Europe witnessed an extraordinary outpouring of theories about the nature of man in relation to his place in the present or future states of society. These were centuries of turmoil, when political, economic, and social revolutions carried the day. The traditional order of medieval Europe gave way to an emerging industrial society. Individuals became aware and conscious of the variety of alternative paths open to them in their own personal lives, in their religious, philosophical, and political creeds, and most significantly, in the ordering of society. It is the view of many historians that the wave of industrialization and modernization of the "age of

ideology" gave rise to an "age of pragmatism" in which political, philosophical, and religious extremism slowly ebbed to the point of extinction.

Raymond Aron first explored the possibility that the West was reaching the close of the ideological age in The Opium of the Intellectuals.<sup>54</sup> His thesis referred to two propositions. Aron suggested that the decline of ultimate values stated in ideological goals, encased in rhetoric had declined rapidly in the post-war era. Further, he suggested that there had been a modulation of intensity and emotional fanaticism with which politics were pursued. Three points were intrinsic to Aron's argument. First, he argued that total or extremist ideologies appear to be in a state of decline. He suggested affluence as the primary cause for that state of decline. Lastly, Aron found a lack of meaningful difference in political practice marked by a similarity of approach on both the Right and Left of the political spectrum.

For Aron and for the end of ideology school, the scenario was one of a world in which a tempering of ideological forms and the emergence of a seemingly large, homogenized, affluent and consumption-oriented middle class had come to exist. The ensuing consensus on the desired ends was to lead to a transformation of hitherto political problems, of ideological propensity, into administrative-technical routines. Commentators agreed that the rise of a "post-industrial" society and growth of bureaucracy and affluence made extremely likely a



social system in which class conflict and radical politics could be minimized. Domestic politics became the art of collective bargaining. Industrial society came to experience what was called by technologists the "continuous-process" revolution. Continuous-process meaning automatic production with very little human intervention. In an "age of affluence" there was to be an end to political alienation, with man and government entering a long and enduring period of "rapprochement."

In "the heartland of contemporary anti-ideology,"<sup>55</sup> the United States, a leading theorist, Daniel Bell, introduced a persuasive title in The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties.<sup>56</sup> According to Bell, we are led to believe that there exists a "rough consensus" in the West. That is, after centuries of squabbling, basic agreement had been reached on the goals that society was to attain. Debate of minor significance could now begin to focus on the means or administrative technologies necessary to achieve these goals. The administrators were taking over from the politicians. The scientific civil servants who populated the Galbraithian technostructure insisted that they alone could solve the endless stream of problems and technical difficulties presented by science and technology. Cost-benefit analysis, the heart of the analytical mode, found problem-solving better than the politics of provocation.

Bell held in effect that society in the 1960's had come to the point where what was required was not ideological politicians, but "tinkerers," who would adjust an "economic rheostat" here and a "social gauge" there to keep the mechanisms of society running easily without discord. For Bell and his colleagues in the end of ideology school, the 1950's and early 1960's were a sort of backdrop of a world which held progress, industrialization, consumption, and rationality as the basis for western civilization.

The Bell thesis can be traced back to its origins in Mannheim's "end of utopian thought" - forecasts made in the late twenties. Even further back is the contribution of Max Weber on the coming of bureaucracy. Ideology for the end-of-ideologists connotes everything negative. The pejorative element is dominant.

Many commentators took issue with the end-of-ideologists on the question of whether in fact ideology, as a search for valid ends had come to an end. They suggested "to assert an 'end of ideology' in a general sense would be to assert an end of the search for wisdom. It would mean an end to the changing goals, or to the changing of priorities among them."<sup>57</sup> Or as Henry Aiken suggests, "to my mind, therefore, the end of ideology is, in a sense, almost tantamount to the end of politics itself."<sup>58</sup>

The end of ideology thesis has been challenged as inadequate on numerous counts. It neglects the developing third world situation, not to mention international politics in general. It totally neglects political clashes, revolts, and uprisings, even in the Western World. And finally, it parades as scientific fact when it is more like a philosophy of history or ideology itself. The homage paid to "scientism" and the status quo by the end-of-ideologists portrays a vested interest in empirical and non-moral concerns.

Rolf Schulze, an empirical social psychologist, himself concludes and demonstrates quantitatively that "ideology, far from being at an end, being in decline, or in danger of disappearing, has re-emerged as the focal point of major social concern in recent years."<sup>59</sup> Giovanni Sartori as well finds the suggestion of an "end" of ideology a most hazardous prediction. In fact, "the 1946-50 period represented an increase in ideology. With respect to a pre-war base, and it seems to me that the late sixties reveal no decline, but resurgence, with respect to the late fifties."<sup>60</sup>

It is with the end of ideology debate that many of the quantitative aspects used to measure ideological commitment and intensity arrived on the scene. Positivistic sociology had attained the point where only what was demonstratable in quantitative fashion was acceptable as fact. The brute empiricist, devoid of all passions,

was the only one who could describe the world as it really is. Free from ideological Weltanschauung, only the social scientist was capable of viewing social reality and reporting it by descriptive methods supported by hard facts. Many normative political theorists, however, found this preconception a delusion and an escape from moral responsibility.

For facts are themselves the product of our viewing "reality" through our theoretical preconceptions which, in turn, are conditioned by the problems confronting us. And the theoretical precepts which determine the relevant facts of a particular view of "reality" are not themselves entirely value free. Social theories, in short, are the result of our concern with specific problems. And social problems, at bottom, are concerned with ethical goals.<sup>61</sup>

In a very real sense, the end-of-ideologists created an ideology of their own. By suggesting that social analysis is objective only in the cataloguing of pure "facts," one can see the end of ideology as "a wertlos positivism which amounts to nothing more than an unthinking apologia for whatever is."<sup>62</sup> The veneer of scientific objectivity when stripped away produced a core of very ideological assumptions whose consequences, if not at all times recognized, meant a direct importation of value preferences under a guise of scientific conclusions. "In trying to escape the Scylla of utopianism we are foundering on the Charybdis of empiricism."<sup>63</sup>

We should remember that the late 1960's witnessed societal upheaval on an unexpected level for the late twentieth century. Most significantly, the events of France in May 1968 served as a form of mass mobilization. Capitalizing on the uniqueness of the historical event, the ideology of revolt politicized French society on domestic issues at least, to a level previously thought unlikely, if not impossible, for the post-war period.

The phenomena of ideology, it can be said, determined the May affair. Aware of the increased means at man's disposal, the question of goals and ends to which these means were to be committed assumed its true importance. For much depends upon the normative purposes men create for themselves, or perceive as having been given for them. It was upon this theoretical base that the direction of action was fundamentalized and further made effective.

The events of May 1968 and the repercussions of dissent evidenced around the world bore witness to a general and thorough dissatisfaction with the meaninglessness of life. It was this meaninglessness which supplied the occasion for criticism. The criticisms took place in the very society that was the model for neo-capitalism. For the ideologues of May 1968 the greatest good was to be "engaged" against the system: this became the ideology described best in "confrontation" and "contestation."

The 1968 French revolt can be viewed as the end of

the end of ideology. One can survey the ingredients of both the French political system and the complexion of the May events to conclude that ideology is an unceasing instrument of social mobilization and theoretical conceptualization. We can conclude, with Geertz, that "we may wait as long for the 'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion."<sup>64</sup>

#### A Short History of Behavioral Political Science

The behavioral movement in American political science dates to the consumer-oriented survey projects in the years following the second world war. Behavioralism quickly developed into an important paradigm for the study of politics. In conjunction with the end of ideology argument, modern social science research sought and developed further empirical political inquiry. The phenomenon of ideology in turn occasioned the need for new concepts of ideology. The conceptualization of ideology proved interesting ground for the emerging behavioral movement, which began its ascendancy in the 1950's and took its hold on the discipline of political science in the United States by the 1960's. "Ideology," that frequently cited, yet inadequately understood concept, was to become a focus of study for some of the leading figures in the behavioral movement.

The prevailing assumption suggested that "the most important problems facing the students of ideology are empirical; that is, they do not involve the analysis of

the merits and shortcomings of particular ideologies . . . Rather they involve the relationship between political thought and behavior, and this relationship is primarily a problem of linkage."<sup>65</sup> Most recent discussions of ideology have emphasized function rather than content or truth value; the emphasis is on the behavior of individuals whose systems of ideas, beliefs, and attitudes explain the world, justify and rationalize action, limit choices, and create social solidarity.

In the absence of a conception of man as an ontological being, with a spiritual center, the problem of ideology is handled in a purely functional manner by behaviorists. The thought of an individual affects one's "behavior." This underlying view of man makes man then a socio-psychical animal.

According to Norman Birnbaum, students of ideology in the modern period have concentrated on the following areas: "(1) studies, chiefly psycho-analytic, of the psychological processes; (2) studies of the structure and effects of mass communications; (3) studies of the internal structure of ideological systems; (4) studies of class consciousness; (5) studies of the ideological biases of social sciences; and (6) studies of the intellectuals."<sup>66</sup>

Ideology in the behavioral paradigm is clearly distinguished from two similar, yet different concepts: "political culture" and "belief systems." Ideology is set apart from political culture by its internal coher-

ence and consistency, its articulation and clarity. Because of ideology's central coherence, its restraint on actual political behavior is sometimes thought to be more potent than that of political culture. By consistency is meant that a logic of sorts connects the various ideas of a particular ideology. This logic allows the scientist to predict patterns of affinity between various beliefs or attitudes in given categories of individuals. Prediction from beliefs to wider belief systems includes orientations to strategies and tactics, and to other motivational tendencies.

The ideological personality is constrained in one's behavior by the very fact that one holds, and believes with good faith, that a particular ideology is true. Characters of strong ideological conviction normally deny the existence of alternative criteria or conceptions of truth. It is this ability to fully discriminate from a given picture of the world which sets the ideologue off from the non-ideologue. According to many behavioral writers the empirical behavior of the ideologue is at complete variance from that of the non-ideologue. Therefore, ideology can be said to carry a personality dimension that political culture does not. Political culture has come to mean the collective meaning reflected in the norms supported by the institutions and historical antecedents of society at large. It is not my purpose here to fully analyze and distinguish "political culture" from "ideology" but at least this can be said:



(E)ssential to the concept of a working ideology is the formulation of generalizations about the acquisition and distribution of status in the society at the national level. It has been argued that a working ideology presupposes a political culture which enables citizens to understand the organization of political roles in the society.<sup>67</sup>

The conceptualization of ideology in behavioral political science is seen as related to the broader category of belief systems, but not as synonymous with it. The concept of belief system tries to meet the problem of linking the differences between attitude and personality.

It includes all of a person's beliefs and therefore is meant to be more inclusive than what is normally meant by ideology. Ideology refers to a more or less institutionalized set of beliefs- "the views someone picks up." Belief-disbelief systems contain these too but, in addition, they contain highly personalized pre-ideological beliefs.<sup>68</sup>

"Belief system" is often categorized as an open concept referring to political attitudes in general. Belief systems are individualized and do not show a high degree of constraint. For political behavioralists, ideology is a belief system which is bound by an inner logic, shows more than superficial consistency, and is advocated in consciousness by an individual or group of individuals. This leads one recent commentator to suggest that "by ideologies we have understood in the context primarily those politically consequential belief systems which have determinate spokesmen and leaders and a politically consequential following."<sup>69</sup>

Ideology is seen as a sub-set of belief systems. Ideologies incorporate beliefs that particularize selections from religious systems of ideas, or other particular or more general systems. It is when ideas become tightly organized and logically interrelated that they are identified as ideologies. From this rather unspecific kind of idea system an ideologist derives more specific assertions and propositions and further generalizes on concrete issues and events.

Political behavioralists believe that "most people do not achieve this degree of intellectual and behavioral integration or congruence but they do have ideas and opinions about the world around them."<sup>70</sup> Ideologies are clearly more than simple beliefs in something. They are interrelated, accumulated beliefs that provide the believers with a thorough picture of the world; while "political science has adopted the notion of belief systems, suggesting that individual attitudes and perceptions could be conceived as having latent structural qualities which might not be exactly or explicitly recognized in the values governing political life."<sup>71</sup> One could say that ideology affects behavior through specific attitudes and norms, based on values which themselves emanate from the ideology; they actually make up the ideology.

Political scientists of a behavioralist persuasion are usually in agreement that all persons have the possibility of possessing an ideology. We all have belief

systems, but only when the beliefs are acted on and recognized as being logically connected can it be said that one has an ideology. Ideology is therefore seen as a measurable phenomenon; it is a concept pregnant with possibilities for the researcher with the proper social scientific tools. Furthermore, for the political behavioralist,

from the point of view of the study of ideology, the value system of a society is its most important characteristic. In some ways the value system is the ideology. Loosely speaking political philosophy aims at an understanding of political values and norms. Political ideology is a value or belief system that is accepted as being correct.<sup>71</sup>

Ideology for the behavioralists is conceived as normative because it is highly evaluative. It is made similar to and even at times identical to political philosophy.

L. T. Sargent provides us with a list of characteristics which embody the concept of "political ideology." These are in a sense the paradigm for many behavioral writers concerned with the study of ideology: (1) They deal with questions: Who will be the rulers? How will the rulers be selected? By what principles will they govern? (2) They constitute an argument; that is, they are intended to persuade and to counter opposing views; (3) They integrally affect some of the major values of life; (4) They embrace a program for the defense or reform or abolition of important social institutions; (5) They are, in part, rationalizations of group interests-

(not necessarily the interest of all groups espousing them); (6) They are normative, ethical, moral in tone and content; and (7) They are (inevitably) torn from their context in a broader belief system and share the structural and stylistic properties of that system.<sup>72</sup>

Ideology can be said to exist on three levels. The first is the rigid and dogmatic standard of doctrine or creed. Inflexibility categorizes this level. The second level is that of attitudes, where high levels of coincidence lead to programmatic thinking. And the third level is the informal usage, wherein ideology is a disconnected, almost accidental outcome of political opinions coalescing in some randomized effect on political events, situations, and alternatives. The behavioral contribution in political science emphasizes how ideas and behavior are structured in individual and group responses to political life on these three levels. However, many political behavioralists neglect the questions of why ideas influence behavior, and rarely deal with the normative issue of which ideas ought to affect behavior.

The literature on the study of ideology contains "two apparently antithetical tendencies -- an empirical and a theoretical one. The dominant empirical one entails the analysis in fact not of ideology but of ideologies."<sup>73</sup> If Birnbaum is correct in this view, then the behavioral influx must be considered as the impetus to the empirical study of ideologies.

I suggest that by "behavioral" is meant the movement in political science growing out of two intellectual developments in the early part of the twentieth century. The first is of non-normative philosophical lineage, the second has its roots in the school of psychology customarily associated with Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner. The developments in behaviorist psychology had an impact on the emerging theories of political science. Some of the authors discussed in separate chapters, below, however, borrowed heavily from the psychoanalytic approach as well.

One of the central developments in behavioral political science is the employment of a stimulus-(organism)-response model to explain behavior. Simply put, the model holds that the behavior of any organism can be explained as a definite response to prior stimuli. Further, that by determining the total constellation of stimuli it is possible to explain and to predict future responses. Commenting on behavioral science, Bernard Berelson said, "to be considered part of the behavioral sciences, a field must satisfy two basic criteria. First, it must deal with human behavior . . . Second, it must study its subject matter in a 'scientific manner.'"<sup>74</sup>

Heinz Eulau, an important spokesman for the behavioral "persuasion," lists four major aspects of the behavioral approach: (1) Units of Analysis: the political behavior of the individual is the central and crucial empirical datum of the behavioral approach to politics; (2) Levels

of Analysis: political parameters of an institutional sort cannot alone describe or explain variability in political behavior; (3) Theory and Research: the goal is the explanation of why people behave politically as they do, and why, as a result, political processes and systems function as they do; (4) Behavioral Methods: the revolution in the behavioral sciences has been predominantly a technological revolution.<sup>75</sup>

The development of the behavioral tendencies in political science can be traced back to the first attempt to treat politics as closely related to psychology. It was Graham Wallas, in Human Nature and Politics, who sought to demonstrate the rationalist fallacy at the basis of conventional political thinking. This pioneer work in the application of psychology to politics concluded that

for the moment, therefore, nearly all students of politics analyze institutions and avoid the analysis of man. The study of human nature by the psychologists has, it is true, advanced enormously since the discovery of human evolution, but it has advanced without affecting or being affected by the study of politics.<sup>76</sup>

The history of the behavioral development has been well documented.<sup>77</sup> It can be said that the maturation of the behavioral movement had a revolutionary impact, as it was to "become technical and quantitative, segmentalized and particularized, specialized and institutionalized, 'modernized' and 'groupized' - in short, Americanized."<sup>78</sup> A behavioralist in political science is one who, for the

purposes of this study, (1) accepts the behavioral creed,<sup>79</sup> and works within it as the predominant paradigm; (2) accepts, "the scientific outlook" with its emphasis on skepticism, empiricism, and quantification; and (3) would be choice wish to describe himself as a political behaviorist, or as influenced by political behavioralism. All of those under consideration in the following chapters would fit into these categories.

Not only is behavioral political science oriented to a psychological orientation with its American roots in the contributions of John B. Watson; it also is heavily indebted to non-normative philosophy, including philosophy of science, linguistic analysis and above all, logical positivism. By "non-normative" is meant concerned with factual relationships and a strict focus on facts and values. For the logical positivists factual propositions were observable and verifiable, therefore objective. Value preferences, on the other hand, were seen as subjective preferences which cannot be verified in any objective sense. Further, it was held that no right or good can be made morally binding. Value judgments were seen as emotive expressions, feelings of individuals, and in no way to be viewed as objective, scientific statements of truth.

In the hands of the logical positivists then, ethical or normative propositions were reduced to individual preferences. As such,

they are of course phenomena of the behavioral world . . . The basis for the split between facts and values rested on the proposition that only statements which contained empirical referents had meaning. All other statements were "metaphysical," i.e., meaningless noise.<sup>80</sup>

These two intellectual currents: logical positivism and behaviorism, converged on political science with a mutually reinforcing effect. Science, based on the model of the physical sciences, became the sum total of inquiry. Discourse was unequivocally grounded in the search for empirical facts.

Hence, if political science was to deserve its name, a thorough purge was necessary. Traditional inquiry into the form and content of the "good life" was useless because the question posed was scientifically unanswerable. One man's social heaven is another's hell. Traditional categories of explanation had to be reformulated or cast aside because they were based on non-observable constructs.<sup>81</sup>

They were "ghosts," as Arthur Bentley called them.<sup>82</sup>

The goal of political science during the behavioral revolution was the building of a systematic empirical theory to take account of the phenomena called politics. The new theory brought with it new methods and new techniques of research with the utilization of more precise means of observing, classifying and measuring data.

But the major feature of the behavioral outlook is its dogmatic skepticism, or suspicion of all claims of universal truth of any formulation. For



it proceeds in terms of contingencies and probabilities, rather than in terms of certainties and verities. It represents an attitude of mind, a persuasion as I have called it, that takes nothing for granted and accepts as valid only the results of its inquiries which it would be unreasonable to assume that they can be explained solely by the operation of chance. This is a difficult standard to live by, perhaps more difficult in politics than in other fields of human action. For in politics as in physics and metaphysics, man looks for certainty, but must settle for probability.<sup>83</sup>

The possibility of a uniquely behavioral political science did not pass without criticism and debate. Sorauf suggests that "the issue of whether political science can achieve the systematic, ordered, predictive propositions we associate with a 'science' remains the most hotly debated issue within the profession itself."<sup>84</sup>

There has grown up a considerable and increasing body of criticism of behavioral analysis.<sup>85</sup> There has even been declared a "post-behavioral era."<sup>86</sup> However, no other paradigm has had such a significant impact on the discipline of political science in such a brief time. It remains, even in the alleged "post-behavioral era," the dominant persuasion or outlook. We can agree with Berelson that the behavioral sciences, particularly in political science, have "affected man's image of himself and permanently so. They are one of the major intellectual and cultural inventions of the twentieth century."<sup>87</sup> But the contemporary debate in American political science continues. Fundamentally it concerns the question of epistemology, the theory of knowledge which underlies all research in the discipline. It touches on the priorities of a political scientist and has ramifica-

tions for political action itself. The debate takes place among conservatives and radicals alike.

While conservatives generally focused their criticisms on the inability of scientific method to deal adequately with human problems - only reason, wisdom, insight and cultivation (i.e., a return to the idealist tradition) could penetrate this most difficult of domains - radicals saw in the behavioral analysis of politics an attempt to vindicate ideological positions without recognizing them as such. They went on to decry the ulterior motives lurking behind many of the methodology-laden treatises, the jargoned "scientism," the self-effacing "neutrality." "Science," they claimed, "is politics by other means."<sup>88</sup>

With the conceptualization of ideology the debate ensuing in political science in general can be made more understandable. For many debateable ingredients surface in the behavioral treatment of the phenomena of ideology. It is a microcosm of much that has happened in political science; and more, it is also a new and significant contribution to the long and tenuous history of the concept of ideology itself.

#### A Behavioral Theory of Ideology in Political Science

David Minar has suggested that there are two reasons for the popularity of ideology in the work of the social sciences. One is the history of the concept, which has already been sketched out. Its historical use, one could say, has been long and frequent enough to become habitual. "The other is that ideology constitutes a particularly effective tool for dealing with phenomena and relationships

at certain levels of political behavior that are important but difficult to reach."<sup>89</sup>

Many contributors to the behavioral theory use the historical concept of ideology as a starting point on which to build a new, and for the first time scientific, theory. Research in political behavior has as its goal the accounting of observable political categories. Independent variables can be changed while dependent variables are recorded. All other intervening variables are carefully controlled. Implied in the behavioral study of ideology is the assumption that the subject under consideration, in this case ideological behavior, has a role in the totality of political behavior. Ideology is thus seen as a factor in general political action. Ideology has for political behavioralists an observable political impact which can be demonstrated and attributed to what has been defined as "ideological."

An early contribution to the behavioral theory of ideology and one that has had significant impact on later refinements of ideology is the schema of Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in the early 1950's in their Power and Society: A Framework of Political Inquiry, in which "Ideology is the political myth functioning to preserve the social structure; the utopia, to supplant it"; (i.e., with the seizure of power utopian symbols become ideology).<sup>90</sup> Such a conception is parallel to that of Mannheim. The category of "political myths" in Lasswell and Kaplan serves as the carrier of ideology. Myths are "certain fundamental

assumptions which at the time, whether they be actually true or false, are believed by the mass of the world to be true with such confidence that they hardly appear to bear the character of assumptions."<sup>91</sup>

In the landmark Lasswell and Kaplan study, ideologies take a symbolic form and are not scrutinized for their truth content; rather, they are analyzed according to structure and function. "Uniformity of ideology — in formulation, promulgation, and acceptance is a function of other perspectives of nonsymbolic ("material") uniformities. Conversely, it is difficult to impose a uniform ideology where the conditions set up heterogeneous predispositions and practices."<sup>92</sup>

The Lasswell and Kaplan definition of ideology is based on symbolic function and does not include the characteristics of the symbols; indeed, according to this conceptualization the same symbols may at one time be utopian, at another ideological. Such is the case in a later work of Lasswell's, with Lerner, in which these authors deal with world revolutions and the elites that make ideological movements coercive.<sup>93</sup> Values are considered the cornerstone of ideology but no attempt is made to distinguish between values. In fact, ideology is in a sense determined by the given political elite. For, "from the point of view of the power holders, the ideology put forward will clearly depend on the base values of their power. . . ."<sup>94</sup> Further, echoing the end of ideology argu-

ments, Lasswell and Kaplan suggest that

(i) in a society with a stable social structure, the ideology is a matter of consensus, not opinion. . . The degree to which the ideology is a subject of disagreement and debate may be taken as an index of instability of the social structure supported by the ideology. Under conditions of stability, elaborations of the ideology is in the direction of ceremonialization and glorifications, not explanation and justification.<sup>95</sup>

The boundaries between ideology and utopia are further clouded by Lasswell and Kaplan in their contention that political symbols have either manifest or latent content. "The manifest content - the literal, direct, or obvious significance may purport to state a nonsocial fact or express a nonpower demand; but its latent content may be directly political."<sup>96</sup>

Given this criterion, Marxism can be seen as revolutionary and ideological, utopian in its expectation of classless society, and even preservationist and reactionary in the Bolshevik seizure and maintenance of totalitarian power. Lasswell and Kaplan's approach clearly does not overcome the difficulties cited earlier in Mannheim's thought. This affinity between Mannheim's view of ideology and the behavioral conception of values is an interesting connection. Recall that Mannheim's historicism lead to the crucial possibility of not being able to identify that which is utopian or ideological, even when one attempts to make the distinction. The analysis is always post facto.

Willard Mullins lists five succinct criticisms which can be levelled against the conceptualization of Lasswell and Kaplan. The first, already touched on, is its post facto analytical problems. The second is a taxonomical consideration of its limited value. Third, is the problem of classification. Fourth, "the differentia proposed. . . fail to recognize established usages or to honor distinctions which scholars normally utilize." And lastly, the approach is found weak in its reliance on an a priori definition which severely limits its empirical relevance.<sup>97</sup>

When one defines ideology in terms of a few functions, the groundwork is established for studying its empirical patterns and relationships. At the same time it is pre-ordained that what one seeks to empirically validate has been identified in the very definitions with which one carries out research. This is made even more difficult when the research is to take the form of complex statistical analysis. Conceptualizing ideological thinking does not lend itself easily to statistical technique. The behavioral study of ideology embarks on the convergence of two very difficult tasks: overcoming the traditional usage with all its snags and pitfalls, as well as meeting the requisites of scientific analysis.

One can distinguish between two approaches in the study of ideology. Historians and philosophers of social thought usually categorize ideologies according to content, truth value, and sometimes associational membership, but in a

non-quantitative fashion. On the other hand, social psychologists and political scientists, particularly those of a behavioralist bent, tend to see ideology as a social-psychological determinant. Emphasis is placed on the individual in a setting where measurement can be taken of commitment and intensity. Measurement is executed by observation, interviewing, or through questionnaires or voting studies. This conception of ideology implies that a distinction can be made between ideology and other sources of ideas, such as pragmatic considerations that reinforce a given social system.

Harry Johnson summarizes what can be referred to as the "behavioral" position in his list of five sources of ideology: (1) social strain; (2) vested interests and prospective gains; (3) bitterness about social change that has already occurred; (4) limited perspective due to social position; and, (5) the persistence of outmoded traditions of thought.<sup>98</sup> He further proposes five foci of ideology, all of which have been given attention by behavioral theorists who utilize the concept in political science: (1) causes of strain; (2) extent of strain; (3) goals of social action; (4) other social systems (with which the system of reference is compared); and, (5) the nature of the dominant value system and its implications.<sup>99</sup> These categories seem to be widely agreed on in the literature on the functions of ideology. For instance, in the ground-breaking work of Geertz two main approaches as determinants are suggested,

which fit into the general scheme of Johnson; ". . . the interest theory and the strain theory. For the first, ideology is a mask and a weapon; for the second, a symptom and a remedy."<sup>100</sup> These are not suggested to be contradictory, but complementary, realizing perhaps that the latter allows greater empirical and statistical verifiability.

The phenomenon of ideology and the concepts used to capture it, by their very nature, do not readily yield to all the demands of natural science. If measurement is the handmaiden of social science, the generally assumed path to precision, ideological analysis stands or falls with the ability of the scientist to accurately measure the phenomenon. Without quantification behavioral political science finds it difficult to make meaningful statements about political affairs.

It is clear that any empirical approach to the study of ideology must deal with the measurement problem, for no generalizations about ideology and conflict can be better than the measurement techniques on which they are based. While many useful methods exist for measuring ideology and its dispersion, all have weaknesses, and considerable improvement is both desirable and possible.<sup>101</sup>

Further, "an examination of the ways in which ideology has been measured reveals that much work remains to be done."<sup>102</sup>

Despair is not altogether warranted. Ideology may at times be vulnerable to vagueness, overgeneralization and definite problems of awkwardness in measurement. Other concepts in political science have been bound by the Gordian



knot. Some, other concepts have shown signs of progress in overcoming these difficulties. Perhaps

(i)deology as a political variable will probably be most quickly and clearly understood through self-consciousness about the ends and techniques of research and the advantages and shortcomings of alternative research tactics. The complete study of ideology is perhaps necessarily eclectic as to level and technique, as the best in the traditions of the discipline of political science has tended to be.<sup>103</sup>

For political behavioralists it is the technical analysis of ideology, as a tool for diagnosis in regulating the functioning or malfunctioning of a social system, that holds all the possibilities for empirical investigation and theoretical meaningfulness. It is, however, in the area of theoretical conceptualization that the behavioral study of ideology has been questioned most. "The thread common to the theoretical ventures is this: the concept of ideology has been severed from its philosophical bases and discussions of it no longer entail epistemological dispute."<sup>104</sup>

Some critics have argued that the enormous collection of ever growing knowledge of the sociological and political sort, made possible by utilization of modern research techniques, now standardized, has not produced an accompanying endowment of political theory. At times theory has been subordinated to or adjusted to the limits set by techniques. What has been gained in terms of exactness and precision is not always a compensation for the resultant damage to theoretical focus and philosophical conjecture.

We can agree with Frederick Watkins that

(f)or the student of political thought, the conclusions to be drawn from all this would seem at first glance to be extremely discouraging. The historical method makes it possible to view ideologies as meaningfully interrelated systems of ideas which evolve in a dynamic social context, but offers no rigorously scientific assurance that the resulting picture bears any close relationship to the realities of political behavior. The behavioral method rigorously analyzes and measures specific attitudes, but provides no means of showing how attitudes evolve and merge into effective ideologies. Faced with such an uninviting pair of alternatives, a man might well be forgiven for abandoning the whole thing as a bad job.<sup>105</sup>

We should not, I think, so easily abandon the many behavioral constructions for the concept of ideology. While political behavioralism may suffer from various shortcomings, deflating its claims to explaining political phenomena with its present theories and concepts, it has nevertheless made an interesting and valuable contribution to political science. Only by fully analyzing in descriptive fashion some of the works of leading behavioral proponents in the study of ideology can we arrive at a point where intelligent criticisms can be formulated. Such criticisms cannot review all the numerous models and conceptions of ideology that are what we have called "behavioral" in orientation. Therefore, those given attention must either be among the foremost representatives in the movement, or be seminal works that we should not ignore. This study is obviously not meant to include an exhaustive listing of all the recent works on

ideology. Neither is it a brief sampling of a few intriguing proponents. It attempts, rather, a selective analysis of some of the leading and even differing conceptualizations of ideology in behavioral political science, and of their underlying philosophical suppositions. The epistemological and ontological problems raised by the behavioral study of politics are the concern of the latter part of this effort. Commentators on politics are continually impelled to incorporate ideology in their conceptual schemas. The analyses that follow permit an in-depth look at a few important and influential contributions to behavioral political science.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter, ed. Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 47.

<sup>2</sup>One need only spend a short time paging through the literature to collect dozens of different, although not totally unrelated definitions. I have myself collected over two hundred such definitions to date. The best review of the numerous meanings can be found in Arne Naess, Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantic and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956. especially, 1-18 and 141-176.

<sup>3</sup>Everett Carl Ladd Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975, 37.

<sup>4</sup>Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict: On the Relationship Between Political Thought and Behavior," The Journal of Politics, August, 1966, 20:3, 513. A recent and thorough analysis of the psychological literature examining studies by Adorno, Rokeach, Eysenck, and Tomkins, as well as historical sources of left-right motivations in the theories of Hegel, Nietzsche, Pareto, Weber, Freud, Pavlov, and Marx is David Loye, The Leadership Passion: A Psychology of Ideology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1977.

<sup>5</sup>Arne Naess, op. cit., 141.

<sup>6</sup>See Richard H. Cox, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969, 8. He notes with some interest that in the fifteen volumes of the American Encyclopedia of Social Sciences of the 1930's no article on "ideology" appears in the entire index of some 12,000 items. Contrast this with the ever growing interest in the concept today, illustrated in the new International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968, seventeen volumes). It contains two articles on ideology, covering some twenty pages, one of the longest treatments of any topic in the entire work. The two articles cite seventeen cross references and the general index lists fifty five cross references, mostly to separate articles in which the concept is used.

<sup>7</sup>For an intriguing discussion of the roots of the Greek "idea" and "logos" see D. A. Strickland, "Defining 'Ideology' - A reformulation," Res Publica 1974, xvi:1, 161-162. I should add that I do not agree with his suggestion that ideology would be no different than metaphysics for the ancients.

<sup>8</sup>Many students of intellectual history suggest the path was broken for the Ideologues long before in the works of Francis Bacon. His observation was that words become idols and obstruct understanding. Bacon concluded that because "words beget other words" it becomes necessary to "recur to individual instances." See Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," in David E. Apter, Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 294; and Hans Barth, Wahrheit und Ideologie, Zurich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1961, 32-60.

<sup>9</sup>The best collections on Tracy and the Ideologues are to be found in Jay W. Stein, The Mind and the Sword, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1961; Jay W. Stein, "Beginnings of Ideology," South Atlantic Quarterly, April 1956, 55: 163-170; George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology, Toronto, Vintage Books, 1967, 4-22; H. M. Drucker, The Political Uses of Ideology, London: MacMillan, 1974; and Richard H. Cox, "The Original Concept of Ideology," in his (ed.) Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishers, 1969, 10-27.

<sup>10</sup>See Jay W. Stein, "The Beginnings of Ideology," South Atlantic Quarterly, April 1956, 55:166. "Tracy and his colleagues had the same unshakable confidence in the infallibility of their system as Lenin, Stalin, and their fellow Bolsheviks had in theirs. The spread of their philosophy, they felt, would usher in a completely new age."

<sup>11</sup>Jay W. Stein, The Mind and the Sword, New York: Twayne Publishers, 1961, 180.

<sup>12</sup>Quoted in Joseph S. Roucek, "Nature and Function of Ideologies," in Joseph S. Roucek and George B. De Huszar, (eds.), Introduction to Political Science, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954, 423.

<sup>13</sup>Clifford Geertz, op. cit., 47.

<sup>14</sup>Ben Halpern, "'Myth' and 'Ideology' in Modern Usage," in George H. Nadel, (ed.), History and Theory, vol. 1, The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1961, 131.

15 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Toronto: Progress Books, 1947, 91.

16 George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology, Toronto: Vintage Books, 1969, 16.

17 John Plamenatz, Ideology, London: Pall Mall, 1970, 15.

18 Marx and Engels, op. cit., 18-19.

19 Reo Christenson, Alan Engel, Dan Jacobs, Refai Mostafa, and Herbert Waltzer, Ideologies and Modern Politics, London: Nelson, 1971, 4.

20 Ibid. However, according to V. I. Lenin there are only two kinds of ideology: socialist and bourgeois. See Leonard Shapiro, Totalitarianism, London, Pall Mall, 1972, 47.

21 Plamenatz, op. cit., 11.

22 Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism, London: Pall Mall, 1972, 46.

23 Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, June, 1972, 66:2, 500.

24 Marx and Engels, op. cit., 14.

25 For a more thorough account of Marx and ideology, see the following: R. N. Berki, "The Marxian Concept of Bourgeois Ideology: Some Aspects and Perspectives," in Bhikhu Parekj, R. Benewick, R. B. Berki (eds.), Knowledge and Belief in Politics, London: George Allen, 1973; Maria Hiraszowicz, "Ideologies and Traditions," International Social Science Journal, 1966, 18:1, 11-40; John Lewis, Marxism and the Open Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957; Charles Mudge, Society in the Mind, London: Faber and Faber, 1964, esp. 60-71; and Rudolph Schlesinger, Marx: His Time and Ours, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950.

26 Geertz, op. cit., 49. Geertz compares the present situation regarding the study of ideology with the position of the Javanese folktale figure, "Stupid Boy, who, having been counseled by his mother to seek a quiet wife, returned with a corpse."

<sup>27</sup> Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. from the German by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936. The import role of Max Scheler must not be discounted as he had a direct influence on Mannheim. See, Manfred S. Frings, (ed.) Max Scheler: Centennial Essays. The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1974, 165-174 for a bibliography of the primary and secondary literature on Scheler. For a good discussion on Scheler see, Gerald DeGré. Society and Ideology. New York: The Hamilton Press, 1943, 10-22. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The Social Construction of Reality. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966, 2-17 has an excellent overview and discussion of three intellectual heritages that can be found in Scheler's and later Mannheim's thought (i.e., Marx, Nietzsche, and Dilthey).

<sup>28</sup> Geertz, op. cit., 51.

<sup>29</sup> Mannheim, op. cit., 14.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>32</sup> Robert Merton, "Sociology of Knowledge," in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Twentieth Century Sociology. Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1945, 372. For the best discussion on the sociology of knowledge, see Norman Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ideology," Current Sociology, 1960, 9:2, 91-117, (an excellent classified and annotated bibliography 1940-60); see also Arthur Child, "The Theoretical Possibility of the Sociology of Knowledge," Ethics, 51:41, 392-418; Leon Dion, "Political Ideology as a Tool of Functional Analysis in Socio-Political Dynamics on Hypothesis," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February, 1959, 25:1, 42-59; David Kettler, "Political Theory, Ideology, Sociology: The Question of Karl Mannheim," Cultural Hermeneutics, May 1975, 3:1, 69-80; David Kettler, "Sociology of Knowledge and Moral Philosophy: The Place of Traditional Problems in the Formation of Mannheim's Thought," Political Science Quarterly, September, 1969, 3:1, 399-426; Jacques J. Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledge, Boston: Beacon Press, 1951; and Werner Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

<sup>33</sup> Robert K. Merton, The Sociology of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 12.

<sup>34</sup>Gunter W. Remmling, (ed.), Towards the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, 202.

<sup>35</sup>For a valuable historical discussion of the roots of the sociology of knowledge see Kurt H. Wolff, "Ernst Grunwald and the Sociology of Knowledge: A Collective Venture in Interpretation," Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences, April, 1965, 1:22, 152-165. It is important to take note of the German term "Wissenssoziologie," "The German word usually translated into English as the sociology of knowledge. The ambiguity in the translation resides in the much wider use the term "Wissen" has vis-a-vis the term "knowledge," Whereas the word "knowledge" is usually reserved for exact, scientific information, "Wissen" may have as its referential base such cultural phenomena as philosophic, religious, and aesthetic information. An additional ambiguity involved is that the German term carries with it not only greater scope but an indication of a higher truth value, i.e., metaphysical certainty. The English word knowledge is more carefully delineated to exclude non-verifiable information. Thus, while propaganda analysis, studies in mass culture, measurements in personal influence, etc. would all be included as part of Wissenssoziologie, they tend to form independent branches of study in non-German speaking areas. Clearly these verbal distinctions have had extraverbal repercussions in the formation of a sociology of knowledge; all of which points to the increasing need for a common, unified language of the social sciences." in Horowitz, Irving Louis, Philosophy, Science, and the Sociology of Knowledge. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1961, 140.

<sup>36</sup>Walter Benjamin, "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problem of Objectivity," in Llewellyn Gross, (ed.) Sociological Theory: Inquiries and Paradigms, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967, 339.

<sup>37</sup>Mannheim, op. cit., 40.

<sup>38</sup>Adrian Cunningham, "Reflections on Projections: The Range of Ideology," in B. Parekh, R. Benewick, and R. Berki, (eds.) Knowledge and Belief in Politics, London: George Allen, 1973, 41; see 43-52 for a discussion of the impact of Herder on the sociology of knowledge.

<sup>39</sup>Mannheim, op. cit., 55-6.

<sup>40</sup>Quoted in I. L. Horowitz, op. cit., 81.



<sup>41</sup>Remmling, op. cit., 5.

<sup>42</sup>The most important early contribution to this theory is the work of Znaniecki; particularly, Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge, New York: Columbia University Press, 1940; of interest is the breakdown and secularization of (religious) schools and scholars into seven categories: (1) discoverer of truth; (2) systematizer; (3) contributor; (4) fighter for truth; (5) eclectic and historian of knowledge; (6) disseminator of knowledge, (1) popularizer and (b) educating teachers; and (7) explorer of new knowledge.

<sup>43</sup>T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology of Knowledge," British Journal of Sociology, 1956, 7:1, 57.

<sup>44</sup>Richard H. Cox, op. cit., 79-80.

<sup>45</sup>Quoted in Benjamin, op. cit., 344.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 398-9.

<sup>47</sup>Geertz, op. cit., 48; for the comparison with Zeno, see Reinhard Bendix, "The Age of Ideology: Persistent and Changing," in David E. Apter, Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 294-329; "The paradox of the liar, as the ancient philosopher Zeno formulated it, is an integral part of theories about society. All social theorists are bound to begin with postulates on how they propose to investigate society dispassionately. For, in the 'Age of Ideology' their efforts must be to seek truth through the quest for objectivity, not to praise God through discovery of His wisdom. The paradox was first formulated by the Greek philosopher Zeno in the statement: 'A Cretan says all Cretans are liars.' Since the person making the statement is himself a member of the group of whom a lack of veracity is asserted, an infinite chain of mutually contradictory assertions follows. For our purposes the analogous statement would be: 'Social scientists say that every man's knowledge of society is the product of that society,' although this application lacks the simplicity of the classical world." 322.

<sup>48</sup>Bottomore, op. cit., 55.

<sup>49</sup>Cox, op. cit., 87.

<sup>50</sup>Benjamin, op. cit., 352.

<sup>51</sup>I have elsewhere dealt in some detail with the "end of ideology" argument, especially as it relates to the student revolt of France in May 1968. See Theodore R. Malloch, "The 1968 French Revolt: The End of the End of Ideology Myth," unpublished M. Litt. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1975.

<sup>52</sup>Lichtheim, op. cit., 46.

<sup>53</sup>Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology," Commentary, April, 1967, 37:4, 32.

<sup>54</sup>Raymond Aron, The Opium of the Intellectuals, London: Secker and Warburg, 1957. For an excellent review and criticism of Aron see Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology," Commentary, April, 1967, 37:1, 29-69.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 34.

<sup>56</sup>Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, New York: The Free Press, 1965. The best collections of literature on the end of ideology debate can be found in: Mostafa Rejai, Decline in Ideology? Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971; and Chaim I Waxman, (ed.) The End of Ideology Debate, New York: Funk and Wagnells, 1968; for an interesting attack, counter-attack, see Daniel Bell and Henry David Aiken, "Ideology - A Debate," Commentary, October, 1964, 38:4, 69-76.

<sup>57</sup>Karl W. Deutsch, "On Political Theory and Political Action," American Political Science Review, March, 1971, 65:1, 13.

<sup>58</sup>Aiden, op. cit., 76.

<sup>59</sup>Rolf Schulze, "Some Social-Psychological and Political Functions of Ideology," in Gunter Remmling, (ed.), Towards the Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, 118.

<sup>60</sup>Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems," American Political Science Review, June, 1969, 63:1, 406. The analysis presented here is particularly persuasive; follow the figures 1-10 to understand the many implications that need to be supplied for a real "end of ideology hypothesis."

61 Stephen W. Rousseas and James Farganis, "American Politics and the End of Ideology," The British Journal of Sociology, December, 1963, 14:1, 351.

62 Ibid., 352.

63 Ibid., 354.

64 Geertz, op. cit., 51.

65 Barnes, op. cit., 513.

66 Norman Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ideology," Current Sociology, 1960, 9:2, 99.

67 Douglas Ashford, Ideology and Participation, London: Sage Publishers, 1972, 241.

68 Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960, 35; apart from contributing a theory for the measurement of belief systems, Rokeach includes good material on authoritarianism and the dynamics of belief systems; of special interest is the selection on dogmatization of catholicism, 376ff.

69 Alan P. Grimes and Robert H. Horwitz, Modern Political Ideologies, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. xiii-iv.

70 Robert E. Dowse and John A. Hughs, Political Sociology, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1972, 245.

71 Ashford, op. cit., 13.

72 L. T. Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies, Homewood, Ill.,: The Dorsey Press, 1972, p. 9.

73 Ibid., 1969 ed., 1.

74 Birnbaum, op. cit., 116.

75 Bernard Berelson, (ed.), The Behavioral Sciences Today, New York: Basic Books, 1963, 2-3. For the best general overview and review of the psychological literature in political science see James Chowning Davies, "From Where and Where to?" in Janne N. Knutson, (ed.), Handbook of Political Psychology, San Francisco: Jossey-Boss, Publishers, 1973, 1-27. For an

important article on what "behavioralism" is, see David Easton, "The Current Meaning of Behaviorism," in James C. Charlesworth, (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, New York: The Free Press, 1967, 11-31. I am not in total agreement with this analysis but find the emphasis on the "more intelligible" behavioristic paradigm of S-O-R (stimulus-organism-response) correct. His summary on 30-31 is helpful.

<sup>76</sup> Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1908, 14.

<sup>77</sup> One of the best treatments of the history of political behaviorism remains, Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The Development of Political Science From Burgess to Behaviorism, Boston: Allyn and Beacon, Inc., 1967; see also Heinz Eulau, Behavioralism in Political Science, New York: Atherton Press, 1969, which contains important articles on the tendencies of behavioral American political science. Robert A. Dahl and Deane E. Neubauer, (eds.) Readings in Modern Political Analysis, Engelwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, is the classic textbook of readings for the behaviorally inclined student, Austin Ranney, Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962, is also an important collection of essays.

<sup>78</sup> Berelson, op. cit., 8.

<sup>79</sup> See David Easton, "The Behavioral Creed," in Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, (eds.) The Development of Political Science From Burgess to Behaviorism, Boston: Allyn and Beacon, Inc., 1967, 176-180. This collection is a very thorough treatment of the history of behavioral political science from its early days into the present period.

<sup>80</sup> Don R. Bowen, Political Behavior of the American Public, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing, Co., 1968, 6.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908, 202. Bentley's "spooks" include anything that is not reducible to empirical factors; values, morals, conviction, faith are all relegated to the "other world" of quasi-phenomena.

<sup>83</sup> Eulau, op. cit., 35.

<sup>84</sup>Francis J. Sorauf, Political Science: An Informal Overview, Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1965, 9.

<sup>85</sup>I will not duplicate the very lengthy and satisfactory footnote given in, Henry S. Kariel, Open Systems, Ithaca, 10-11, Peacock Publishing, Inc., 1969, 10-91, which takes note of the extensive bibliography available in criticism of behavioralism.

<sup>86</sup>See George J. Graham Jr. and George W. Carey, The Post-Behavioral Era, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., to pickup on Easton's coining of the term "post-behavioral" in his APSA presidential address, in which he discussed the shifting thought in the discipline.

<sup>87</sup>Berelson, op. cit., 11.

<sup>88</sup>Bernard Sussér, "The Behavioral Ideology: A Review and a Retrospect," Political Studies, September, 1974, 22:3, 271.

<sup>89</sup>David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, November, 1961, 5:4, 317.

<sup>90</sup>Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 123.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 117.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., 124.

<sup>93</sup>Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds. World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements, Cambridge, Mass.; M.I.T. Press, 1965; this early study of political elites deals in detail with: the polit-buro, nazi elites, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communists. For a bibliography of all of Lasswell's work see: Arnold Rogow, (ed.) Politics, Personality, and Social Science in the Twentieth Century, New York: MacMillan, 1973, 407-444.

<sup>94</sup>Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., 124.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid., 123.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., 104.

<sup>97</sup>Mullins, op. cit., 301-302.

<sup>98</sup>Harry Johnson, "Ideology and the Social System," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 7, New York: MacMillan Company, 1968, 79; see also the contribution of Edward Shils, "Ideology" and "Ideology and Civility," The Intellectuals and Power and Other Essays, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, which is closely related to the Johnson argument.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., 81.

<sup>100</sup>Geertz, op. cit., 52.

<sup>101</sup>Barnes, op. cit., 520.

<sup>102</sup>Barnes, op. cit., 516. Various methods are discussed; for example the work of Campbell, open-ended questions, Lane's depth interviews, attitude structures, content extraction, panel survey, and battery questions.

<sup>103</sup>Minar, op. cit., 331.

<sup>104</sup>Birnbaum, op. cit., 116.

<sup>105</sup>Frederick M. Watkins, "Political Theory as a Datum of Political Science," in Roland Young, (ed.) Approaches to the Study of Politics, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1958, 153.

CHAPTER II

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF:

FRANCIS X. SUTTON

Francis X. Sutton, a political sociologist, is an important early author in the behavioral study of ideology. Some of his contribution is in the field of political science, while other parts are in sociology. Sutton's most notable work, The American Business Creed, published in 1956, was co-authored with three economists. Although it is a joint work according to Sutton, the theoretical framework of this analysis is his own.

The three economists among us therefore went to school to the one sociologist, Francis Sutton, in the course of the work. His contribution is fundamental. . . . This framework was worked out in an earlier study by Sutton, "The Radical Marxist" unpublished doctoral dissertation. The order of listing of authors' names is used to indicate the relative place of his efforts; the rest of us appear alphabetically.<sup>1</sup>

The study is basically a sociological analysis that considers political factors. Even if we take into consideration the collaboration of all four authors, Sutton remains the designer and theorist in the conceptualization of ideology used throughout the work. It is therefore proper to attribute to him an early influential behavioral conception of ideology.

Definition

Realizing the long and troubled use of the term "ideology," Sutton wishes first to limit the concept, realizing the fact that others have used the term differently. Sutton is primarily interested in monitoring public statements to discern ideologies. He dislikes the definition of ideology which "In particular, has been used to refer to underlying 'private beliefs,' and sometimes to the ideas believed to be implicit in the actions of particular persons or groups. In terms of our own analysis, neither of these concepts of ideology appears satisfactory."<sup>2</sup> This is not meant to deprecate the probability that there may exist a high consonance between public utterance and private belief. Sutton is thankful for evidence of a strong consistency, especially on ideological matters, because it gives, "that rather slippery concept, what appears to be a useful interpretation for operational purposes."<sup>3</sup>

Ideology is thus not only private beliefs, but public statements of explicit thought. In the study of the American business community, careful attention was paid to advertisements, slogans, and speeches which show the underlying attitudes, opinions, and values of business firms. Ideology is defined around what businessmen say or write in public. Sutton insists that such a definition of ideology is not derogatory, as is often the case in polemical argumentation. "For us the term is neutral and describes any system of beliefs publicly expressed with the manifest



purpose of influencing the sentiments and actions of others. In this sense, ideology is an essential element of all social life."<sup>4</sup>

Ideology, Sutton suggests, is something that all human beings possess. These ideologies may be true or false, Sutton is not ready to inject his own personal values to color that decision. According to Sutton, personal value, or overarching belief systems of good and bad hide behind every ideology. Further, ideologies can be on the Left or Right. They proliferate in fact under democracy. Ideology is not a matter of disgust and alienation, rather, "One has no more cause to feel dismayed or aggrieved by having his own views described as 'ideology' than had Moliere's famous character by the discovery that all his life he had been talking prose."<sup>5</sup>

At no place in his rather lengthy study does Sutton set down in so many words a single definition of ideology. Characteristics are elaborated, a theoretical conceptualization is executed and a systematic examination of a particular American business ideology is carried out. However, a single brief definition of ideology is nowhere suggested. There is, however, in a section on "the strains of ideology," a statement where "loose usage" is advocated:

Ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role . . . Explicit thought about action is typically a response to conflict. Where a role involves patterns of conflicting demands, the occupants of that role may respond by elaborating a system of ideas and symbols, which in part may serve as a guide to action, but chiefly has broader and more direct

functions as a response to strain.<sup>6</sup>

The fundamental relation is that between strains and ideology. Ideology is not offered as the only individual response to strain. Rather, the term refers to a general mode of symbolization formed by collective responses. Ideology is seen as a symbolic outlet of emotion created by stress and strain, which can be attributed to a patterning of behavior. This definition relates ideology to deep-seated motivations, and to personality study.

Sutton's definition of ideology calls for definitional neutrality and delimits all value orientations. It uses a psychological theory to provide dynamic key terms. Although a negative definition is avoided, a subtle stress on the strain of mistake, incorrectness, and rationalization or insincerity creeps into the definition and provides some negative sentiment. Behind the definition is the assumption that strain is bad; although, at times it may be inevitable, if not essential, for emotional behavior.

### Context

Sutton's contribution to a concept of ideology is in the realm of social theory as it relates to the comparison of political systems and to the study of American business ideology. For Sutton, ideology is important because it is "commensurate with its prevalence: in a complex, literate, open, and democratic society ideological statement and argument are the core of the processes of public life, and

in our society, the business creed forms one of the major contributions to the total flow of public discussion."<sup>7</sup>

The aim of the Sutton, et al. study is to answer questions concerning the business ideology current in America during the late nineteen forties and early nineteen fifties; it is a search for the motivational sources underlying "why" and "what" that ideology says. The two main themes are the contrast between the business creed and economic science, and the production and consumption of the creed. Theories of explanation are offered to make the themes, symbols, and arguments of business ideology understandable. Content analysis of form and substance are the tasks involved.

By defining the characteristics and general role of ideologies in social life, Sutton seeks to make the generalizations applicable to investigations of particular strains inherent in the business world. Business ideology is thus shown as a verbal and symbolic resolution of specific conflicts. Also covered are the shaping environmental forces of cultural inheritance and the institutional setting -- some of the givens of society. "This is a book, then, about what American businessmen and their spokesmen say or write in public in the hope of influencing the actions and attitudes of other businessmen and of the rest of the community. Our interest is in the question: Why do businessmen and their spokesmen say and write the things they do?"<sup>8</sup>

Sutton's work is broken into two parts; the first of which expounds the content of the American business creed. Chapters are devoted to the economic system, free enterprise, managerial views, competition, ethics, and the American businessman's picture of government. The second part is an analysis of the roots of the business ideology, drawing from the discussion in the first sections. Three modes are covered: cultural heritage, institutional frameworks, and motivational analysis. It is the last of these, the study of the motivations of businessmen who are the producers and consumers of their ideology, that Sutton finally settles on as central to his overall theory.

The thesis of the business creed is explained in terms of strains to which people in the business world are subject:

Businessmen adhere to their particular kind of ideology because of the emotional conflicts, the anxieties, and the doubts engendered by the actions which their roles as businessmen compel them to take, and by the conflicting demands of other social roles which they must play in family and community. Within the resources of the cultural tradition and within the limits of what is publicly acceptable, the content of the ideology is shaped so as to resolve these conflicts, alleviate these anxieties, overcome these doubts.<sup>9</sup>

Ideology is a functional, psychological-ability mechanism which allows an individual to meet the demands of his employment situation and further to adapt to the whole of

society and its complex pressures.

### Theoretical Conceptualization

Ideology is conceived as having functional significance without truth content for Sutton. All ideologies, regardless of content or proponents have certain common characteristics.

They are selective in subject matter and in use of empirical evidence and logical argument. They are simple and clear-cut even when their subject matter is complicated. They are expressed in language that engages the emotions, as well as the understanding, of their readers and listeners. At the same time, their content is limited to what is publicly acceptable.<sup>10</sup>

Four things, then, enter the conceptualization. Ideologies are selective in the subjects they discuss, in citing empirical evidence, and in the use of logical argumentation. Ideologies usually draw incomplete pictures of reality. This tendency towards oversimplification is categorized by the contrasting of black and white. Ideologies tend to be simple and clear-cut, although exaggerated; they are never too complicated. In language, ideologies are expressive and emotion-laden. The use of symbols is more than a way of conveying a message, it is action promoting. "Ideology is oriented to influence action and sentiment. To influence action, it is necessary to do more than merely inform. It is necessary to engage the likes and dislikes, and the moral feelings, of the audience."<sup>11</sup> Finally, the make-up of ideology

implies control by its audience. Public acceptability sets the limits within which ideology can be expressed. The constraints which are imposed insist on plausibility and legitimacy in terms of current standards.

A great deal of Sutton's theoretical conceptualization is negative in orientation. Much effort is put into creating a distance between ideology and other sorts of activity, especially scientific enterprise. He tries also to reject the interest theory of ideology. "We have rejected the 'interest' theory, that ideologies simply reflect the economic self-interest, narrowly conceived, of their adherents."<sup>12</sup> Although an interest-based theory of ideology has some elements of truth, Sutton is unwilling to accept a Marxist position. In fact, "Were this the model for all ideology, there would indeed be little problem of explanation and little need for our book. Actually, the relationship between specific ideologies and economic interest is seldom so clear."<sup>13</sup> For Sutton, interest theories show little ingenuity and widen the boundaries to include attributes which are other than the economic. Psychological satisfaction should be kept clear of interest because, "these expedients are really the end of the theory they are designed to salvage. They reduce it to a tautology: 'Men act in their own interests' becomes 'Men act as they are motivated to act.'"<sup>14</sup>

If for Sutton ideologies are values which hang to-

gether in some coherent fashion in order to overcome psychological strain and to give meaning, they also exhibit some inconsistencies and contradictions. It is the nature of ideologies -- part of their function as value-symbols -- that they suffer from logical inconsistency.

If they were qualified to the point where they could be applied literally, they would lose their evocative force. An old dilemma of ethical theories is that they must either impose a dogmatic rigidity on human efforts to deal with the complexities of the world, or lose their force in a misty indefiniteness. . . .<sup>15</sup>

Sutton compares ideologies to the great ethical traditions where dependence is on the "mystical." He suggests that because both ideology and philosophy are simple and direct, they are also fundamentally inconsistent. Ideologies are found to be pronouncements of directives toward action. For Sutton, however, anything that is not vague has difficulty taking account of the dilemmas of complexity. "In short, unqualified prescriptions for human behavior must either be vague in their applicability or be manifestly unsound."<sup>16</sup>

Ideologies for Sutton have a historical dimension that cannot be denied. The cultural heritage of a specific ideology can be distinguished in three elements: general character, descriptive ideas, and its set of values. All of these derive from a general heritage and

traditions peculiar to the setting. "Whether an ideology is devoted to conservative rationalization of the existing society or stoutly demands a revolution, it is always grounded in the culture of the society in which it appears."<sup>17</sup>

Ideologies are both stimulated and produced for wide dissemination by the institutions indigenous to the setting. Organized groups facilitate ideology and communicate it through interaction, one with another. Publication is especially important in generating ideology and providing an outlet and important means for its distribution and conveyance. Government, mass media, political parties, and trade unions all play important parts in the formulation and propagation of ideologies and counter-ideologies. The arrangements shape the content of various ideologies through: selection of topics, language used in treatment, and the use of extended argument and symbols for impact.

The Sutton conceptualization of ideology is psychological in its focus on the motivational bases of ideology. The general framework assumes that the greater part of human action is unreflective and therefore somewhat irrational. "Far from being the reflection of consistent and regularly applied systems of ideas, ordinary human action appears inevitably to proceed with the 'carelessness and inattention' which Hume advocated as the only remedy for man's estate."<sup>18</sup> Proof of such phenomena, for



Sutton, is found in the field of psychopathology, the roots of which are in the very nature of any society's socialization processes. "In the nature of human socialization, the great mass of possible questions for discussion are, as it were, resolved in advance, and the solutions are internalized to become working parts of personality."<sup>19</sup>

Sutton suggests that the individuals who constitute societies are often plagued by difficulties and disturbances. Their ability to cope becomes a functional problem. Imperfections, as "strains," must be resolved and made bearable. "Like societies, personalities are systems but systems with persisting imperfections which add to the burden of strains experienced at any given time."<sup>20</sup> Strains are normal, but in conformity with the given traditions can be overcome. In societies, bodies of explicit ideas exist for use against demands of undue strain. This strain occurs in patterns; therefore, reactions to strain are not randomized. Linkage is evident between a particular strain and its concomitant reaction. However, "Emotional energy generated in one context can become displaced and symbolically linked to other activities, functions, or contexts. Because of this mobility, the linkage of strains and reactions is bound to be loose,"<sup>21</sup>

Ideology is the reaction to strains of a social role, Sutton continues. Ideology has a definite pattern, it is

suggested in the symbol systems and guiding principles of a given cultural tradition. Roles can be played by various individual personalities, and quantitative reactions to strain-producing situations vary, as is to be anticipated. However, basic conflicts can be expected to have strong qualitative uniformity, with ideological reactions similar in tone and content.

For Sutton, ideologies are systems of ideas that select from reality particular systematic ways to cope with the affective needs that strains produce. As such they tend to be very imperfect and incomplete. Sutton agrees that we should, "recognize the discrepancy between ideology and actual social structure, but consider it to be an intrinsic source of strain, leading to ideological rationalization or attempts to adjust the social structure to the ideological model."<sup>22</sup>

Ideologies can be supremely paradoxical. They assume that great intricacies can be recognized by the simplest of minds. Oversimplification of abstract systems of ideas are commonly made discussable by use of symbols, as with the contrasting of global systems. "Systems" as grand alternatives are discussed not merely because they promote logical and precise thought but because they serve a special purpose as symbols. By the use of such symbols we can dissociate ourselves, our institutions, or our society from actions or features we dislike."<sup>23</sup>

Sutton depends on psychological research to give

clarity to his conceptualization of ideology. His theory of ideology is based on the study of individuals as discussed in various fields of psychology -- especially perception formation, behavioral response, and studies of pathological traits. In essence, "The normal functioning of personalities and social systems would thus seem to preclude constant reference to clearly defined, consistent systems. Conversely, if such constant reference occurs, it is the result of strains within the social system."<sup>24</sup> Sutton's theory of ideology suggests deep-seated motivations are expressive, yet constrained by the boundaries of legitimation; although, essentially they represent the "real beliefs" of their adherents.

Usage.

Sutton's analysis of the phenomena of ideology defined by his concept is based upon an extensive survey of literature from the major organizations comprising the business community. The survey included: (a) advertisements of business firms and of associations of business firms in periodicals of general circulation and of business circulation, (b) articles, speeches, public letters, and books by business authors, (c) articles and editorials in business periodicals or in the business and financial sections of other publications, (d) pamphlets, leaflets, and books distributed by business firms, associations of business firms or organizations supported by businessmen and devoted to the propagation of the business point of

view, (e) statements of businessmen or their representatives before Congressional hearings.<sup>25</sup>

The content analysis is not, however, based on a statistical sample. Formal sampling concepts were not applied. However,

(t)he material that we have examined discloses such homogeneity in its major themes that we have no fears that our report suffers from an unrepresentative selection of sources. The same themes, arguments, facts, and symbols recur again and again. We are confident that the reader who cares to survey the literature will find that the chapters which follow report faithfully the substance of the creed.<sup>26</sup>

Consistency is thus expected to vary due to the small number of total sources and the unrepresentative nature of the approach. Ideology is used as a concept with possibilities as an analytical tool throughout the work of Sutton et al. Ideology is continually related to the motivational clues that have already been mentioned. "In this book, however, we will make the business ideology a test case of our theory."<sup>27</sup> Ideology as used by Sutton makes individual responses conform to regularities of the same pattern, habits, and principles; that regularity is the business creed.

Sutton's use of the concept of ideology takes as its starting point the theoretical discussion of ideologies and social science associated with Karl Mannheim. Interestingly, many recent contributions to the concept of ideology make use of the contribution of Mannheim as a

basis for initiating systematic discussion. Sutton wants, however, to make it clear from the outset that there are a number of items at which he would want to point out his variance with Mannheim's "interest-bound" theories. For example

Mannheim's famous analysis of ideology is then on the motivational side. While Mannheim was very critical of the Marxian theory of ideology he essentially took over its motivational analysis (or lack thereof). "Vulgar" Marxism has shown a persisting tendency to interpret ideology as rational action in terms of "interests," but the more sophisticated tradition is at once more subtle and more vague. The famous view that ideas are determined by class position does not in itself supply an analysis of the psychological mechanisms whereby ideas are acquired and believed. By its assumption that "class position" could be defined in terms of "objective conditions," the Marxist theory can be regarded in some sense as an "interest" theory of ideology but it is not, strictly speaking, a theory which assumes rational orientation in terms of perceived interests. The Wissenssoziologie which has flourished in Germany in the twentieth century has been strongly influenced by the Marxist tradition (and in part sprung from common roots) and it has largely shared this weakness of motivational analysis. The basic viewpoint of this tradition, namely that the motivation of ideological belief must be sought in reference to social status, is now certainly axiomatic but it needs to be integrated with the advances in sociology and psychology which permit a more substantive and explicit analysis of motivation.<sup>28</sup>

In order to escape the equation of interests with objective economic advantage, Sutton draws on the distinction between actor and other(s) made by Talcott Parsons. The work of Parsons serves as a backdrop which

allows Sutton to draw on it for substantiation. For,

(A)s a general principle, it may be assumed that any social action (including the verbal expression of a belief) is subject to two determining influences: (1) the subjective orientations of the persons initiating the action, and (2) external situational conditions, including the expectations of those persons to whom the action is oriented.<sup>29</sup>

The place of ideologies in social systems described in Parsons, The Social System, and the psychological contributions of T. W. Adorno, et al. in The Authoritarian Personality, serve as the two important sources in Sutton's conceptual framework. The "motive" theory used in Sutton's analysis is drawn directly from the Parsons essay on "profit motive," in which "motive" is made understandable as the natural equipment of individuals.<sup>30</sup>

As a political sociologist, Sutton also pays tribute to Max Weber. He accepts the value-free Weberian tradition and quotes Weber at length to substantiate his own comments. When economic theory is employed, Joseph H. Schumpeter is frequently cited.<sup>31</sup> Psychological material is often consulted to support an argument. References to Paul F. Schilder and his studies of psychopathology, Sigmund Freud, and many works on irrationalism, motivation, and belief systems are scattered throughout Sutton's text. The only political scientists cited in Sutton's work are V. O. Key and R. M. Williams, and then only sketchily, since they are not central to the main theme of the study.

Although essentially free of formal statistical technique, Sutton on an odd occasion uses polls to add to points he has already made. The work of Ithiel De Sola Pool and Hadley Cantril are cases where polls are used to document businessmen's opinions.<sup>32</sup>

In a telltale article, Sutton claims: "The diffusion of Durkheim's ideas, principally through Radcliffe-Brown and Parsons, has created a kind of flying wedge to propel me through difficulties."<sup>33</sup> Sutton, as are most other behavioralists, is indebted to various sources from the long history of the sociological and psychological orientation to politics. There is not much evidence of a familiarity with traditional political thought in his study of ideology.

### Science

For Sutton science is value-free. The purpose of taking on the study of the business creed is to analyze. "We wish to explain the business creed as a social phenomenon, not to evaluate it in terms of 'right' and 'wrong.'"<sup>34</sup> Noting that all social science carries with it the particular nuances of its authors, "to the extent that we do so, (Sutton, et al.) our account of the creed is 'critical;' yet, we wish to emphasize that the criticism appears in service of our analysis, not as an end in itself."<sup>35</sup> The viewpoint of the study is thus the neutral scientific aim of scholarly description. "We have tried to avoid

the presentation of evaluative arguments from the standpoint of one or another anti- or pro-business ideology. Our success in this is, of course, for others to judge."<sup>36</sup>

Ideology, in fact, is to Sutton directly the opposite of science. Whereas science is objective, ideology is subjective. Ideology and science are both public activities; the one has as its end the influence of social action, while the other seeks only the furtherance of understanding. "This distinction between science and ideology is fundamental to the approach of this book."<sup>37</sup> Ideology and science can be compared in the areas of selectivity, over-simplicity, language, and public acceptability.

Both science and ideology are selective. But whereas science is logical and complete, ideology is non-logical and necessarily incomplete. The objectives of science and ideology are also at complete variance with each other.

The institutionally defined objective of science is to seek understanding. If a question is complicated, if there is much conflicting evidence, if there are logical arguments leading in diverse directions, the discipline of the scientist demands that he recognize these facts. The ideologist seeks to influence action and attitude. His objective leads him to overlook complications of logic and of evidence which would dilute his argument and weaken his influence. His selectivity is not necessarily deliberate deception, although at times it may be. More often the possibilities he overlooks simply never occur to him.<sup>38</sup>

For Sutton it is science, especially social science, that explains reality through abstraction, clas-



sification, and contextualization. Social science serves as a directional guide to overcome ideologies ". . . imprisoned by the confines of our present knowledge, we can judge the selectivity of a current ideology only by comparing it with the scope of current science."<sup>39</sup> Ideology is characteristically oversimplistic, whereas science is complicated and clearly ordered. Ideologies use exaggeration and caricatures; "In contrast, a scientific description of social phenomena is likely to be fuzzy and indistinct."<sup>40</sup> Ideologies are not amenable to mixed verdicts, instead they always proffer a sphere of "truth." Ideology must categorize "wholes," whereas science is at its root concerned with particulars.

For Sutton excessive use of symbols is another hallmark of ideology which sets it apart from science. Emotional reactions, feelings, and moral sentiments are not the concern of scientists. Scientists use words to refer to things, while ideologists refer to symbols that evoke approval or disapproval. Sutton stresses the fact that the language of the scientist is totally different from that of the ideologist. Sutton's argument here is an example of the nominalist epistemological root which is part of the behavioral approach. Science is value-free and therefore should aim at neutral, objective statements describing or analyzing. For Sutton science takes on an almost revelational significance. It replaces naive experience as the basis of knowing.

"The orientation of ideology subjects it, to a greater measure than science, to control by its audience."<sup>41</sup> Emotional associations limit ideology to that which is publicly acceptable. Science has no particular audience in mind and is free to comment as it sees fit.

A scientist, . . . does not solicit diffuse public acceptance for his statements and does not use words in contexts where their symbolic associations matter to any comparable degree. A scientific statement is consequently much less affected by the values and sentiments of its audience; it is limited only to logical consistency with the existing body of scientific knowledge.<sup>42</sup>

Sutton finds science and ideology fundamentally at loggerheads with each other. In both objective and method the two are in sharp contrast: "In its broadest interpretation this canon of method emphasizes that a proper science deals with the general rather than the unique; a multiplicity of empirical cases must be brought together under the abstract categories of theory."<sup>43</sup> Sutton accepts the foundations of "proper science." First, he argues, "a tradition of scientific inquiry, the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, has become firmly established in the institutions of Western societies. Neutral and objective investigation gains its strength from this tradition and from these social institutions."<sup>44</sup> Next he applauds the foundations of a science which is free of personal motivation and in conformity with established scientific method.

Even social science, Sutton insists, which is based on the model of the natural sciences, can meet the requisites of "proper science." Social science is no less scientific than natural science.

The claim of the social sciences to be sciences cannot rest on any pretension to success and precision comparable to the achievements of the older natural sciences. It must rest rather on the claim that social scientists approach their subject matter with the same objective and the same orientation as natural scientists bring to the study of their phenomena.<sup>45</sup>

Sutton realized the difficulties of Mannheim's paradox, wherein the interests of the investigator are inescapable and therefore bound by his own social existence. This problem is acute for the political scientist, who "has a special claim to the study of the integration of total societies."<sup>46</sup> Ideologies too, present problems, since a scientist cannot enter a conclusion finding them true or false, right or wrong.

Many ideological statements are evaluative, and social science provides no basis for classing them as right or wrong; for non-evaluative statements, social science is often not definite enough to support categorical conclusions on the truth or falsity.  
...<sup>47</sup>

Sutton is caught on the classical Weberian dilemma; Mannheim's paradox can be overcome, according to Sutton, only by a tradition of professionalism which demands values be

set apart from facts. Technique will allow this endeavor to succeed. "In the social sciences, the tradition of scientific neutrality is one of growing strength, and the techniques necessary to implement it and to enforce it are steadily becoming more effective. It is in the spirit of this growing tradition that we have tried to write this book."<sup>48</sup>

NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen, and James Tobin, The American Business Creed, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956, ix.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., viii.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 2-3

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 307-8.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., vii.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 264.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 265.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 274.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 305.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 306.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 307.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 316-17.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 318.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 319.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 10.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 10-11.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 304.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 101.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., 211-12, 366-67, 380.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 321-25.

<sup>33</sup>Francis X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds. Comparative Politics, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, 67.

<sup>34</sup>Sutton, et al., op. cit., vii.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>43</sup>Sutton, op. cit., 67.

<sup>44</sup>Sutton, et al., op. cit., 6.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 7.

<sup>46</sup>Sutton, op. cit., 79.

<sup>47</sup>Sutton, et al., op. cit., 9.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 8.

CHAPTER III  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF:  
ROBERT E. LANE

Robert E. Lane has been a faculty member at Yale University since 1962. He, perhaps more than any other social scientist of the post-war period, has studied and published on questions concerning political ideology.

His numerous articles and books when read together are an impressive collection on literature, education, psychology, philosophy, and preeminently on politics. Lane has served as the President of the American Political Science Association. He has described himself as part of the behavioral movement.<sup>1</sup> His conceptualization of ideology, important to the behavioral study of political science, is very difficult to uncover as it is developed in a vast body of literature.

Definition

Lane opens his classic work on ideology with a list of nine interpretations of the concept, spanning sources from Webster's dictionary to Adorno, et al.'s The Authoritarian Personality. Understanding that the term has been construed in so many ways, Lane sets down seven characteristics and two qualities that he suggests by his definition of "political ideology." They are a body of concepts whose characteristics:



1. - deal with questions: Who will be the rulers? How will the rulers be selected? By what principles will they govern?
2. - constitute an argument; that is they are intended to persuade and to counter opposing views.
3. - integrally affect some of the major values of life.
4. - embrace a program for the defense or reform or abolition of important social institutions.
5. - are, in part, rationalizations of group interests- but not necessarily the interests of all groups espousing them.
6. - are normative, ethical, moral in tone and contents.
7. - are (inevitably) torn from their context in a broader belief system, and share the structural and stylistic properties of that system.

Most ideologies also have these qualities:

1. They are group beliefs that individuals borrow; most people acquire an ideology by identifying (or disidentifying) with a social group.
2. They have a body of sacred documents (constitutions, bills of rights, manifestos, declarations), and heroes (founding fathers, seers and sages, originators and great interpreters).

And all ideologies, like all other beliefs, imply an empirical theory of cause and effect in the world, and a theory of the nature of man.<sup>2</sup>

Because Lane deals with the beliefs of the "common man" in his study of the men of Eastport, he makes a sharp differentiation between the articulated political arguments of conscious Marxists, Fascists or liberal democrats, and the very loosely structured, unreflected, "off the cuff" statements of those in his sample. Therefore, "it is useful to distinguish between the 'forensic' ideologies

of the conscious ideologist and the 'latent' ideologies of the common man."<sup>3</sup> The definitional quality here is between the debateable public ideologies and those of a dormant, hidden, or undeveloped nature; between esoteric and exoteric ideology.

This approach to defining ideology concerns more than attitudes and values on topical or current events; it has as its primary concern the "fundamental views which form the ideational counterpart to a constitution: "ideas on fair play and due process, rights of others, sharing of power, the proper distribution of goods of society (equality), uses and abuses of authority, etc.,"<sup>4</sup> Ideology here defined goes deeper than conventional beliefs that people hold, to a layer of ideas,

which are selected from among alternatives because these ideas have a special "resonance." Where the conventional ideas may be conceived as related to national character. . . , the resonant ideas, the more or less individual ones, may more properly be related to and explained by the concept of individual political personality.<sup>5</sup>

For Lane the study of "political personality" is a study of political ideology. Political personality is defined as

the enduring, organized, dynamic response sets habitually aroused by political stimuli. It embraces (a) motivation, often analyzed as a combination of needs and values (the push-pull theory); (b) cognitions, perceptions, and habitual modes of learning; and (c) behavioral tendencies, that is, the acting out of needs and other aspects of manifest behavior.<sup>6</sup>

Working from the other direction, Lane suggests a synoptic paradigm. "For any society, an existential base creating common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts produces certain political ideologies."<sup>7</sup>

Political ideology is part of political explanation under the larger rubric of belief systems. For Lane it is the belief system that sets the values and attitudes that assign a place in the human scheme. This scheme is marked by politics and government. Individuals need belief systems to function in daily tasks and to guide them along the ongoing stream of events. Groups also have belief systems to provide legitimate goals of interest for their members. Lane argues that there are "core belief systems" of the literate and illiterate alike. These core systems provide the premise for thought and action. "There is a strong case for explaining great events by reference to the dominant philosophies. I am arguing that this is inadequate and that reference to both philosophy and common culture is crucial; the two are related in a special way."<sup>8</sup>

The eight elements of the core belief system are:

1. Beliefs about the Self; concepts of identity; self-evaluation.
2. Beliefs about the world of "others," classification of human sets, concepts of human nature, beliefs about interpersonal relations.

3. Beliefs about authority, as a specially important set of interpersonal relations, beliefs about appropriate behavior in the face of authority; legitimacy, kinds of authority.
4. Desires, wants, needs, motives, goals - and the elaboration of beliefs about them. These elements are values, in one sense of the term.
5. Beliefs about the moral good; ethical systems, concepts of what people should desire contrasted to what they do desire.
6. Explanatory systems; concepts of causation, habits of causal inference.
7. Concepts of time, place and nature, where nature is seen as the impersonal economy, the order of things, including the Divine order; metaphysics.
8. Concepts of knowledge, truth, evidence, and how to discover truth; epistemology.

According to Lane it is the core belief system outlined above which guides thought, be it religious, economic, political -- any area of life. The paradigm for the political belief system is that of Lasswell's definition of politics which speaks to these questions:

Who gets what from whom, when, where, how, and why? Who should get what from whom, when, where, how, and why? What should be done about it? What shall I do about it?<sup>10</sup>

Political ideology as defined by Lane addresses the elements of the core belief system. It follows the paradigm given under the area specified before as - "political belief system." The answers given to the questions asked of the political belief system are those which form each individual's political ideology. Ideology, as suggested,

is tied to political personality and is best perused by "ideological self-analysis." This is Lane's term for the analysis of a person's political values, opinions, and beliefs as they function and serve the individual's personality and life and world situation.

It is an extended response to the questions: 'Of what use to me are my political ideas?' and 'How did I come to have these political ideas?' More specifically, . . . it is a response to questions about man's liberalism or conservatism, or in a few cases, his Republican or Democratic party preference. The aim in asking for an ideological self-analysis is to invite a clarification of views that are normally quite vague and inconsistent, often below the threshold of consciousness, often accepted up to that point without examination, often quite unrelated to a person's life purposes. In some ways, too, this self-oriented inquiry seeks to make the student more aware of the relationship of personality to ideology, of basic needs to social thought.<sup>11</sup>

### Context

Political ideology is the major focus of Lane's contribution to political science. He distinguishes three aspects of American political ideology as empirical phenomena: the latent content of ideology; the sources of ideology in culture and experience; and last, and in less detail, the way ideology supports and weakens the institutions of democracy. By exposition and then generalization, Lane searches for the implications of ideology in the working of a democratic political system.

The context of Lane's studies is conversation. His famous study of the men of Eastport is actually in large

part co-authored, since he stresses and credits the fifteen political actors that he interviewed in depth and at great length. He sought to understand these men, by "listening with a third ear." The interviews were: discursive, dialectical, textual (therefore contextual analysis of tape recordings were possible), and biographical.

In this spirit I have sought in these interviews to understand these men as men, to understand the private import of what they say, to penetrate the latent meaning of their remarks, and then to see the social implications of what they have said. In this I am aided by certain features of a clinical, relaxed, conversational situation.<sup>12</sup>

Lane's interest is in why a man believes what he does. This leads him to probe for the facts of perception; to understand authority; to find the connection of facts to social theory or the causal component; to suggest each man's view of others -- or moral sense, his inferences or logic, as well as what each believes should be done or prescribed.

Lane informs us that there are two ways of explaining the ideological belief:

by referring outward to tell of the world and inward to tell of the self, these are complementary features of a total explanation for the simple reason that belief is inevitably an interaction between self and world, especially if we speak of ideological constructs as large as "conservatism." These two ways have literatures and histories, one leading back through political philosophy and political science, the other leading back from psychology and sociology, and the two meeting

and intertwining whenever the political philosopher or scientist attempts to explain, rarely his own thought, usually the thought of others.<sup>13</sup>

Lane's approach is the "inward method" which shows motivation shaping political thought and specifically political ideology. Assuming that intelligent citizens are guided by conscious belief systems or political philosophies, Lane surmises that by having individuals outline their own ideologies he can demonstrate what it is that constitutes their political thinking and behavior. He employs the typologies and traits of psychiatric medicine as a scheme to diagnose the thought of those who open their ideological cupboards to him. For,

(E)very politics implies a psychology. Classic political theorists relied, implicitly or overtly, on assumptions regarding the plasticity, sociability, fearfulness, ambition, conscience of mankind. Sophisticated modern political theorists, more conscious of the many dimensions of human nature, may turn to the theories of contemporary psychology and psychiatry to inform their doctrines and make their conceptions more plausible. In both cases the combinations of traits which are thought to go together create "types" - that is, persons with similar habitual responses to political stimuli, responses which have their sources in some aspect of personality.<sup>15</sup>

Lane's numerous studies of the development of political ideas in common men, students, and educators have their basis in a set of intellectual biographies. These biographies seek answers to questions which lead to an

"ideological self-analysis." This is Lane's analytical technique of ideological self-analysis: through self observation and evaluation the individuals involved participate in a socialization process that can only be described as political education. There are three forms of technique: the autobiographical essay; the oral, therapy-type interview; and a group-therapy model. This so-called "meta-knowledge," opens the personality so that beliefs are seen as something more than true -- that is, also functional.<sup>16</sup> In essence, Lane argues that political ideas are in large measure the raw material of personality. The ideas of human experience are those of the core belief system that one draws on to interpret experience. The social environment in which any personality acts becomes the context for political ideology.

In a less global sense, the inquiry into the nature of man contributes to an understanding of political behavior within the democratic framework. Explanations of political decisions which rely wholly upon analysis of the social environment, while they may have high predictive value, neglect a vital link: they never explain why an individual responds to the environment the way he does.<sup>17</sup>

Only by psychological interpretation can this explanation be provided, "Only when the intervening psychological variables are explored and brought into the analysis can many social problems. . . be brought under control."<sup>18</sup>

It is the notion of control and the problems of ideological intensity that link Lane to the end of ide-



ology argument, In 1964, in a work co-authored with David Sears, Lane quotes with approval the familiar thesis of Daniel Bell, that ideology had come to an end. Lane's objective in this argument is that intensity without fanaticism, "interest and action, controlled and patient emotion, disciplined by experience, is (for Lane and Sears) surely. . . a better foundation for a better society."<sup>19</sup>

Lane went on in 1965 and 1966 to develop these thoughts in two well-known articles, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," and "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society."<sup>20</sup> He reasoned that the growth of the domain of knowledge, particularly science, caused it to impinge on and reduce ideology. Modern American society is Lane's knowledgeable society, where "politics like ideology is declining as a necessary ingredient in change, partly because, given present values, knowledge sets up a powerful kind of attitudinal disequilibrium all its own."<sup>21</sup> The knowledgeable society is made possible by an age of affluence. "Affluent society" for Lane, means

- (1) a relatively high per capita national income;
- (2) a relatively equalitarian distribution of income;
- (3) a "favorable" rate of growth of per capita Gross National Product; .
- (4) provisions against the hazards of life - that is, against sickness, penury, unemployment, dependence in old age, squalor - the features now associated with the term "welfare state"; and

- (5) a "managed economy" in the sense of conscious and more or less successful governmental use of fiscal and monetary powers to smooth out the business cycle and avoid depressions, as well as to provide for the economic growth mentioned in (3) above.<sup>22</sup>

Affluence on this communal level meant that political behavior would evidence a new rapprochement between man and government -- suggested in what Lane calls the "politics of consensus." Six specific things occur: people come to trust each other, political partisanship declines, class awareness and consciousness changes, religious institutions and dogmas lose their influence, racial equality is facilitated, and there is a decline of alienation between citizens and government. The context of Lane's conceptualization of ideology must be seen in relation to his end of ideology -- knowledgeable and affluent society predictions; and to the documented historical record of the decade of the 1960's.

#### Theoretical Conceptualization

Lane, following Lasswell, submits that public policy can be explained best by understanding political belief systems. These belief systems perform ideological functions. Lane lists ten functions of political ideology. Paraphrased, they are functions that:

- (1) contribute to individual's sense of identity, thus telling one what demands he may make upon government and society.
- (2) provide cues concerning goals, thus providing concepts of success, criteria for self-management and estimation of others.

- (3) inform men about elements of human nature.
- (4) provide guides for interpersonal behavior, thus reciprocal understanding.
- (5) provide the means for interpreting the roles they and others occupy.
- (6) borrow from a more general belief system certain explanatory or causal concepts.
- (7) provide a setting in time and place for relevant political events.
- (8) assign to some men the imprimatur of legitimate authority and to others the stigma of usurpation.
- (9) give clues to the appropriate ways of knowing, learning, and understanding.
- (10) provide an ethical code and what may be called an ethical style.<sup>23</sup>

Lane does not debate the truth of any particular ideology. Rather, he accepts a sociology of knowledge paradigm which sees the relation between phenomena and their contexts. The basic framework that Lane works within is contained in five analytical questions: "What are political beliefs or ideologies? What causes them? What are their consequences (or implications)? How shall we evaluate them (Are they true? Are they useful? Are they good?) What shall we do about them?" The context of the questions can be: comparative, historical, societal, or personological in nature.<sup>24</sup>

Ideology serves the functional purpose of placing both an individual and a group by defining roles and role behavior, status and expectation, thereby supplying norms pertinent to places and times. Ideology is neither universalistic nor relativistic according to Lane; rather, as in Mannheim, it is relational, perspectival, and directive. Ideology serves its proper functions when it

supplies answers to the questions, "What is real?" (metaphysics), "What is true?" (epistemology), and "What is good?" (ethics). But the study of man in society is never absolutist, the comments and criticisms of every position leave something to be desired. "Man and society are in a state of tension by the very nature of things. There is no perfect solution, only an optimum one, a temporary compromise among the things we want."<sup>25</sup> Simply, Lane abhors utopian thinking -- stresses and strains in better and worse combinations are the existential condition from which there is no escape.

By exploring the political mind, Lane outlines the important themes of ideology. He describes and generalizes his findings, putting them together in a theory which has implications for a democratic political system. From his interviews, Lane writes about political ideology and power under the headings of Freedom, Equality, Democracy, Alienation, Collectivism, and Utopianism. He finds the sources of ideology in: Society and Experience (opportunity, community, work, money, family), Culture (time, geography, explanation, morality, conceptualization), and in Personal Qualities (identity, personality, and change). The political consequences of an ideology are: Stability and Responsiveness, and Resources for Public Justice and Liberty. For each heading, source, and consequence, Lane provides illustrations from his sample.

Lane's succinct generalizations of his empirical results,

taken from his data base of depth interviews, is a thorough treatment of psychological dynamics. He not only maps the ground of ideology, he goes some way toward an account of why the patterns he discovered exist. Lane's categorization and conceptualization does not attempt to connect the various component parts of his findings.

In fact, Lane's is not a general theory. Instead, he supplies a static conception of the component parts of the total phenomenon of ideology. Lane does devise a study integrating the "four major approaches" to ideological formulation, those being: the tradition of intellectual history, the sociology of knowledge, psychoanalytic and personality theory, and the literature on attitudes, beliefs, and "isms." His approach also adopts a holistic view of ideology. There is however, no conceptualization of change, which could be interpreted as a defense of American liberal democracy. In Lane's conceptualization of ideology neither is there an attempt to connect logical causal factors. Because of this the holistic attempt is less established than the various autonomous variables which have been collected from in-depth interviews.

#### Usage

"Ideology" is widely used by Lane, incorporating everything from epistemology and ethics to metaphysics. Lane's survey, however, points out some surprising findings relevant for

the empirical study of ideology. His method, much more open than the structured questionnaire, produces he says a fuller and more accurate view of ideology. Lane sees his data as sources of testable hypotheses on the survey, mass-public research level. He is not a quantifier but rather a theorist whose insights can lead to quantification and statistical analysis. Already in his early work, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice,"<sup>26</sup> in which he used Survey Research Center data, Lane showed signs of disappointment with the simplistic electoral type of analysis. This is made more clear later when he writes that

There is something, I think, to learn from this examination of the micropolitical data that does not emerge from the review of mass behavior or the study of electorates. For one thing, influence is not limited to elites: the common man generates types of influence peculiarly his own. Moreover, the electoral moment is but a brief span in the long political day; much takes place at other times and in other ways. Again, the decisions are often so casual, so linked with other events, so much a part of non-political life that they can be captured only in a view than embraces almost all of social life. Finally, they are so small, these individual political acts of common man, that they can be seen only in a microscope trained upon the areas where they occur.<sup>27</sup>

In micropolitical investigation, Lane collects from the common man the data which he will bring together in a macropolitical theory of ideology. He tells us that insights gained on the lower level will bear fruit on the higher level. Lane realizes that ideology is so complex

in its functions, so all encompassing, that nothing simple or inclusive can be said about it.

Lane is part of a tradition in political science that leans heavily on the work of other behavioral sciences. His indebtedness to sources in psychology is especially weighty. In glancing over author indexes of Lane's major titles, the names of Berelson, Lasswell, Campbell, Lazarsfeld, Riesman, and Adorno et al. stand out as the most cited authorities.<sup>28</sup> Most of these persons are not, in the main, political scientists.

According to Lane, Berelson is the foremost theorist of public opinion, and he pays tribute to his paradigm for political science: Berelson organized and defined the field of study, more than any other individual. It is, however, Lasswell's "psychotherapy model" that Lane makes his own. The reconciliation of citizens to the state, or of liberal individuals to government control, is the thematic goal of Lane's theory. The method for Lasswell as for Lane in this rapprochement is social science. Lane's early and little read, The Liberties of Wit: Humanism, Criticism, and the Civic Mind, is a diatribe against the intuitive, non-rational, standardless field of literary criticism. Lane's solution to the problem outlined is the adoption of social science, because it alone has right reason and provides an order for contemporary liberalism. It is interesting to note that Lasswell's "displacement hypothesis" is Lane's starting point in his "psycho-dynamic interpretation" of core beliefs. He quotes Lasswell:

(T)he most general formula which expresses the developmental facts about the fully developed political man reads thus:  $p \rightarrow d \rightarrow r = P$ , where "p" equals private motives; "d" equals displacement onto a public object; "r" equals rationalization in terms of public interest; "P" equals political man; and  $\rightarrow$  equals transformed into.<sup>29</sup>

The psychological interpretation which Lane uses is that of Smith, Bruner, and White, in Opinions and Personality; of Lasswell in Psychopathology and Politics; and of Adorno and associates, in The Authoritarian Personality. The implications of the antidemocratic strains found by the Adorno et al. study, pathologies such as ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, are continually discussed as symptoms of Lane's clients in the Eastport study. The strain theory, according to which "an ideology builds up like an oyster's secretion around strain,"<sup>30</sup> is that analyzed by Sutton in his study of business roles. Lane's approach is truly interdisciplinary as he draws from a wide ranging body of literature pertinent to the study of ideology. He admits that "In the analysis of political belief systems and ideologies, the methods of many disciplines are germane and fruitful; this paper draws upon several of them: history and biography; psychology, anthropology, and sociology; and, more specifically, sociology of knowledge, phenomenology, and systems theory."<sup>31</sup>

The sociology of knowledge contribution of Mannheim is very evident in Lane's concept and treatment of ideology. Lane finds Mannheim's historical sequence from fatalism to



conscience to responsibility attractive and uses his paradigm in unison with those of other disciplines. Mannheim is in a sense Lane's very point of departure.<sup>32</sup> Without the delineation of the field of political ideology by Mannheim, Lane's work would likely not have materialized in the form it has appeared.

### Science

Lane's 1971 Presidential address to the APSA, "To Nurture a Discipline,"<sup>33</sup> gives some strong clues about the ideas he holds regarding the discipline of political science. It is the science part of the discipline's title that Lane is most concerned about. He applauds the increasing resources spent on scientific investigation, paying tribute to practitioners in the social and behavioral areas. This "reflects both a new appreciation of the role of scientific knowledge, and a new merger of western organization and scientific knowledge, and a new merger of western organizational and scientific skills."<sup>34</sup> Remember, Lane's "knowledgeable society" is the American scientific community, where knowledge is industry and its expansion is recommended.

The scientific model that Lane implements to deal with political behavior is borrowed from learning theory:

It is a simple model . . . having only three elements: S (stimulus), O (organism or individual), and R (response). Expressed as S- O- R, it merely means that a selected response, guided by a series of predispositions and traits, follows (is caused by).

some external event perceived as a stimulus by the individual.<sup>35</sup>

For political science R is the political behavior of any given actor, where Q are psychological attributes, and S the social environment. Lane's desire is to study the functions applying to the above model. More specifically,

"the functions of ideas," in satisfying needs, in serving a personality and a usually hazy plan of life. . . . If one knows what ideas will be useful to a man in his time and situation, with his goals and needs, one knows how he will select from among the available alternatives, and in what direction he will strain them. This is, so to speak, the psychology of the sociology of knowledge.<sup>36</sup>

Lane is plainly not concerned with ontology. Ideology is mainly "myth" and therefore not scientifically established knowledge.

Listing the explanatory modes of discourse: Divine providence and intervention, fate, magic, great men, organismic action, natural law, and science;<sup>37</sup> Lane settles on the last, as the most orderly principle of investigation because it has a method. The use of scientific method allows man to mold nature to his own will -- he can master it. For science is objective, it tolerates ambiguity and dissonance, and it reflects abstraction of common properties. With Comte, Lane holds that "in the knowledgeable society theological and metaphysical modes of thought shrink in contrast to scientific modes."<sup>38</sup>

Even in the Eastport study, dogma of the religious type was profoundly minimized. For when "one gives up belief in divine rule, he must accept the belief in human rule; and if legitimacy is not conferred by God, it must be found in an only slightly less mythical belief in the sovereignty of the people."<sup>39</sup>

Epistemologically, Lane is both an empiricist and a rationalist; he is also a defender of the positivist scientific method. He lists his analytical methods as those of: explication, exegesis, thematic analysis, classification and typology, structural analysis, linguistic analysis, logical analysis, and reconstruction.<sup>40</sup>

Lane is not completely "value-free" in his analytical process. Evaluation, he insists, should be objective, something he dubs "value-clear." In introducing Political Ideology, Lane admits that "this is, of course, not a value-free study; the values are those of a rational, open society governed through democratic institutions."<sup>41</sup> Lane sets his notion of reason in opposition to Etienne Gilson's species of scholastic reasoning. By "reason" Lane means, "Man's reason, not God's, a secular orientation with a penchant for evidence and a tropism toward verification procedures."<sup>42</sup>

The Liberties of Wit: Humanism, Criticism and the Civic Mind, a non-political writing which is set off from the bulk of Lane's contribution to political science, actually holds the key to understanding his philosophy

of science. Lane here confesses that he is a nominalist not an absolutist;<sup>43</sup> an anti-Platonic, non-idealist;<sup>44</sup> an empiricist;<sup>45</sup> and a behavioralist.<sup>46</sup> He tells us that for him science has as its ultimate purpose explanation and prediction; it has an objective for which to account, a process of valuation, and a framework to work within. Lane follows the probability methods of science looking to validate hypotheses — verification is his aim.<sup>47</sup>

Science is furthered by operational meanings, fruitful conceptualization, set definitions, and proper classification. According to Lane there is no chasm between science and the humanities in these regards; there are not two worlds of truth. Science is the rationale of both; its function: "imparting an understanding of how to understand, explaining the nature of explanation, showing how to weigh, test, verify the knowledge that we think we know. Surely the better part of wisdom is in knowing how to be wise."<sup>48</sup>

NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>Robert E. Lane, The Liberties of Wit: Humanism, Criticism, and the Civic Mind, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961, 3.

<sup>2</sup>Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 13-15. Of interest is the variety of language used by political scientists to deal with the same kinds of things. Lane demonstrates this well in reference to political beliefs. See, Robert E. Lane, "Patterns of Political Belief," in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed. Handbook of Political Psychology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 83-84.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 16. See, William T. Bluhm, Ideologies and Attitudes, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Co., 1974, 10. "Forensic is a word which refers to debate, and 'forensic ideologies' are the elaborate, self-conscious word systems, formulated at a rather abstract level, which constitute the language of political discussion in times of severe political stress and strain. 'Latent ideologies' are the implicit sets of political words which are expressed in attitude and behavior during more settled times, but which can be 'excavated - that is, raised to the forensic level - by social science research.'"

<sup>4</sup>Robert E. Lane, Political Man, New York: The Free Press, 1972, 15.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Robert E. Lane, "Political Personality," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, v. 12, New York: MacMillan and Free Press, 1968, 13.

<sup>7</sup>Robert E. Lane, "Patterns of Political Belief," in Jeanne N. Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. 1973, 85. Lane goes on to deal with each of the italicized terms of the quotation in detail. Beginning with, "political ideology" he quotes McIver, Bell, Sutton, and Parsons, suggesting that most analysts find ideology part empirical, part mythological, always guiding action, mostly conscious, evaluative, and goal oriented. In, Political Man, 170-72, Lane compares a digest of the conceptualizations of ideology by some

leading scholars. Some of the attributes covered include: Relation to action, Empirical reference versus mythology, Evaluative and moral components, Opposition versus status quo, Conscious or unconscious Telos, or goal reference, Mode of thought or expression, Function, The carriers of ideologies, Individual or Social, Ideology and Personality, and Compulsory belief.

<sup>8</sup>Political Man, 164.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 174. See, 175-89 for elaborations on each.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 175.

<sup>11</sup>Robert E. Lane, Political Thinking and Consciousness, Chicago: Markham Company, 1969, p.2.

<sup>12</sup>Political Ideology, 8-9. See 4-6 on the details of the details of the conversations and the characteristics of the fifteen men; 7-10 for the way the interviews were conducted; 481-93 contains a summary of the actual Interview Guide employed by Lane.

<sup>13</sup>Political Thinking and Consciousness, 2.

<sup>14</sup>See Political Man, 1-3 for the concepts taken from psychoanalysis; for example anxiety and hysteria, paranoia, obsession, and compulsion, perversion, neuroses, and depression.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>16</sup>See Political Man, 121-139, where various case studies are discussed. Also, Robert E. Lane, "The Self-Analysis of Educational Belief Systems," Daedalus, 1, Fall 1974, 250-56.

<sup>17</sup>Robert E. Lane, Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959, 98.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 99. Lane has inspired a great deal of exploration similar to his own. For instance, see James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; Using the same scales Lane employed in Political Ideology, to measure authoritarianism, social trust, dominance, social and neurotic anxiety, and anomie, he suggests; ". . . this study is concerned more with the origin and maintenance of belief systems - of ideologies than with behavior;" 30.

<sup>19</sup> Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964, 107.

<sup>20</sup> Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," American Political Science Review, 4, December, 1965, 874-95; and Robert E. Lane, "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," American Sociological Review, 31:5, October, 1966, 649-62. Lane after much embarrassment qualifies these early theories when ideology declined to "decline." See, Political Man, 211-15 for nine reasons conflict re-arose.

<sup>21</sup> "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," 662.

<sup>22</sup> "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence," 874.

<sup>23</sup> Political Man, 161-62. L. B. Brown, Ideology. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc. 1973, influenced by Lane, makes a similar list; 173-179.

<sup>24</sup> "Patterns of Political Belief," 87-88.

<sup>25</sup> Political Ideology, 476.

<sup>26</sup> Robert E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," American Political Science Review, 1, March, 1955, 173-90.

<sup>27</sup> Political Ideology, 446-7.

<sup>28</sup> For example, see: Political Life, 359-65; Political Man, 319-28; Political Ideology, 499-502.

<sup>29</sup> Political Man, 191.

<sup>30</sup> "The Self-Analysis of Educational Belief Systems," 254-6. See, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," 175; Lane's suggestion that personality factors provide fruitful exploration is based on "the authoritarian 'syndrome' isolated by the pathbreaking study on The Authoritarian Personality."

<sup>31</sup> "Patterns of Political Belief," 83.

<sup>32</sup> See Political Ideology, 221, 292, 377, 397, 414, 439; Political Man, 165-6, 171-2, 265; and "The Self-Analysis of Educational Belief Systems," 251, 256.

<sup>33</sup> Robert E. Lane, "To Nurture a Discipline: APSA Presidential Address, 1971," American Political Science Review, 56:1, March, 1972, 164-82.

<sup>34</sup> "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society," 653.

<sup>35</sup> Political Life, 5. See, p. 6 for a paradigm of the study of electoral behavior; also, 186, for a psychosocial model for S-O-R Sequences over Time; Lane makes use of numerous scales in his studies to test his model. See, Political Ideology, 494-5 for a list of objective measures employed.

<sup>36</sup> Political Thinking and Consciousness, 2.

<sup>37</sup> Political Man, 184.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 259.

<sup>39</sup> Political Ideology, 200.

<sup>40</sup> See "Patterns of Political Belief," 89-90, for elaboration and examples of each.

<sup>41</sup> Political Ideology, 11. See, The Liberties of Wit, 74. "The idea of a completely value-free analysis is a chimera and should be disposed of at the beginning. The important question is: at what point shall personal preferences and values be permitted to enter the analytical process? . . . They may enter at some points but they need not, any more than logic need be corrupted by preference, correlations determined by wishes."

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 347; see footnote 4 for the discussion on Gilson.

<sup>43</sup> The Liberties of Wit, 20-22.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 33.



<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 128-131. The behavioral scientist does not ask "why are we here? But they know how real people all over the world answer this question, and that is something. This is simply saying that the behavioral scientist knows about human beings, although he does not know the Divine Will. But it is human behavior, not Divine Behavior which is his speciality."

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 6-61; note the references to Lazarsfeld, Ayer, and Braithwaite.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 122.

CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF:

ANGUS CAMPBELL AND PHILIP E. CONVERSE

Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse are best discussed together, since most of their contributions have been co-authored. Working and writing together since the late fifties, they have concerned themselves with the activity of voting. The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, with which both men are associated, has produced a large volume of major studies on elections over the last two decades. The concept of ideology developed by Campbell and Converse is then part of the growing literature on voting behavior which is a mainstay of the behavioral trend in American political science.

Definition

Aware of the inherent difficulties of a term like ideology, Campbell and Converse suggest the use of substitute terms like, "belief systems" or "attitude structures" to overcome terminological handicaps. In a section on clarification of terms, Converse points out, "a term like 'ideology' has been thoroughly muddled by diverse uses."<sup>1</sup> However, he goes on to agree that there is obvious overlap between concepts such as belief system and ideology. In fact, they are roughly the same

in the development of the Campbell and Converse argument.

Even though the term "ideology" is evasive in a definitional sense, it is assumed that one's political ideology -- one's set of beliefs -- deal with the proper ordering of society and how that order can be achieved. Like a prism, ideology filters a person's view of the world. According to Campbell and Converse the elements of one's ideology restrict or constrain that individual's views of specific political questions and issues. This is particularly true when we look at those persons labelled political "extremists." Ideology for Campbell and Converse implies extremism.

The relationship between various attitudes underlies the definition of belief system provided by Converse in his often quoted article, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."<sup>2</sup> It is the "attitude structure" of two or more beliefs which allows opinions of individuals to be functionally related. Thus "belief system" is defined as, "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."<sup>3</sup> Constraint, of course, has to do with the predictive capacities implied from knowing one attitude and generalizing to other attitudes. The degree of constraint is measureable and therefore open to methods of quantitative political science.

Ideology is not simply a political phenomenon but,

may be seen as a particularly elaborate, close-woven, and far ranging structure of attitudes. By origin and usage its connotations are primarily political, although the scope of the structure is such that we expect an ideology to encompass content outside the political order as narrowly defined - social and economic relationships, and even matters of religion, education, and the like.<sup>4</sup>

Ideology here defined is differentiated; it is very organized and coherent. In scope, ideology is extremely wide ranging.

Depending on the structure of logic, Converse holds that "a change in the truth-value of one proposition necessitates changes in truth-value elsewhere within the set of related propositions."<sup>5</sup> It is "idea-elements" which concern him, specifically their centrality, "the role that they play in the belief system as a whole,"<sup>6</sup> and range, "referents for the ideas and attitudes in the system."<sup>7</sup> A focus on wide ranges and political centrality, presuming relevance to political behavior, "brings us close to what are broadly called ideologies, and we shall use the term for aesthetic relief where it seems most appropriate."<sup>8</sup>

The Campbell and Converse definition realizes the origins of the concept of ideology in its narrow form reserved for insincerity, and seeks to move beyond such limitations. Suggesting that matters of social diffusion are better dealt with by hypotheses than by definitions,

their construction is wide; it is the "belief system." Truth content is not addressed; ideology herein is essentially a functional value.

### Context

The task for Campbell and Converse is to fully analyze the practice of voting. This is achieved in a broader context of what political scientists have come to call the "political system." The electoral process is part of the larger domain of a given political system. Historically, the empirical studies provided by Campbell and Converse deal with American presidential elections in the era from 1952-1972. They admit that

(T)his research lies within a sequence of studies on voting. Both in its methods and in its substantive concerns it has depended heavily on prior research, and an account of the development of voting research may suggest a good deal about the nature of our own studies.<sup>9</sup>

Electoral behavior is the focus because it is a fundamental process in making political decisions, a bridge of democratic theory and practice. Starting with a descriptive appraisal, Campbell and Converse hope to search out the causes, not only the simple effects of the voting act. Further, comprehending the political, "our quest of understanding should not end with the discovery of causes of electoral decisions; it should extend to their consequences as well."<sup>10</sup> Political elites can make use of the issue clusters provided in order to win or stay in power. In-

formation is furnished which can serve to strategically locate and mobilize winning coalitions.

The search for causality begins at the psychological level and is seen as the result of "attitudinal forces." Partisan attitudes, negative or positive, are of primary significance to the voting act. These attitudes lead to behavior expressed with "direction" and "intensity" towards politics. "The individual act was the ultimate behavior to be explained, and the analyst typically sought to identify the various types of motivational patterns within a total sample and to indicate their relative frequency."<sup>11</sup> Clearly the Campbell-Converse contribution must be seen not only as primarily interested in the vote, but also having deep-rooted behavioral origins.

Campbell agrees that "early fixation on social structure as the basis of political behavior was the natural development from earlier emphasis on research on voting."<sup>12</sup> He goes on to suggest that his survey methods are not limited, and that new links of research are forthcoming: (1) to study the influence of political institutions on political behavior; (2) to interpret mass behavior; and (3) to analyze the interaction of different levels of the political system.<sup>13</sup>

The popular conservative-liberal distinction is the context in which Campbell and Converse analyze partisan politics and formulate their conceptualization of ideology.

Perhaps the most widely-used spatial metaphor involves the ideological proximities and distances that shape the terms of political competition. And in a remarkable number of countries of the world, the standard yardstick for estimating relative distance between political objects in such an ideological space is the "left-right" continuum.<sup>14</sup>

For Campbell and Converse, ideology is primarily thought distinguished by content and structure along the common liberal-conservative dichotomy. This dichotomy is based on issue preferences and is best differentiated through hard empirical research. Moving beyond earlier research, Campbell and Converse are aware of the multidimensionality of issue preferences.

The survey research of Campbell and Converse is part of the growing body of literature now established as a tradition. This type of research examines the empirical properties of cognitive attitudes of individuals towards the voting act, or what is known as "political competition." The right-left continuum encourages the kind of analysis that Campbell and Converse support. Their emphasis is an empirical focus on similarities and differences of perceptual judgments that make political behavior predictable.

The assumption with which Campbell and Converse begin is similar, in at least one sense, to the end of ideology thesis. It is only made more technical by referring to it as the "consequences of declining information for belief systems,"<sup>15</sup> wherein ideology disappears due to ignorance rather than knowledge. They

understand that a substantial majority of Americans have little grasp of their country's ideological environment; and that those who have conceptualized the political situation and who concern themselves with its issues have - and probably with the same gesture - committed themselves already to one side or the other, and are not to be moved. Those who do move, those who create landslides and upsets in our elections, are the relatively uninformed for whom the issues may burn only as they come close to home, and for whom the cast of a public man's left eye is the only way of knowing a fool.<sup>16</sup>

We are informed that only 2½ percent of the American voters are full ideologues.<sup>17</sup>

#### Theoretical Conceptualization

The thesis of this concept of ideology holds that:

\* there are important and predictable differences in ideational worlds as we progress downward through such "belief strata" and that these differences, while obvious at one level, are easily overlooked and not infrequently miscalculated. The fact that these ideational worlds differ in character poses problems of adequate representation and measurement.<sup>18</sup>

Campbell and Converse begin their theoretical conceptualization with a search for the determining factors of electoral behavior. Only by arranging the many threads of material that their survey technique provides can they understand what the voter does at the polls. With improved methods, the empirical work of the social scientist becomes that of testing hypotheses while constructing a framework into which the various findings will fit; "as empirical access broadens, the question becomes less what can be



measured than what is most strategic to measure. A new criterion of the value of a concept may be applied: how well does it fit into a broader theoretical orientation?"<sup>19</sup>

Because there are a multitude of determinants producing voting behavior, a single-variable theory is simply not complex enough to deal with the mass of data. For these reasons, "we can visualize the chain of events with which we wish to deal as contained in a funnel of causality."<sup>20</sup> This metaphor allows for a convergence sequence of the causal chain, making multiple factors explanatory. Clarity is further restricted to measurements that exist as "one slice of time." Their subject is the election of presidents.

Campbell and Converse use many techniques to uncover the ideological characteristics of voters. All of the techniques are based on the premise that a functional relationship exists between the knowledge of an individual's belief on one issue and the same individual's belief on some other issue. Underlying dimensions are shown to correlate through use of the Guttman scale. "So that, where these 'scale' criteria are met, individuals may be located at various points on the underlying attitudes dimension, which produces the scale according to the extremity of the alternatives that they will accept."<sup>21</sup>

The concept of ideology acts as a bridge, or "a medium of political translation par excellence,"<sup>22</sup> for

Campbell and Converse. Perceptions come in contact with cognitions of political objects bringing meaning to the political order. More directly, Campbell and Converse isolate an attitude structure which captures ideological controversy:

(T)he structure exists empirically, and, moreover, it shows relationships of substantial magnitude with partisan preference in the direction that would be predicted by notions of ideology, that is, people sort themselves into patterns of response that are coherent in terms of a liberal-conservative dimension.<sup>23</sup>

Ideology and self-interest are linked together in this conception. The function of ideology is that of political evaluation which leads to political action, where "action" is seen as the fulfillment of self-interest. "In sum, then, the pattern of responses to our domestic issues is best understood if we discard our notions of ideology and think rather in terms of primitive self-interest."<sup>24</sup> The ideological structure is further extended to include responses toward change, again seen as a form of self-interest. It is suggested that liberals seek innovation whereas conservatives hesitate and oppose change in an effort to retain their comfort and privilege, for they have little to gain.

Campbell and Converse suggest that a liberal-conservative notion is the best referent to frames of mind which order issues in widespread use. Political evaluation is carried on in this process and, if measured, leads to predictable organization of behavior. When, as they find,

ideology is not widespread in the population, "surrogates for ideology" satisfy intellectual differences. These need not be programmatic ideologies but are what they refer to as "ideology by proxy."

We are told that the employment of a liberal-conservative continuum makes possible greater efficiency of political observation. Responses to association of ideological labels, party, and meaning, combined with further questioning on political issues, allow Campbell and Converse to develop a multiple level conceptualization of ideology.

Political conflict can be focused on a single, stable issue domain which presents an ordered-dimension that is perceived in common terms by leaders and followers. Let us call this the case of strong ideological focus. On the other hand, political controversy can be diffused over a number of changing issue concerns which rarely present position-dimensions and which are perceived in different ways by different political actors. Let us call this the case of weak ideological focus, a case that is well illustrated by the contemporary American scene.<sup>25</sup>

These focal dimensions can be assigned levels in a classification system, or levels A, B, C, D. Level A is that of the "ideologue," a position reserved for those respondents who have abstract conceptions associated with ideology. These include for Campbell and Converse persons who make mention of an ideology, a political philosophy, class conflict, or a high issue awareness. Level B is where persons' issue comments reflected only "short-term group interest;" these are representative of what has been described as "ideology by proxy." Level C finds persons

making very simplistic associations between the party in power and the times; here persons are familiar with "only one issue." Level D is the bottom level which contains individuals who evaluate political objects "without reference to any issues."

To the degree that occupants of Level D have perceptions of the parties at all, they are bound up in moralistic themes like mudslinging and chicanery. More often the parties are poorly discriminated, and comment is devoted almost entirely to the personal characteristics of the candidates - their popularity, their sincerity, their religious practice, or home life.<sup>26</sup>

If the left-right continuum applies to the ideologues, it certainly fades out rapidly over the vast majority of the electorate. Campbell and Converse find that what they call "ideological thinking" is limited to a small group of persons. The continuum also loses most of its centrality as an aid to the cognitive organization of political perceptions. Ideology, one could say, is construed by Campbell and Converse in such a manner as to limit its content. The purpose of the voting studies seems to be as much an aid to political elites forming winning coalitions as it is to the study of political ideology.

The conceptualization of ideology here developed is, as noted, an account of "average types" (Levels A-D). This psychological typology allows the researchers to present their empirical results in quantitative form. This understanding of ideology is substantially changed from what earlier commentators would have called a "Weltanschauung" or a world and life view.

Usage

The use of "ideology" as a concept is for Campbell and Converse tied to the understanding of voting behavior.

Efforts to understand the voting phenomenon have emerged from two currents of thought,

one primarily sociological, the other more psychological in emphasis. Much work on political behavior does not, of course, hew clearly to either of these approaches. But the most intensive research efforts have tended to contribute primarily to one stream or the other. If we seek bases for a theory of political behavior at the level of the mass electorate, we find in these alternatives the most coherent beginnings.<sup>27</sup>

The sources of constraint (logical, psychological, and social) which are developed theoretically are therefore not unexpected. "It seems clear that, however logically coherent a belief system may seem to the holder, the sources of constraint are much less logical in the classical sense than they are psychological and less psychological than social."<sup>28</sup> This point is labored to include the classical meaning of the term "ideology" as well. Here idea-elements go together for reasons surpassing self-interest. Converse suggests the possibility of more abstract, quasi-logical reasons developed into a world-view as a source for social constraint. It is noteworthy that the term "constraint," meaning "the amount of interrelatedness of structure of a system of variables when measured by degree of uncertainty reduction,"<sup>29</sup> is taken directly from the psychological literature.

Much of the Campbell and Converse conceptualization is indebted to the ground-breaking work of Harold Lasswell.

Lasswell's early suggestion that research be made available for political ends is generally followed by Campbell and Converse. The liberal democratic state is to be enhanced and served while the American political system is defended. Campbell and Converse take up these aims and endeavor to put scientific technique to work for the realization of American ideals.

The psychological basis of voting studies finds its source in the personality approach of Lasswell and in the field theory approach of Kurt Lewin. Following Lewin, "behavior" is defined as "a product of interaction between the person and his environment."<sup>30</sup> Persons are seen as responding to different stimulus situations. The "person" side of the equation is of interest. "The qualification 'political' personality seems to warn us that what is intended is an analogy: we are invited to think of political dispositions as organized in the same fashion as 'deeper' personality dimensions."<sup>31</sup> By limiting a set of concepts and isolating them, the political scientist-personality theorist can characterize and then measure a wide range of behaviors in which individuals engage. Campbell and Converse focus on the voting act.

This early model of the voting studies is therefore highly "individualistic." It is not until the later work, Elections and the Political Order, that the model of Campbell and Converse is made more "collectivistic." In this study we are told that "the behavioral approach

to social behavior is now reaching a point of development which makes it possible to think of bridging the conceptual gap between the individual and society by moving "upward" from the individual act toward the collective event."<sup>32</sup>

Although the theoretical and methodological contribution of Campbell and Converse is fairly eclectic, the field theory approach of Lewin makes it understandable. The Survey Research Center as an organization, beginning with The People Elect a President in 1952, and The Voter Decides in 1954,<sup>33</sup> has stressed the "attitudinal mode" of explanation. Dealing with a large number of variables, Campbell and Converse turned to field theory to solve their dilemma. This is "accomplished by concentrating on a cross section of measurements at a point close to the dependent variable. At such a point, the funnel is narrow. It is easier to develop a set of conceptually uniform variables that will span most of the cross section."<sup>34</sup> Psychological field theory is the stepping stone for Campbell and Converse's voting studies. This borrowed theory is crucial to the research on ideology in the voting studies.

The study of political personality using field techniques led Campbell and Converse to stress the importance of ideological and non-ideological issues as an acknowledgement of voting behavior. Ideological issues are said to differ from prevailing pragmatic issues. The researcher however must decide which issues are in fact ideological. Matters of material interest are often de-

tached from the ideological category; as are issues called "valence issues" - or noncontroversial ones. Campbell and Converse are careful to steer away from normative questions; nevertheless certain perspectives do enter into the surveys that they use, most obviously the categorization as to which issues are suggested to be ideological. In some ways Converse's method establishes a process which reinforces the "interest group" as the legitimate frame of reference for ideological behavior.

#### Science

"Belief systems have never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification. Indeed, they have often served as primary exhibits for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and that what can be measured is not important to study."<sup>35</sup> However, for political scientists, behavioralism has demonstrated that attitudes can be measured with reliability beyond what had earlier been deemed possible. Subjective states are now part of the proper realm for social science investigation, or so Campbell and Converse would argue.

The Campbell and Converse hypothesis suggests that the partisan choice of the voter depends largely on the elements which comprise a field of psychological factors. The elements are interpreted as attitudes toward perceived objects of politics. Measurement of direction and intensity of these attitudes accounts for the be-



havior of most voters. "By using our theory and the observations it implies we are able to describe with much greater confidence the influence of these factors on a given election outcome."<sup>36</sup>

Attitude structures in issues of public policy are the basis for "analysis of ten domestic issues and six foreign policy items;" when explored they "yield one set of opinions within each area that forms a satisfactory Guttman scale."<sup>37</sup> Answers of interviews, usually of a quarter-hour conversation over numerous periods of time, are examined for "ideological content." Statistical technique is brought to bear on the responses that individual voters supply. The data to which statistical measures are applied has as its reference the national election of a president every four years. A cross-section of the United States population is interviewed five times on a battery of questions directed to the issues under debate, (i.e., civil rights, social welfare legislation, the relation of government to free enterprise, and problems of foreign policy). These issues are what Campbell and Converse describe as "attitudinal items."

Individual acts are viewed by Campbell and Converse as the ultimate act to be explained. The analyst of the interviews sought to identify the motivational patterns and their relative frequency, and then to combine them into a total sample and draw conclusions. Here, "sci-

entific analysis is typically concerned with the explanation of differences which occur under varying circumstances."<sup>38</sup>

Campbell and Converse have overcome the problems inherited in more primitive journalistic surveys, for

with the development of survey research, this continuing dependence on aggregative data was broken. The evolution of the techniques of sampling, interviewing, data processing, and related methodologies opened the door to a new dimension of information about people and society. It became possible to measure the attitudes and motives of the populace by going directly to representative individuals within it and a broad range of descriptive data which had been inaccessible to the more traditional analysis of election statistics was revealed.<sup>39</sup>

Converse once exhorted that "we should not talk of results at all until we go back and develop better measuring instruments."<sup>40</sup>

In the period before the Survey Research Center studies, the poverty of quantitative evidence to students of aggregative voting was basically due to a lack of theoretical understanding of attitude motivation. Psychological and social laws were needed to explain the behavior of society. "Science abhors a vacuum, and when no immediate evidence on motives is to be had, it is inevitable that intuitive theories about human nature will be proposed."<sup>41</sup> The Campbell-Converse survey techniques filled that void.

The early interest was primarily on scientific methodology. Later the key became refinement and consolidation of theory. "It is often said that good theory leads to the discovery of new data, but it is probably no less valid to say that good data leads to the development of new theory."<sup>42</sup> The relationship between theory and data is the problem of the social sciences.

This problem results in part, no doubt, from a failure of

empirical researchers to exploit the resources of theory which are available to them. It is due in no small part, however, to the fact that much theory in the social sciences is virtually impervious to empirical test. Such theory cannot be very helpful to the development of a discipline which aspires to call itself scientific.<sup>43</sup>

Science then, for Campbell and Converse, is the refinement of technique which when employed on data produces quantitative results. Anything that cannot be measured cannot be controlled. "It is certainly not true that we now know how to submit to empirical test all of the important questions which have interested students of politics for the past 2000 years. Many of these questions may lie outside our competence for a very long time to come."<sup>44</sup> If they are to be answered -- and it is only a matter of time, according to Campbell and Converse -- science, particularly political science, which embellishes the statistical technique of empirical testing, must be more intensively cultivated.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 207.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 206-62.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 207. "Constraint" is the concept used by Everett Ladd in his studies. See: Everett Carll Ladd Jr., Ideology in America, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969, and Everett Carll Ladd Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill Book, Co., 1975. "Central to an ideology is 'ideological thinking' as a property which Philip Converse (1964) called 'constraint.' Any one viewing the flow of public life encounters a diverse array of issues. These he may respond to 'one at a time' or may order by imposing some integrative conceptual dimension. To the extent that he perceives an interconnection among issues and organizes his responses in terms of a larger 'package' or system of policy preferences, his thinking manifests constraint. An ideology is a constrained set of political positions prescribing the 'appropriate' responses to matters of government and public policy. It functions as a logically or quasilogically interrelated system of ideas which treats an area of political life that is both broad and significant. An ideology is more than the sum of its patches; it is the patches bound together - 'constrained' in a specified and ordered arrangement. A person sees politics ideologically when he applies some overarching conceptual dimension to myriad policy choices, when he organizes remote and abstract matters into what, for him, is a logical or quasilogical system."

<sup>4</sup>Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960, 192.

<sup>5</sup>"The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 208.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 209. For a similar approach see, Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," American Political Science Review, 58:1, June, 1964, 361-82.

<sup>9</sup>The American Voter, 4.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 539.

<sup>11</sup>Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order, London: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 1966, 4.

<sup>12</sup>Angus Campbell, "Recent Developments in Survey Studies of Political Behavior," in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the Behavioral Studies of Politics, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962, 32. The earlier sources referred to are: Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, The People's Choice, New York, John Wiley, 1948, and Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, New York: John Wiley, 1954.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Philip E. Converse, "Some Mass-Elite Contrasts in the Perception of Political Spaces," Social Science Information, August-October, 1975, 49. This is similar to the earlier reflection of H. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, 170. "We might frame an hypothesis to the effect that there is in truth only one ideological factor present in the attitude field, namely that of Radicalism-Conservatism. The T-factor itself does not constitute an alternative ideological system but is rather the projection onto the social attitude field of a set of personality variables.

<sup>15</sup>"The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 213.

<sup>16</sup>Philip E. Converse, "The Ideological Character of Mass Participation in American Politics," in Govert W. Vanden Bosch, ed., Political Issues and Business in 1966, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, 1964, 18-19.

<sup>17</sup>"The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 207. Some recent contributions challenge the Campbell-Converse findings. See: Robert S. Erikson and Norman R. Luttbeg, American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973; John O. Field and Ronald E. Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election," Public Opinion Quarterly 33, Fall 1969, 380-98; Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," Public Opinion Quarterly, 3, Fall 1968, 398-409; and Norman H. Nie and Kriste Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," Journal of Politics 36, August, 1974, 540-91. Luttbeg suggests that, "the data offer very

little support for Converse's hypothesis. The leaders and the public differ in the content of their beliefs, but the leaders do not place the ten issues studied on a single unifying dimension. Indeed, their belief systems show a complexity much in contrast to the simplicity suggested by a Liberalism-Conservatism distinction. . . . "The public also differs from what one would expect if the hypotheses were correct. They show an understandable, if not sophisticated, structuring of their beliefs."

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., 206.

<sup>19</sup>The American Voter, 19.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 92. See also, Gerald Kent Hikel, Beyond the Polls: Political Ideology and Its Correlates, Toronto: Lexington Books, 1973.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., 202. For a discussion on Converse's stress of cognition and a fuller understanding of ideology see, Richard M. Merelman, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization," American Political Science Review, 63, September, 1969, 750-67.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid. A much more thorough articulation on Left and Right which examines assumptions of polarity is provided in, Silvan Tomkins, "Left and Right: A Basic Dimension of Ideology and Personality," in Robert W. White, ed., The Study of Lives, New York: Atherton Press, 1963, 388-411.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 205. See, Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, 66, June 1972, 507, for a discussion of Converse's "constraint" as cognition.

<sup>25</sup>Elections and the Political Order, 176.

<sup>26</sup>The American Voter, 244. The table 10-11, 249 gives a summary of the distribution in the total sample of levels of conceptualization. The entire section, "The Formation of Political Concepts at a Mass Level" deserves attention, especially some of the responses which are recorded.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 19. For the classical critique of this reductionism from a Straussian point of view, see: Walter

Berns, "Voting Studies," in Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1962.

28 "The Nature of Belief Systems," 209.

29 "The Nature of Belief Systems," 256, footnote 3. The source here is Wendell R. Gerner, Uncertainty and Structure as Psychological Concepts, New York: MacMillan, 1962.

30 The American Voter, 500.

31 Ibid., 501.

32 Elections and the Political Order, 5. See, Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, The People Elect a President, Ann Arbor: Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1952.

33 Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides, Evanston: Row and Peterson, 1954.

34 The American Voter, 133.

35 "The Nature of Belief Systems," 206.

36 The American Voter, 9.

37 Ibid., 194. See "The Nature of Belief Systems," 259 for discussion of various statistical designs and their usage.

38 Elections and the Political Order, 5.

39 Ibid., 3.

40 Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," in Edward R. Tufte, ed., The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1970, 171.

41 Elections and the Political Order, 2. "But one must approach survey-based findings with caution. Surveys too can distort, particularly if one assumes that a pattern that is found at one point in time represents a general,

long-term tendency extending beyond the specified time period in which the research was conducted. We must be careful that we do not replace a common wisdom of impressionistic political science by a common wisdom based on a precise, but time-bound, research technique." Norman H. Nie and Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," Journal of Politics 36, August, 1974, 540-1.

<sup>42</sup>"Recent Developments in Survey Studies of Political Behavior," 45.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.



CHAPTER V

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF:

DAVID E. APTER

David E. Apter, a professor at Yale University since 1969, has had an impressive career in political science. After graduate work at Princeton, Apter taught in Africa for a number of years. He has been an Oxford fellow and a Rhodes scholar. A list of publications on comparative political systems, African politics, development and modernization, and theoretical questions makes Apter a most important behavioral contributor to the concept of ideology. Under his editorship the seminal Ideology and Discontent<sup>1</sup> was published in 1964.

Definition

For Apter, ideology is understood as the "link" between particular actions and practices within the wider "aura of meaning and symbolism." Ideology makes the mundane more reputable; it adds credibility to social conduct.

Ideology is a generic term applied to general ideas potent in specific situations of conduct; for example, not any ideals, only political ones; not any values, only those specifying a given set of preferences; not any beliefs, only those governing particular modes of thought. Because it is the link between action and fundamental belief, ideology helps to make more explicit the moral basis of action.<sup>2</sup>

Ideology is not defined as philosophy in Apter's work. Rather, it is made a hybrid notion which has

philosophical abstractions contained within it. For instance, Apter insists that nationalism is an example of an ideology at work in many underdeveloped African countries. Yet, "it does not represent a transcendental system of belief compelling man's allegiance to a system of moral imperatives, nor does it advance a particular code of ethics."<sup>3</sup> We should also note Apter's fleeting interest in anarchism as a nonsystematized philosophy-ideology.<sup>4</sup>

Apter has an elaborate construction of the concept of ideology, but never sets down his own definition. At one point, however, he makes Erikson's definition his own.

Ideology is:

an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity. Far from being arbitrary or consciously manageable (although it is as exploitable as all man's unconscious strivings) the total perspective created by ideological simplification reveals its strengths by the dominance it exerts on the seeming logic of historical events, and by its influence on the identity formation of individuals (and thus on their "ego strengths").<sup>5</sup>

In a much shorter form he states, "ideology, for our discussion, can be defined as the explicit and derivative articulation of political norms."<sup>6</sup> This is a rather generous view which does not note distinctions between

the political, the religious, and the philosophical. Apter makes the definition more difficult in his use of "political religion" as a term synonymous with ideology. Where religion is the subject matter, understood as transcendental ends, "political religion" becomes a referent to, "those transcendental ends that define the state as a moral entity. In this sense, political religion is the basis for the norms of a society, which we have called its consummatory values."<sup>7</sup> Both religion and ideology and, therefore, political religion, are seen as non-rational in character in the Apter definition. They both link practice to meaning, involve a doctrine, and cloak shabby motives and appearances. Apter's version of ideology lays emphasis "on the behavior of individuals in a setting of action-in-relation-to-principle."<sup>8</sup> Political revolutionaries and religious clerics have the same significance because

powerful ideologies and creative ideologists do much to enlarge the significance of the individual (as do religious ideas and innovative clerics). This is the reason the role of ideology is so central to the thinking of revolutionaries. To them, the working out of an ideology is a way of indicating the moral superiority of new ideas.<sup>9</sup>

The definition of ideology Apter settles on suggests that ideologies exist on numerous and different levels of meaning; the analysis of which must be functional, structural, and symbolistic. Meaning is diverse:

aesthetic, emotional and connotative, as well as rational, practical, and denotative. This is one reason why ideology is so confusing. It becomes important because it seems to convert reasonable demands into sets of evocative and emotional symbols. Political ideology has the effect of putting complex, individually held sensitivities on the same plane. But precisely because it simplifies what is complex, it is subject to continuous reinterpretation. The dialectic is thus both a source of definition and a cause of misunderstanding and controversy.<sup>10</sup>

Ideology is not restricted to the political domain. Rather, it is a way of thinking; a dogmatic form, often violent, full of stereotypes that are ultimately a defense mechanism. It protects the special beliefs of its adherents from any others seeking to destroy or undermine them. In the political sphere, "political ideology is an application of particular moral prescriptions to collectivities. Any ideology can become political."<sup>11</sup>

#### Context

Apter's modernization theory is the real impetus for the development of his concept of ideology. His basic argument on modernization holds that: 1) modernization is the agent of industrialization; 2) governments and political parties have an active role in the course a country decides to pursue; and 3) perhaps most important, the problem of legitimacy or political authority is the most vital for any given modernizing nation. For Apter, the end of modernization, which is a process, is the extension and enhancement of individual freedom.

and democracy. Modernization involves an increasing complexity of human affairs. More specifically, Apter suggests modernization involves role differentiation, coordination, and integration; increasing choice among alternatives (i.e., the modern versus the traditional way of life); and increasing rationality -- the weighing of means-ends schemes against one another. Illustrative models are provided as "ideal types" -- the secular libertarian, "Western Liberalism" versus the pre-industrial, pre-modern, and "Sacred Collectivity" of developing areas.

Ideology is offered as a product of discontent. Developing areas are in a process of being transformed into modern models. Or, "the ideology of contemporary politics in underdeveloped areas . . . is an ideology of development."<sup>12</sup>

Apter's work is clearly in the behavioral tradition. "In a sense, I felt very much a part of the movement . . . For me, politics is the interplay of three social dimensions -- normative, structural, and behavioral."<sup>13</sup> He states in his collected essays that his future goal is the application of his theory to world events and, "to deal more fully with the behavioral dimensions of politics in terms of the structural constraints presently developed."<sup>14</sup> A "synthesis" of the normative and the empirical, the professional and the intellectual, and

the theoretical and the behavioral is the object of Apter's contribution. He seeks to "capture normative truths without paying some exorbitant ideological price. Sought is some mode of reckoning between the liberal and radical normative points of departure so that a structural theory may come closer to the spectrum of working politics, where events have many meanings and purposes."<sup>15</sup> The gap is closed for Apter by use of the "functional method."

Noting how systems change and then generalizing about the particulars of that activity becomes Apter's modus operandi. The application of this procedure is particularly valuable in the comparative study of countries undergoing modernization.

To do this, my first objective is to present a typology of governmental forms and some theories about how they change, meanwhile demonstrating the relationship between these forms and several functional categories. I regard this as a step toward a more applied form of structural-functional analysis suitable for political analysis. . .<sup>16</sup>

This investigation is carried out in three stages: first, an identification of moral problems; next, a differentiation of change into systems and subsystems; and last, an abstraction of structural properties. "Involved in this task are normative, structural, and behavioral considerations that, when applied to data, will help in the comparative analysis of modernization."<sup>17</sup>

The bulk of Apter's work concerns the so-called third world; however, in the introduction to Ideology and Discontent he tells us that the post-industrial western countries have reached "a broad agreement on fundamentals and corresponding magnification of minor issues."<sup>18</sup> He goes on to describe and applaud the professionalization of society, class structure, liberal technocracy, and the new ideology -- science. The high level of consensus characterized by "broad agreement," established by elitist technocrats ushering in stable, liberal, almost utopian democracy is one of the elements in Apter's modernization thesis. Science, particularly social science, has become the antidote for all of society's ills.

#### Theoretical Conceptualization

Ideology is unlike other subjects of inquiry in that Apter himself realizes it draws any one who studies it to a deeper search, into what he calls the "meta-theoretical" domain. For Apter,

(P)erhaps the main reason for studying ideology is its mirror-like quality, reflecting the moral and material aspects of our understanding. These aspects become intensely interesting, especially in an age of science when they can no longer be rooted in faith. . . We have developed our moral sensibilities along with our skepticism.<sup>19</sup>

Ideology is interesting because it is based on "outrage." Never dull, it shines in moral indignation and reflects the never-ceasing, ever-striving aims of humanity.

Ideology specifically identifies, elaborates, and particularizes views about the choices confronting man. Matters of priority, of choice, and of distribution all contain meaning expressed in ideologies. Further,

an ideology will contain a synthesized relationship of general values germane to the community, whether stated in utopian, scientific, or revelatory terms, and it will have some application of the principles to modes of distribution. In this way the normative element will utilize either a traditional statement or a hortatory interpretation of structure, or some mixture of both.<sup>20</sup>

Apter suggests that ideologies are usually introduced to "resolve" conflicts, but often work in a manner such as to "solidify" them. Ideology is seen essentially as rationalization, be it "matter-of-fact" or "mystical." Ideology is also "always an aspect of roles. It does not refer to 'attitudes' as such. In this context a question such as; What is the effect of ideology on behavior? is irrelevant."<sup>21</sup> Because ideology is normative it is often full of contradictions, loaded with vitality, seemingly self-perpetuating, and charged with intensity. Ideology implies involvement according to Apter.

Ideology, like language and dreams, is related to morphologies of behavior by universal psychological variables. Balance, mastery, and control are the desired results of ideological behavior. Ideas help man control and change their environment. They arise from action rather than pure speculation.<sup>22</sup>



The core of Apter's concept of ideology deals with how ideologies are formed. Of utmost importance is the representation of ideologies in the expressions made by political leaders. Ideologies are communicated through language. Apter informs his theory with numerous examples from the Nkrumah episode in Ghana.<sup>23</sup> Coherent ideologies are best seen as part of a process that generally involves the elite segment of a population.

In this process, individual identities are frequently expressed in metaphor, with some persons describing themselves as worthy cultivators in a new moral system. . . Such an ideology needs to create a picture of the roundness and wholeness of society. Ideology and political religion are thus closely related. Ideology is often the expression of political religion. . . Ideologies do not spring from a sudden revelation but have first passed through a latent period. This latent period ends when confusion in belief is manifested in anger and bitterness.<sup>24</sup>

Ideological perceptions of reality are linked with authority and political groups in a sequence where distinct stages are observable: (1) multiple images are held by elites; (2) there is selective recall of the images; (3) a relative-selective threshold is reached; (4) a search for meaning ends in hortatory realism; (5) a charismatic leader manipulates political fantasy; and finally, (6) a working consensus is reached by practical realism.<sup>25</sup> In practice, according to Apter, only at the conclusion are ideologies related to consciousness. Here consensus on the integration of roles is evidenced by a similarity or agreement of opinion. Ideologies are more than simple sets of par-

ticular ideas, they have become a factor in the legitimization of authority. Apter suggests that the most effective ideologies in the study of modernization, using his sequential pattern, have been Calvinism and Marxism. This is the case because "both have integrated consummatory and instrumental values so that each reinforces the other."<sup>26</sup>

If ideology is a process that can be manipulated by ideologists or dogmatists, ideology can best be categorized in three roles: the "Robin Hood," the Ideologue, and the Scientist. The first two are entrepreneurial in nature, and the last a career role. Robin Hoods emerge at stage one of the sequence and are clandestine, charismatic, and lie between the outlaw and the politician. Apter cites Fidel Castro as a recent example of such a role. Ideologues are heroic figures evident in the period spanning stages two through five. Propaganda of the vulgar sort characterizes these militants, typically nationalistic or socialistic. Scientists arrive only at stage six when the rationalistic-functionalistic universe has come into being. This is the meritocracy based on intellectual ability, where technique solves problems. Science (and social science) allows knowledge to be applied to the problems of development and modernization.

The ideology of science is not merely a style of thinking about problems, nor is it a derivation from the functional significance of science in an industrialized world, although this is clearly the origin of its power. Rather, it is the application of rational methods and experimentalism to social affairs. In this respect, the ideology of science accepts the principle of potentiality as the basis of its ultimate legitimacy.<sup>27</sup>

Ideology is part of the modernizing process but only after nationalism and socialism have given way does ideology as science take shape. Apter lists the following conditions which must be achieved before the advance of science as ideology can follow: (1) there is general acceptance of common membership in the society; (2) sufficient development. Industrial societies are no longer in the process of changing from traditional to modern forms of social life. As a consequence, they look beyond programmatic ideologies with their simplified remedial suggestions.<sup>28</sup>

What Apter describes here is in fact his view of the end of a certain kind of ideology, wherein science downgrades the beliefs of the past. Science for Apter is not a mass phenomenon but rather executed in an elite community of professionals. Apter approves of "the social discipline imposed by the scientific ideology of professionalism. The key to the scientific 'establishment' is its professional status."<sup>29</sup> Ideology as science is unlike earlier ideologies; it is impossible to share with all; its exclusivity means that "in most Western industrialized countries, there is a growing bifurcation between the scientifically literate and the scientifically illiterate."<sup>30</sup>

In summary, Apter characterizes the ideology of science as: (1) Science as a well-defined ideology possessing norms of empiricism, predictability, and rationality as guides to conduct. (2) Social science is becoming accepted as scientific, and scientific norms are

increasingly accepted as guides to social conduct.

(3) There is a universal trend toward planning, calculation, and rationalistic goals concerned with the future in both the developing and the developed areas.

(4) In the developing areas, vulgar ideologies adopt the values of science through some form of socialism in association with the national independence movement.

(5) In the industrialized countries, the new ideology expresses itself in a meritocracy.

Professionalism in science is the only path to political modernization. Apter's concept of ideology is not altogether unlike that of certain eighteenth century ideologues, where science was grounded in rationalism and Liberalism.

#### Usage

The assumptions underlying Apter's usage of the concept are two: (1) the pragmatic notion of man as an individual actor orienting his action towards the achievement of certain goals; and (2) the notion of society as a complex of culture, social sub-systems (including predominantly political structures), and personality, effectively integrated.<sup>31</sup> The models which Apter develops -- traditional and modern secular -- are seen in terms of "role prescriptions," "role patterns," and "role modalities." Ideology becomes one of the foci of attention for analysis because it is important particularly in the study of con-

crete political sub-structures. Apter's research plan is announced in the last sentence of one of his African studies. "We sought to 'research' a problem of great complexity involving as it does the gamut of human emotions and man's ability to adapt to and survive shocks of great magnitude."<sup>32</sup> Ideology is consistently used as a tool in an endless adaptive process. Modernization is the subject matter and ideology is a component part of that subject.

The sources to which Apter is indebted are numerous. Perhaps one initial clue is his dedication to The Politics of Modernization to Marion J. Levy, Jr. The use of a structural-functional approach as developed by Parsons and expanded by Levy, "supplies a vantage point for discussing social systems, including political subsystems in comparative societies."<sup>33</sup> The research theory behind Apter's attempt to examine and explain social behavior in the traditional system and the secular system is based on the methodological framework taken from The Structure of Society by Levy, and on role analysis as developed by Robert Merton. Apter's concept of perception is that indicated by Parsons, in The Social System. He states that "underlying the methodological approach is a concept of perception as a function of socialization."<sup>34</sup> The two systems or models that are described are normative "ideal types" as advocated by Max Weber. In Choice and the Politics of Allocation, Apter informs us of his point of departure: "the general

formulation is a modification of structural components employed originally by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils in their description of the theory of action."<sup>36</sup> Given to a dialectical examination of ideologies, Apter resolves his normative dilemmas by adopting the functional approach supplied in the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss.<sup>37</sup>

These methodological sources should not, however, reduce the significance of Karl Mannheim in the concept of ideology as developed by Apter. Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia is upheld by Apter. "In order to understand political change, one must answer the question, 'What are political perceptions?'"<sup>38</sup> For Apter,

(P)articipants in every society, colonial or independent, cloak reality in different meanings. Indeed, those concerned with the sociology of knowledge have been struck with the importance of the fact and have devoted their efforts to articulating relationships between material and ideal factors in the establishment of any individual's perceptive universe.<sup>39</sup>

In a footnote on this point Apter follows Mannheim when he says, "To extract out of the many-sided reality its slowly changing pattern and the structure of its inner balance, is the aim and at the same time the anticipated final vision of a fully developed historicism."<sup>40</sup>

Apter's concern for the moral predicament and his basis for a social analysis of norms are reminiscent of Mannheim's observations in Ideology and Utopia. By exploring the ideological modes of thought, Apter seeks,

like Mannheim, to put ideologies away in favor of the more hopeful alternative of social science. Agreeing with Mannheim, Apter argues that

the discovery that much thought is ideological challenges the validity of thought itself. Man's thought had from time immemorial appeared to him as a segment of his spiritual existence and not simply as a discrete objective fact. Reorientation had in the past frequently meant a change in man himself. In these earlier periods it was mostly a case of slow shifts in values and norms, of a gradual transformation of the frame of reference from which men's actions derived their ultimate orientation. . . . What we now experience is more than a new idea, and the questions we raise constitute more than a new problem. What we are concerned with here is the elemental perplexity of our time, which can be epitomized in the symptomatic question, 'How is it possible for man to continue to think and live in a time when the problems of ideology and utopia are being radically raised and thought through to all their implications?'<sup>41</sup>

The psychology utilized by Apter in his concept of ideology is noticeably Freudian. Ideology is made a form of personal rationalization which hides reality. He notes

(For Freud, ideologies are elaborate mental fictions that the observer must penetrate in order to understand personality, then ideology is uniquely personal. The scholar who wishes to understand ideology must approach it like a psychotherapist who is unravelling the mental rationalizations of his patients. It is hard to say whether this speculation makes ideology a pathological condition for Freud. Certainly he would consider political extremists emotionally suspect.<sup>42</sup>

Apter appreciates the Freudian aspect of the study of ideology because it goes beyond that offered by the simplistic Marxian suggestions of motivation. He quotes

Erikson with firm approval on the development of personality and the study of ideology.

Erikson's point is that the psychotherapist cum social scientist, as he observes ideology in the context of personality, can contribute a great deal to the understanding of why individuals are so receptive to ideology. Erikson establishes a theory of personality formation that is based on the aspect of maturation he calls the search for identity.<sup>43</sup>

Maturation for Apter is modern secular liberalism and its identity is to be found in the role of the social scientist acting as a professional.

#### Science

The study of ideology, which is, we are told, distinct from the examination of particular ideologies, raises for Apter an issue about the scientific nature of social science methods. The increasing role of science and the historical changes it brings in man's values and norms through slow shifts and gradual transformation is Apter's point of departure. Apter reminds us that

Bertrand Russell made a comment about the role of science that is increasingly applicable to social science as well (as natural science). Science used to be valued as a means of getting to know the world; now, owing to the triumphs of technique, it is conceived as showing how to change the world...to expose the ideological aspects of human thinking does not, however, make ideological thought impossible. It divides it into new forms, one is that of dogma...the more hopeful alternative is the spread of social science.<sup>44</sup>



Ideological thought may no longer be possible in the sense which history has familiarized us but there is the new form, the "hopeful alternative" according to Apter, of social science -- the ultimate and last ideology. "In this sense, science is the ideology of modernity, and by comparison, other ideologies, whether or not they make the claim to be scientific, have become 'vulgar'."<sup>45</sup> Social science is not totally like natural science; although, method, techniques, and quantification are the same. The uniqueness of social science lies in its moral point of view. The meaning of social acts is related to persons, obligations, and choice. Put another way, "The new emphasis upon science is thus an old one; it is a search for elegance of theory, clarity of thought, and the ability to predict political action and purpose in human affairs."<sup>46</sup>

Particularly for political science, the behavioral revolution means that

(P)olitical science has not lost its architectonic impulse, but more and more contemporary social scientists now consider the political system a coordinate part of the wider social system. If anything, sociology has become the new omnibus social science. In political science consensus on the nature of civic virtue has declined. Even the philosophers show greater concern for linguistic analysis than for empirical truths. Doubt about the appropriateness of certain mechanisms for realizing civic virtue has stimulated new forms of analysis, like functionalism, which separates function from form.<sup>47</sup>

The scientific demands of political science are the modern ones of collecting data, applying techniques to that data, and analyzing the data according to theoretical

models. Apter's general theoretical paradigm focuses and stresses the following dimensions:

to organize and classify variables, to generate hypotheses which when verified emerge as generalizations, and to explain the relationships among the generalizations. Thus in an ascending analytic hierarchy, variables point to particular aspects of data, hypotheses indicate relationships among variables, and theories suggest relationships among hypotheses and generalizations. It is with the linkage between variables, hypotheses, and theory that this paradigm is concerned.<sup>48</sup>

Apter, following Merton, calls for the development of middle range theories. For

too much emphasis on abstraction cripples our ability to see the world with freshness and common sense and, most important, to interpret it in ordinary language. Too much emphasis on technique and empirical data without a relevant intellectual context (the current trend) reduces us to the level of a child who has been given a high-powered microscope and asked to describe what he sees.<sup>49</sup>

Realizing the "current trends" in social science, where desire for scientific status has outstripped the actual scientific capabilities, Apter nevertheless applauds the move from "simple description" to "analytical empiricism." He is at all times favorably impressed with quantification and the use of technique. He says, ". . . I prefer working at the 'conceptual level' trying to establish a better analytical basis for quantification but with the latter as a definite, or long-run goal."<sup>50</sup> Again, ". . . the search for ultimately quantitative, indicator variables

capable of standing as surrogates for analytical ones, becomes a long-term concern."<sup>51</sup> It is not a matter of favoring empirical-logical studies over the more quantitative, but "perhaps the real answer is that both will be important if the researcher is himself 'interesting'; that is, capable of locating important regularities of behavior."<sup>52</sup>

Description is an end of politics but it is also the beginning. Apter works within the historical tradition of empiricism which contains the roots of behavioralism for political science. The accumulation of details through descriptive research lead to the later emphasis on research technique and method.

The emphasis on science and technique was expanded and the psychological orientation was extended until politics reached into related fields. . . Thus, if the retreat into specialization was at first antitheoretical, it was not antiscientific. Nor as a matter of fact - was it in the long run antitheoretical. It developed its own theories. The narrow notion of science in politics concerned with the extension of 'hard data' techniques to trends in behavior was the American answer to European theory, but it remained almost exclusively pre-occupied with American problems.<sup>53</sup>

Apter approves of Duverger's dictum that "to seek facts and record observations without any systematization is not scientific." He takes it a step further

. . . with alacrity to the opposite proposition that any systematization which does not seek facts or record observations is unscientific. But between these two propositions,

both of which have that improving piety which a common discourse requires, lie all the real questions.<sup>54</sup>

Outlining the normative, structural, and behavioral models of analytic theory<sup>55</sup> and the various combinations of possibilities, Apter locates himself in the "behavioral-structural dimension." He states, "In our opinion, the structural-behavioral approach represents the frontier of future comparative political studies in the developing nations."<sup>56</sup> Apter's future goals include an application of his theory to world events and "to deal more fully with the behavioral dimensions of politics in terms of the structural constraints presently developed."<sup>57</sup>

Apter therefore works within the behavioral paradigm and, although wary, continues to applaud the direction toward more quantitative techniques. He distances his notion of science from earlier traditional legal-historical and institutional approaches to politics. Political science for Apter, as for Lasswell, is oriented toward "problem solving." The emphasis on science

does not end in specialization, it merely shifts the specialist function first to an appreciation of scientific technique, second to concept formation and organization, and third to technical information of a highly specific sort.<sup>58</sup>

As with most behavioralists, Apter's primary concerns are the use of technique and the advance of scientific research method. Improved techniques for the gathering

and analyzing of data

connect the analysis and study of government to the philosophy of science by emphasizing logical and epistemological problems, and also cause us to speculate about the application of highly advanced mathematical and statistical techniques and computer programming to the careful mapping and testing of propositions about government.<sup>59</sup>

The emphasis on method or what he calls the "rules of the game" are necessary to make the data useful and logical in terms of the canons of science. Political science, in order to be science, must look after and train its profession in areas of experimental control, research design, operational assumptions, and statistical technique. A high state of sophistication can only be reached with the use of behavioral assumptions. Apter lists two types of behavioral models: "nuclear containing predicting assumptions; and experimental which measures changes."<sup>50</sup> It is the experimental which he sees as immediately useful in the area of methodology for social science. For,

they provide a way in which order and control can be brought into the analysis of empirical political problems. If we assume, for example, that our S-R model as nuclear model has relevance to basic factors in general behavioral theory, particularly in learning, it is conceivable that it could form part of an operational model for the analysis of basic factors in political behavior.<sup>61</sup>

The combination of functionalism and operationalism brought to the behavioral dimension implies that the principal job of political science is more precise ex-

perimental testing. Computer programming makes everything possible. Apter insists that ". . . there is not nearly as much new under the theoretical sun as there is under the technological . . . This being so, it becomes a sad irony that we will need to rely on the computer to adjudicate morality."<sup>62</sup>

Apter goes beyond science into the realm of philosophy with a suggestion that theories must yield predictability and, in so doing, control the environment. This science become philosophy "must be thoroughly compatible with rules and uses of empirical evidence, stripped of all mysticism, historicism, and obfuscations . . . Science is after all how the mind creates ideas out of evidence. And that is the fundamental question of philosophy."<sup>63</sup> Remember that science for Apter

requires precise notational constructs whose empirical referents are capable of locating appropriate descriptive events. Theory, based on relationships between these constructs and phrased in the form of hypotheses or propositions, must be transformed into verification.<sup>64</sup>

Science is in this sense both a cause and a method. At times it is creative, more often it is didactic -- always and increasingly, it is technical.

Apter's understanding of the relationship between ideology and science, already mentioned in some detail, is perhaps more complex than most other behavioralists. Approving the wane of earlier ideologies, Apter nevertheless sees the rise of modern science, as a "preferable ideology" of professionalism and technical specialization.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup>David E. Apter, ed., "Introduction," Ideology and Discontent, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. This collection is perhaps the most important of the modern attempts to handle the concept. Note its excellent and helpful bibliography, 329-35.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>3</sup>David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom of Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

<sup>4</sup>David E. Apter and James Joll, eds., Anarchism Today, New York: McMillan, 1970; I cannot help but notice Apter's closing comment applauding the fact that in the modern period, "every man is his own Christ." 13.

<sup>5</sup>Ideology and Discontent, 21.

<sup>6</sup>David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 270.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 267; See his chapter on "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968, 193-232; A further discussion of religion and its relation to ideology can be found in my final chapter where I take issue with the Apter conceptualization.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 314.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.; See also, D. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 22; "Political prophets may be stylistically different from religious ones, but their messages are designed for more or less the same audiences. The simplest way to locate heresies and conflicts over orthodoxies. . . is that which occupied the Church Fathers. . ."

<sup>10</sup>David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, 23-24, footnote 15.

<sup>11</sup>The Politics of Modernization, 314.

<sup>12</sup>David E. Apter, "Political Organization and Ideology," in Wilbert E. Moore and Arnold S. Feldman, eds., Labor Commitment and Social Change in Developing Areas, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1960, 332.

<sup>13</sup>David E. Apter, Political Change: Collected Essays, London: Frank Cass, 1973, 3.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., x; See 23-60 for the two behavioral variables employed in the theory. For Apter, modernization is brought about by imbourgeoisement and radicalization, thus his hypothesis for a comparative study of history employing these variables.

<sup>15</sup>Choice and the Politics of Allocation, 2.

<sup>16</sup>The Politics of Modernization, vii-viii.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., x.

<sup>18</sup>Ideology and Discontent, 30.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 15.

<sup>20</sup>Choice and the Politics of Allocation, 23.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 23-24.

<sup>22</sup>The Politics of Modernization, 280; Apter quotes Freud on this point suggesting ideology as rationalization, particularly in the myth of the "chosen people." "It must not be assumed that mankind came to create its first world system through a purely speculative thirst for knowledge. The practical need of mastering the world must have contributed to this effort." Political belief, here looks behind reality.

<sup>23</sup>See, David E. Apter, "Nkrumah, Charisma, and the Coup," Daedalus, 97:3, Summer, 1968, 757-792; also, The Politics of Modernization, 303-08; and David E. Apter, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 181-85, and 115-35.

<sup>24</sup>The Politics of Modernization, 319.



<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 320-21, for an elaboration of each element in the sequence.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 322.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 343.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 344; Apter's footnotes point to Lipset, Bell, and Shils for supporting evidence on his argument concerning the ascendancy of science.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., 245.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 348.

<sup>31</sup>David E. Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, 327.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 334; Apter distances his approach from the earlier ones of Hobson, Lenin, and Schumpeter from which he wishes to drastically depart. For he has, "sought to examine rather than judge."

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 325.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 328.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 329.

<sup>36</sup>Choice and the Politics of Allocation, 8.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., See, footnote 16, p. 25; also, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 368.

<sup>38</sup>See The Political Kingdom in Uganda, 23; also, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 278.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 460.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., This is taken from Mannheim's, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 87. Apter seems very given to long quotes from Mannheim's classics.

<sup>41</sup>Ideology and Discontent, 39.

<sup>42</sup>The Politics of Modernization, 280-1.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 281.

<sup>44</sup>Ideology and Discontent, 18.

<sup>45</sup>The Politics of Modernization, 318.

<sup>46</sup>David E. Apter, "Comparative Politics and Political Thought: Past Influences and Future Development," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., Comparative Politics, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, 727.

<sup>47</sup>David E. Apter and Charles F. Andrain, eds., Contemporary Analytical Theory, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972, 2.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 5; See also, Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 364-71, for elaboration on "the paradigm" for political science.

<sup>49</sup>Choice and the Politics of Allocation, 4.

<sup>50</sup>Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 2.

<sup>51</sup>Political Change, 5.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>53</sup>"Comparative Politics and Political Thought: Past Influences and Future Development," 730; Note Apter's biting criticisms of the Institutionalists, 730-33.

<sup>54</sup>Political Change, 61; In the same article Apter goes on to refute technique as self-validating but also states the view, "that although theory is not a God, God is a theory.", 70.

<sup>55</sup>See Contemporary Analytical Theory, 9-23.

<sup>56</sup>Political Change, 221.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., x.

<sup>58</sup>Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 11.

<sup>59</sup>Political Change, 99.

<sup>60</sup>Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization, 18; He suggests the classic S-R model in psychology is both a nuclear model from a theoretical point of view and an experimental model from an operational point of view. Note also the footnote to the positivism of Von Mises which Apter describes as "covering nicely some of the problems current in political science today.", 15.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 19.

<sup>62</sup>David E. Apter, "Comparative Studies: A Review with Some Projections," in Ivan Vallier, ed., Comparative Methods in Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 10; "Operationalism" means, "that for each descriptive category there will be specific surrogates or indication variables, preferably quantitative in nature, capable of manipulation by statistical and other methods of data gathering. Such criteria for comparative analysis are in this sense no different from those of the pure sciences. Their formal or mathematical modes, translated into empirical events, are also capable of being categorized by descriptive surrogates whose indicators are programmed.", 9.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 14-15.

<sup>64</sup>Political Change, vii.

CHAPTER VI

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF:

ROBERT D. PUTNAM

Robert D. Putnam's work is a recent, sophisticated, and important behavioral contribution to the study of ideology. The focus of his work is a direct result of his graduate studies at Yale and the dissertation he completed there in comparative politics. Putnam has continued his work at the Institute of Public Policy Studies at the University of Michigan. His book, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy is the latest and perhaps the most thorough of the behavioral attempts to deal with the perplexing phenomenon of ideology.

Definition

Putnam's definition of ideology is tied to the object of his study, "elite political cultures," where "political elite" is defined "very loosely as those who in any society rank toward the top of the (presumably closely inter-correlated) dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics."<sup>1</sup> Assuming that politicians' attitudes matter, Putnam poses three questions of paramount importance for the functioning of political systems:

What do politicians think politics is all about?  
How do they think politics ought to work? And  
how do they work in politics?<sup>2</sup>

It is Putnam's aim to "question and measure" the answers of politicians in Britain and Italy, so as to understand the complex working of ideology and politics; something the "American literature on ideology" has been unable to do, according to Putnam. Putnam readily agrees that "few concepts in social analysis have inspired such a mass of commentary, yet few have stimulated the production of so little cumulative knowledge about society and politics."<sup>3</sup> So Putnam's approach of "political style" is set against prior attempts to define ideology as "pathology." "As long as we consider the link between political style and pathology to be a definitional one, we will be unable to understand realistically the behavior of ideological politicians."<sup>4</sup> This is no easy task and Putnam reports that there are serious methodological problems to overcome. On his own terms, it "requires a concern with elite political culture which is at the same time sensitive to nuances and subject to the hard discipline of coding and counting. I have tried to illustrate here the promise of such an approach."<sup>5</sup>

Putnam never formally adopts a single definition of ideology. Realizing that "a number of exhaustive classifications of definitions of ideology have been proffered, and that there is probably no great gain to be made by compiling yet another,"<sup>6</sup> he is quick to retort that meanings of ideology have caused a great deal of confusion. So "the way to progress must cross the arid plain of definitional clarification."<sup>7</sup> At this point, Putnam suggests

that instead of developing a new definition of ideology, that some of the positive aspects of earlier works by Giovanni Sartori and Edward Shils be adopted. Accepting Sartori's distinction between truth-value and functional value, he goes on to suggest that "if the term ideology is to be useful to social scientists, there must be some identifiable characteristics of individual political actors that justifies describing their attitudes and behavior as ideological."<sup>8</sup> As a last stipulation, Putnam refuses to admit all men are "equally ideological." In other words, "the terms 'ideology' and 'ideological' must refer to characteristics that, at least in principle, are variables rather than constants."<sup>9</sup>

After outlining what ideology could be, Putnam offers a "hypothetical 'menu' of components," which he admits comes essentially from the earlier description of ideology by Shils. There exist fourteen possible elements in a definition of ideology according to Putnam. He tells the reader the concept includes certain types of behavior, the choice of which could include "one or more"<sup>10</sup> of the following:

1. Guided by a comprehensive, consistent, deductively organized belief system.
2. Guided by an explicit, consciously held belief system
3. Guided by a belief system that is closed, rigid, resistant to new information
4. Guided by a belief system that is affectively or emotionally charged
5. Guided by a belief system that distorts or oversimplifies reality, that is biased or irrational

6. Guided by a philosophy of history and/or a social theory that is applied to everyday questions and issues
7. Concerned with abstract principles, not concrete interests
8. Future oriented, utopian
9. Hostile and intolerant toward political opponents; prone to dichotomous, "black-white" thinking, paranoid
10. Opposed to compromise, bargaining, incrementalism, and other aspects of pluralist politics
11. Alienated from established social and political institutions
12. Extremist
13. Oriented to conflict and opposed to consensus
14. Authoritarian; a moral absolutist; prone to value ends; not means.<sup>11</sup>

Putnam closes his section on definitional problems by making certain "kernels" of the above definitions into "testable propositions," and by concluding that definitional analysis is "inconclusive." Luckily, "the way to progress not only crosses the arid plain of definitional analysis; it also winds through the murky swamp of empirical investigation."<sup>12</sup>

The analysis of political style becomes Putnam's "way of interpreting the notion of 'ideological politics.'"<sup>13</sup> Politicians analyze in particular ways that can be empirically tested. Again, politicians' talk reveals "not what men think about politics and policy, but how they do so -- this is the essence of political style."<sup>14</sup> There are twelve stylistic characteristics contained in Putnam's idea of political style. He presents marginal distributions for each national sample, showing the relative frequency of each stylistic characteristic in each country. This allows readers to see the different ways politicians discuss policy.

The list includes coefficients for these categories:

1. Generalizer - particularizer
2. Inductive - deductive thinking
3. Historical context given
4. Discussion moralized
5. Group benefits as criterion
6. Political acceptability as criterion
7. Practicality as criterion
8. Tradition as criterion
9. Cost as criterion
10. Reference to named ideology
11. Reference to future utopia
12. Reference to past utopia

15

Further, by adding together respondents' scores and intercorrelating them by factor analysis, Putnam arrives at three syndromes or main dimensions of political style. These "average types" become indexes, or measures of an individual politician's style of policy analysis. The factors are:

1. Ideological Style  
Generalizer - particularizer  
Inductive - deductive thinking  
Reference to named ideology  
Reference to future utopia
2. Traditionalism  
Tradition as criterion  
Reference to past utopia  
Historical context
3. Partisanship  
Discussion moralized  
Group benefits as criterion  
Practicality as criterion

We are told that this decomposition of elements of political ideas is the mix of which most men are made. According to Putnam, man's goals, as well as the rules he follows to seek those goals are "informed by his operative ideals."<sup>16</sup> Further, "the empirical judgments a man hazards about a



complex and ambiguous world are structured by his cognitive predispositions."<sup>17</sup> These two components, the normative and the empirical, when combined are regulated by "political style." And according to Putnam, the most salient dimension of "style" is the influence of ideology in politics.

### Context

Putnam has published two books and numerous articles to date. In all of these, his primary focus has been the beliefs and attitudes of politicians or civil servants. The study of political leaders or elites is based on the premise that political decisions are of ultimate importance and those who actually make decisions -- the "decision makers" -- count. "Who rules," the central question for empirical political research, is also the backbone of Putnam's work on political elites. For, "systematic research has begun to produce a modest store of knowledge about political elites that is both reliable and reasonably coherent."<sup>18</sup> Putnam's latest text, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, has as its goal "to summarize and assess our evolving understanding of those who rule . . ."<sup>19</sup>

Putnam's inquiry finds its context in the juncture of two approaches to politics. On one hand, Robert Dahl's work on political elites serves as the impetus, while on the other, "political culture" directs his approach. Putnam accepts the "culture" approach directly from Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Lucian Pye. He quotes Fred Greenstein's statement that attitudes matter because "behavior . . . is a

function of both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those situations . . . "20 Political culture provides the answers to many important questions.<sup>21</sup> Only by using this avenue can Putnam arrive at answers to queries about what political leaders really believe -- what central standards of political evaluation are used by elites. The establishment of basic orientations which are measureable is the first priority. Uniquely, he claims, causal contexts, effects, and origins can be suggested. In his research Putnam acknowledges Robert Dahl's logical structure of inquiry as the orientation for his study:

I. Factors determine Beliefs - II. Political Beliefs -  
III. Political Actions - IV. Regimes<sup>22</sup>

The behavior of politicians is the context of the Putnam theory of ideology: "what politicians believe (cognitive predispositions), what they believe in (operative ideas), and how they believe (political style)."23

#### Theoretical Conceptualization

Man is essentially non-political according to Putnam. "Most men are not interested in politics. Most do not participate in politics. And few have much power or influence."<sup>24</sup> Ideology then, is functionally conceived as the style of politicians, not of mass publics. Elites are supposedly more sophisticated in ideological terms because mass political behavior has been found conceptually impoverished in the studies by others including Converse, Barnes, Cobb, and Bennett.

Not the what but the how of elite political thought entails the makeup of ideology. Given this conception, it is not unusual that the research design takes the form of an investigation into the ideological framework of specific politicians using specially designed questionnaires. These questionnaires are given to numerous practicing politicians in various national settings on a host of concrete policy issues. By zeroing-in on individual politicians of a given political elite, cross-national comparison is also facilitated. Putnam's aim is prediction and understanding of leaders' opinions and actions. Accordingly, he develops scales, indexes, and configurations around four basic classes of elite attitudes:

- (1) Cognitive orientations - assumptions about how society works;
- (2) normative orientations - views about how society ought to work;
- (3) interpersonal orientations - attitudes about other players in the political game; and
- (4) stylistic orientations - structural characteristics of elite belief systems.<sup>25</sup>

Operationally, after coding and factoring into categories previously discussed, Putnam arrives at what he terms the "Ideological Style Index," or the sum of the respondents' ratings on each of the component variables. Persons who score high on this index are considered to be "ideological" politicians. When validated empirically, Putnam concludes: "Certain politicians have characteristic A -- they conduct politics from the standpoint of a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs. Such politicians are 'ideological'."<sup>26</sup>

Putnam is clearly opposed to the traditions of political inquiry springing from psychoanalytic argument or from Marxist philosophy. Ideology is not conceptualized as "rationalization" or as "class-interest" in his theory. He admits that behavior is influenced by emotional and material-structural ingredients, but these only supplement his explanation of ideology as the public beliefs of politicians with "conscious intention." It is to be expected that he locates the ideologists at the extremes of the left-right spectrum. "Using this linear definition of 'extremist' (a five point scale), we can see . . . that ideologues are indeed concentrated at the political extremes."<sup>27</sup> Further, the proposition that: "Ideologues are extremist and they are relatively hostile toward established institutions" is judged correct. Putnam, to his disappointment, finds these ideologues, however, are not altogether "unwilling" to compromise. Instead they are willing to enter into political give and take -- they accept the usage and practice of pluralism. Or to say it another way, "some people are more dogmatic than others, but ideologues as a group are not."<sup>28</sup>

The conceptual tools Putnam employs lead him into the murky waters of the "end of ideology" debate. Interestingly, it is referred to by Putnam not as the "end," but the "decline" thesis. Since there is no information on politicians of bygone eras, Putnam suggests a generational approach which can overcome this methodological dilemma. His findings suggest a "decline in hostility" because compromise becomes ac-

ceptable, yet ideology is found to be "increasing to a small degree."

Our conclusion about the decline of partisan hostility in Western Europe is consistent with the speculations of most other observers. But our finding that there is no similar decline in the frequency of an ideological style of politics is somewhat less orthodox. . . .<sup>29</sup>

The decline of any particular Weltanschauung is not the point under debate here. Putnam thinks that "persisting ideologies" may also be said to be readapting to the new environment. "Ideologism" we are told is increasing and convergence is taking place as we enter "the knowledgeable society." Intolerance does not signify the decline of ideology; in fact, Putnam closes his argument with a suggestion that Charles Lindblom's "problem-solving, modern decision-maker" is remarkably similar to his description of those found to have "political style." Ideology in an old sense has passed, but in this new and rational-synoptic sense becomes the empirical-technical link between thought and action.

Putnam argues that ideology as "isms" or "extremism" on the left-right continuum is definitely declining while "ideological" as a style is increasing. He suggests the center of the spectrum is not particularly given to ideologies; it also ranks low on ideological style. Accordingly, the vast "middle" of the spectrum could even be called "non-ideological."

Following Lane, Putnam agrees that ideology and politics are going through a period of reformulation. However Putnam parts company with Lane when it comes to the latter's "mis-

understanding" that scientific knowledge can totally replace political ideology. Putnam rather believes that thought and knowledge to some extent "affect" politics. But he insists his "squabble" here is a definitional one and not a substantive one.

#### Usage

As a behavioral scientist, Putnam has borrowed heavily from earlier works on ideology by fellow social scientists. Although he is quick to criticize: "the absence of conceptual clarity has been matched only by the nearly total lack of 'hard', (i.e., replicable) empirical evidence,"<sup>30</sup> he nevertheless realizes that "the link between ideology and politics continues to attract the attention of students of politics, for it lies close to the core of our collective concerns: how men act politically and how they ought to act."<sup>31</sup>

Putnam escapes the problem of definition by listing a "menu" of components. Because there is no single definition of ideology the actual use of the term "ideology" in his study cannot be called inconsistent. It is really Shils' usage that one notices shining through Putnam's conception. Recall that for Shils, ideology implied a political outlook which was both coherent and comprehensive, inasmuch as it would override all other considerations.

Shils is, naturally, not the only student of politics to make this argument, but his discussion is the most comprehensive and provocatively phrased and will be used here to represent a long list of contributions by equally distinguished scholars.<sup>32</sup>

Others listed include, most notably, Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell. The Shils' definition is made "scientifically useful" or empirically testable by Putnam in his set of complex empirical assertions, called "propositions." There are other debts throughout the course of Putnam's conceptualization of ideology. They are to Sartori, Lane, Dahl, and Converse, respectively.

The Sartori stipulation about ideology and the domains of "ideology in knowledge" and "ideology in politics" is underscored as a starting point for Putnam.<sup>33</sup> Lane's influence is much more general in nature, since Putnam explains that "Lane's argument parallels my own" [Putnam].<sup>34</sup> Putnam and Lane would quibble over definitions but they arrive at the same general conclusion. Putnam admits that "the approach here sketched owes a great deal to the work of Robert E. Lane on the 'cultural premises' of political thought."<sup>35</sup> Perhaps the most mentioned authority, and as previously stated the mentor of the entire design, is Dahl. Not only does Dahl receive the first footnote, he is continually being cited and thanked throughout the text of The Beliefs of Politicians.

The left-right continuum is important to Putnam's usage, and it is largely abstracted from Converse's seminal works. The conflict-consensus syndrome is analogous to the left-right spectrum as developed by Putnam.

Left-right ideology is, as we have seen, very closely bound up with a respondent's assumptions about social discord and harmony, and a respondent's position in the left-right spectrum is also closely related to his sensitivity to latent issue conflict.<sup>36</sup>

Again, "no other factor is more important in explaining a politician's views on social conflict and consensus than his position on a left-right ideological continuum."<sup>37</sup> Putnam's best predicting device is left-right ideology and his source is Converse.<sup>38</sup>

Ideology for Putnam is similar to political philosophy. "A politician's orientation to social cleavage and social consensus is, in short, a fundamental characteristic of his view of the world."<sup>39</sup> The strategy of this study is the assessment, according to designed categories, of central features of political philosophy, or individual politicians' ideologies. Here the thought and beliefs of politicians have their "antecedents" in political philosophy. Putnam suggests that ideology can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, that in effect political philosophers and political scientists have the same focus: "conflict and consensus." Yet, ideology is conceptualized as not the what of political thought but the how. Putnam does not attempt to make distinctions between political philosophy and ideology. Rather they seem to be made synonymous.

### Science

The methods used in Putnam's survey are those of modern behavioral science. It is his objective "to bring the results of some 'hard research' to bear on a few aspects of this broader question of change in contemporary Western politics."<sup>40</sup> Putnam's view of science is not explicit therefore, except its outworking in a "scientific methodology."



In his research, Putnam uses the random sample. Respondents' interviews were tape recorded in native languages with "little apparent impairment of frankness and sincerity."<sup>41</sup> Agreeing that smallness of sample size is always a problem, Putnam feels that his "sophisticated statistical tools" overcome that initial handicap. He does not apologize for his occasional hard "squeezing" of the data. Rather, he makes a point of warning his readers "about the necessarily lower precision of these detailed results."<sup>42</sup> The interviews are conducted by professional interviewers under his personal direction. They are open-ended, allowing the politician or civil servant to choose which themes to emphasize in the discussion. Several questions are identical in all interviews.

This double-barreled strategy allowed us to compare styles of policy analysis, holding constant, first the respondent's degree of interest and expertise in the problem, and second, the nature of the issue itself.<sup>43</sup>

The investigation of elite political culture differs from that of mass culture. Putnam quotes Pye suggesting that elite culture calls for skill of interpreting, categorizing, operationalizing, coding, and defining calculations, whereas mass culture depends on advanced techniques of survey research simply in measuring public opinion. Putnam's aim is to arrive at a method which will suitably deal with the mass of empirical evidence compiled. He seeks to bridge the gap between abstract general theory and masses of unorganized empirical findings.

We need a method of inquiry which is capable of reaching for these kinds of insights, yet one which also reaches beyond aesthetic appreciation toward acceptable scientific canons of intersubjective validity.<sup>44</sup>

The dilemma of "normal verification", and the rather "elusive" features of elite political culture allow for "no perfect solution," according to Putnam. However, the fundamental premise of his inquiry suggests that "the best way to study the beliefs of political leaders is to talk with them systematically and listen carefully."<sup>45</sup>

The scientific exactness of interviewing achieved, Putnam goes on to perform a number of statistical operations with his materials, all in a stated "objective" manner. Codings of the verbatim transcripts were, he tells us, "assessed by two different independent judges.

The statistic used is tau-beta, a measure of ordinal correlation between the two independent judgments. In the coding process the independent judgments of the two coders were confronted, and the coders arrived at an agreed final judgment; the statistical analyses reported in this paper are based on these consensual judgments of each interview.<sup>46</sup>

The ratings by coders, according to scales, then mark the empirical evidence used in the Putnam studies and form the various mentioned syndromes, characteristics, factors, and indexes. Simply put, the results are factored and extracted into clusters which seem to "go together." Putnam adds an appendix to his major study, entitled "Coding Controversial Interviews," because the procedures used are so uncommon.

to political science. He further directs interested parties to the literature on quantitative analysis and research methods in the behavioral sciences.

There can be little doubt that Putnam's idea of science is the adoption of technique. Ideology which is made coterminous with political philosophy can be measured with the proper instruments and scientific tools, granted those tools are, "calibrated and tested for reliability."<sup>47</sup> Techniques borrowed directly from the study of attitudes in psychology, "offer real promise for reconciling our competing demands for both insight and evidence."<sup>48</sup> Scientific rigor means precision, and in Putnam's inquiry into ideology he suggests "we will use caution and counting to discipline our imagination."<sup>49</sup>

When it comes to a discussion of the relationship between science and ideology, Putnam has very little to add, except for an approval of Lane's argument concerning the birth of a new and "knowledgeable society." He tells us that he is unwilling to enter any debate which seeks to distinguish between "veridical abstraction" (science) and "dogmatic abstraction" (ideology). Instead Putnam chooses to "dissociate" himself from the argument and return to the business of studying elite political behavior.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>Robert D. Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, September 1971, LXV:3, 651.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 681.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Robert D. Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973, 31.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 32.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 34.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 35.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., 40-41. See 34-42 for elaborated discussion of these traits and some illustrations from Putnam's respondents.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 237.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975, 2.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> The Beliefs of Politicians, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 4. See the list which, he claims, lists all of the following political questions: What is human nature like? Is it basically good or evil? What is society like? Is it harmonious or conflictful? What kinds of social and political differences are important and how are these differences to be dealt with? What is politics all about? What does the political system look like? How do decisions get taken and who is important in the decision-making process? What counts as a political issue and what kinds of solutions are conceivable and preferable? What criteria are relevant in judging alternative solutions? To what extent are political conflicts irreconcilable or "zero-sum"? How does one go about solving public problems or resolving political conflicts? What political tactics are useful and acceptable? Who are my opponents and who are my allies, and what for me, is the appropriate orientation toward each? What is the nature of political leadership? What is my own role in politics? What is the good society? What is the good polity?

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>25</sup> The Comparative Study of Political Elites, 80.

<sup>26</sup> "Study Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," 665.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 666.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 669.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 677.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 651.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 655.

<sup>33</sup>See the discussion on Sartori, 654-5, 14, and 160-5.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., 678.

<sup>35</sup>The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, 128.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., 119.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 129.

<sup>38</sup>See 45, 78, 222 for the discussion on Converse.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 93.

<sup>40</sup>"Study Elite Political Cultures: The Case of Ideology," 676.

<sup>41</sup>Robert D. Putnam, "The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Britain, Germany, and Italy," British Journal of Political Science, 3:1, July, 1973, 95.

<sup>42</sup>The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, 17-18.

<sup>43</sup>Robert E. Putnam, "Perspectives on Public Policy Making," Tulane Studies in Political Science, XV, 1975, 190.

<sup>44</sup>"Study Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," 653.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., 653-54.

<sup>47</sup>The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy, 23.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., the technique is that of intercorrelating multiple indicators and overcoming the problem of "inter-item assimilation." See 24-25 and the footnotes which direct the reader to the applicable psychological literature.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 27.

## PART II CONCLUSIONS

At this point we should attempt to show suitably explicit conclusions from the descriptions of the various behavioral conceptualizations of ideology. For the arguments and criticisms in the next chapters bear directly on the material we have collected on the representative behavioral treatments of ideology.

Although many interesting comparisons and contrasts can be drawn from the five preceding descriptive chapters, it is not my purpose to summarize our findings or to develop an argument around the differences in style, approach, and nuance of each individual author. Instead, we will, while acknowledging a generalizing tendency, try to state certain tendencies in the representative behavioral theories that we have examined.

### Definitions

Realizing the difficulties of past uses of the term, some of the authors have never presented us with a single definition of "ideology"; however, those who did tried to define ideology as a neutral term. Ideology implied public beliefs, attitudes and styles. Typically, psychological terms were used to suggest emotional implications of certain kinds of behavior.

### Context

The research scheme of each author is somewhat distinct.

Although similar methodologies, theories and techniques are employed by some authors, nuances in approach should be appreciated. Sutton studies American businessmen and their advertising literature, making use of a psychological strain theory to explain ideology as a functional, psychological-ability mechanism. Lane interviews a working-class population, using a psychological, autobiographical analysis that shows certain motivations giving shape to political thought. Campbell and Converse analyze the practice of voting and develop survey research techniques that delineate certain psychological causes for partisan attitudes. Apter offers a "functional" modernization theory that suggests ideology is a product of discontent. And finally, Putnam interviews (and quantifies his findings) political elites to discover the environmental and psychological factors that provide the context for the behavior of politicians and their style of behaving.

#### Theoretical Conceptualization

Each author goes about the conceptualization of ideology in a slightly different manner. What is important to note is that all of the authors conceive ideology as a functional value. The elaborations of each author should not be obscured, but the understanding of ideology as functional, individual, and irrational in nature is noteworthy. The various theoretical constructions are empirical in orientation. Not the what but the how of political thinking entails the makeup of ideology in each of these conceptualizations.



### Usage

Each author uses different studies and authorities to reinforce his arguments. Most of the discussions begin however, with the seminal work of Karl Mannheim and go on to make continual use of recent social science literature and theories. The most commonly cited authorities would seem to include: Parsons, Lasswell, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, Adorno, Shils, Erikson, and Dahl.

### Science

Each of the behavioral authors examined believe that facts can be separated from values; furthermore, each believes that behavioral social science is both neutral and objective. Because science is value-free, it is possible to objectively study ideologies, which by their nature are highly subjective. In this sense, science and ideology are for certain behavioralists, fundamentally at loggerheads with each other. Therefore, professionalism, as in a "knowledgeable society", is held out as a tradition, which is allowed to succeed on the basis of objective and statistical techniques. Epistemologically, the behavioralists examined tend to be empiricists, rationalists, positivists, and often nominalists who have completely broken with metaphysical and ontological forms of knowledge in favor of some combination of functionalism and operationalism that permits its adherents to scientifically observe given behaviors.

### PART III INTRODUCTION

Central to the argument of the chapters in Part III is the difference between the functional analysis -- often uni-dimensional -- of ideology that certain behavioral theorists have developed versus the analysis of any given belief system's truth-value or truth-content. In this context, I should make clear that the perspective I will develop and the normative criticisms brought to bear on the functional analysis of ideology are considerably influenced by the thought of Herman Dooyeweerd, his school of philosophy, and its extrapolation to problems like this, which he did not confront in his own writings. The utility of the Dooyeweerdian perspective, we will find, aside from its personal attraction, lies in its comprehensive and thorough accounting of reality and its development of a systematic and normative social theory, including an idea of the State and of "politicality." This normative approach, rooted in a Christian philosophy, can serve as a "norm-critical" theory by which we can inspect the functional conceptualizations of ideology that certain behavioral political scientists have developed.

When I argue that the truth content of ideology is ignored or under valued by the political scientists we have examined, I am suggesting that the behavioral approach tends to identify "ideology," "philosophy," and "religion" as functionally equivalent. This blurring of categories is an unargued premise of behavioral political science suggesting that it

need not be concerned with the substance of a political phenomenon but only with the function ideology plays in society. Truth or falsity of any given pattern of thought is no longer analyzed from one normative standard or another, but instead becomes a measure of social forces and psychological mechanisms. This difference in approach between an analysis of what could be called "truth-content" as opposed to "functional-value" is central to my arguments on reductionism in the ensuing chapters. Because the behavioral concept of ideology uses Mannheim's sociology of knowledge paradigm as a springboard to a so-called "more scientific" study of ideology, a definite, often unargued assumption, accompanies their analyses of ideology. The assumption is: all thought is situation specific, and all truth is relative. Thought is largely a function of groups and persons acting and reacting in society. To understand political thought we must therefore uncover its social origins or its psychological motivations. This thoroughgoing skepticism produces a situation wherein science and technology effectively undermine the plausibility of religious ontological definitions of reality, including "politicality."

We must now consider the problems of conceptualization in many behavioral analyses of ideology, as well as the underlying fact-value dichotomy from which behavioral political science operates, keeping in mind the danger of dealing exclusively with functional matters to the exclusion of a discussion of truth questions. It is my premise that a narrowly defined functional approach to the study of ideology seriously

damages a truthful account of these real political phenomena, besides failing to deal with the substantive content of particular ideologies.

CHAPTER VII

PROBLEMS OF CONCEPTUALIZATION

Concepts of ideology, like any concepts which try to capture experience, are analogous to a beam of light. The center may be unmistakable but the ranges on either side of the circumference become increasingly nebulous. The further out one ventures, the more the concept of ideology blends and merges with other concepts. The behavioral understanding of ideology is therefore tied to the other concepts employed in behavioral political science. Any criticism of a concept, for whatever reason, involves both that of its center, or accepted usage, and its range, or permissible usage.

Most political scientists would agree that concepts are interrelated and that, when viewed together, they make up distinctive orientations. The behavioral concepts of ideology are essential to the composition of a behavioral orientation of political science. The concept of ideology has in fact been given an inordinate amount of attention by many leading figures of the behaviorist persuasion. The description of a few of the major representations of the concept of ideology in behavioral political science now complete, I turn to an assessment which focuses on some of the behavioral assumptions and implications. But we must first discuss how "conceptualization" takes place in behavioral theory. What does it mean to form a concept?

When the political behavioralists employ a concept of ideology it is used in connection with many other concepts. Often these concepts call for clarification as well. The network of concepts employed in behavioral political science deserves close attention. These concepts engender a stance described by William Connolly as "the position of the cabinetmaker who, after sharpening and cleaning his tools for weeks, is dismayed to discover that no cabinets have yet been built. Time spent examining the concepts of politics, it is feared, is time taken away from politics itself."<sup>1</sup> This argument is misordered, to say the least. The language of conceptualization is not insignificant. Any time spent demonstrating the shortcomings in prevailing efforts at conceptualization is time well spent; for the concepts employed in political science are an important reflection of politics itself. This is especially so when a concept as important as ideology is under discussion, for this term reflects not only the theory of the political scientist but his understanding of the political process as well. Properly developed concepts are necessary when examining actual politics, lest too much time be spent on foundational study which is never put to work.

Behavioral theory, in the nominalist tradition, proceeds from a fact-value dichotomy, dominant in mainstream social science. This dichotomy implies that a concept abstracts generalized behavior and gives it a certain name so that scientists can study, analyze, and quantify it. Behavioral concepts are usually broken down into a number of quantitative values or

qualitative categories so that each member of a class of phenomena may be assigned to a value or category. I would suggest that in the behavioral paradigm, "behavior" is seen as factual "datum" which can only be observed with the senses. Norms or values, in contrast, refer to intrinsically desirable goods, that is, something good or worthy as judged by the internal, subjective moral, ethical, or esthetic appreciation of the person doing the evaluating. In the behavioral paradigm it is understood that consensus on values is unlikely to appear, especially in complex, diversified cultures. Behavioralism then stands in the nominalist tradition with respect to epistemology and concept-formation, with an "empiricist" orientation.

It appears to me that behavioral theory often refers to itself as a set of systematic concepts which explain interrelations among facts. This means that values supposedly are not transmitted. In this sense behavioral theory refers to itself as non-normative. Dealing with only facts and the relationships between them, behavioral theory is primarily empirical. Behavioral theorists would therefore state that their work tends to be less abstract than that of normative theorists who deal with norms and values, which are more general than facts. Nevertheless, as any theory does, behavioral theory generalizes statements, summarizes, and links together propositions into a unified, logical structure.

The behavioral concepts of ideology that I have reviewed are instances of this widely accepted epistemological framework. In many instances measurement is the method of the behavioral sciences. Assigning mathematical characteristics to

conceptual entities, we are told, permits unambiguous description of factual situations and further arranges occurrences in serial order. Since only facts can be measured, behavioral scientists have attempted to turn certain value preferences into factual statements, so that they too can be measured.

Forming a concept in behavioral theory makes use of two types of terms. Proper terms describe events, such as the Civil War, or objects, such as the United Nations, or persons, such as V. I. Lenin. Common terms, more importantly, refer to generalizations, such as nation, man, or war. These are concepts. The purpose of behavioral social science is to explain and predict phenomena on the basis of generalizations. These generalizations, in turn, are based on repeated, empirical observations of factual phenomena. Concepts are thus located at two levels of abstraction: theoretical and observational.

Theoretical concepts make use of already defined abstract concepts. Observational concepts specify operations for observation and measurement. The behavioral concepts of ideology have been developed on both of these levels. We can call these the theoretical and the operational levels.

In behavioral theory, concepts must meet at least two requirements of adequacy. First, concepts must have "empirical import:" they must be "operationalized:" Empirical import must ensure "objective testability." Secondly, concepts must have appropriate "systemic import." This means that all scientific concepts in the behavioral paradigm must use generalizations or laws which are systematically connected to other concepts.



A systematic connection between concepts links facts generalized in concepts to other facts. For instance, class status or regionalization may be said to have probable systematic bearing in social science, whereas color of eyes would not have such import.

The concepts of ideology in the behavioral framework, by the authors already cited, were developed along the lines and in sympathy with the principles of conceptualization that I have here outlined. I believe that the conceptualization of ideology in this setting is subject to a number of criticisms.

Henry Kariel has described two modes in the study of politics that are pertinent to my criticisms of the behavioral concepts of ideology. The first mode suspends critical judgment in an effort to understand. It accepts the subject as described. One working in this "indicative mode" tries "to move as close as possible to the phenomena under study as (one) can. . . to embrace the prevailing definitions of 'event,' 'problem,' 'fact,' 'cause,' and 'decision.'" The second, "transactional mode" has as its assumption the premise that the matter under study needs to be challenged, revised, or reinterpreted: It questions established practices. The scholar working within this framework seeks "to confront the present state of things -- himself included -- but not accepting anything as it appears to be, as complete, having ended."<sup>2</sup> A transactional mode underlies the criticisms in this chapter and

the next. Kariel's "transactional mode" is parallel to, although not the same as Herman Dooyeweerd's "transcendental critique," which also attempts to probe every underlying assumption (dogma) of a theory or philosophy.

In this connection it should be immediately clear that my descriptive analysis of the behavioral concepts of ideology purports to be more than a factual naming of a few interesting behavioral theories. The descriptions go beyond naming: they characterize a particular vantage point and purpose of each theorist in question. This has been made clear from the start.

Now the time has come to place this characterization in a more systematic context, to give it a measure of direction, keeping in mind the distinction between a functional study of ideology and one that seeks to question the truth-content in ideologies. I will attempt to do that in terms of a three-part typology, which discusses three fundamental problems. The remainder of this chapter is divided accordingly. The first section, "What is Political Reality?" will deal with certain behaviorists' lack of reference to objective political reality. Here I will point to an overdependence on scientific behavioral psychology. This overdependence explains, at least in part, the inability of some behavioral political theorists to give an adequate account of political institutions and political experience. This section is a prelude to the second, since it attempts to outline the criteria for delimiting things political. The second section is entitled "Obscurity by Word and Number," and deals with the problem

of a technical vocabulary which is exacting but not always relevant, and it will focus on certain reductionistic tendencies involved in mathematical quantification. The third section, "Conservatism: Static Quality of Models," will discuss methodological conservatism, the stress of the functional over the dysfunctional, and the disregard for truth evidenced in certain behavioral concepts of ideology. In each section reference will be made and illustrations drawn from various treatments of ideology I have described in previous chapters.

#### What is Political Reality: Dooyeweerd's Paradigm

Many of the comments one could make concerning scientific behavioral psychology are interlinked with what will be stated about the technical and quantitative aspects of behavioral political science. It is my position that the use of behavioral psychological standards in political studies is often at the cost of neglecting important political experience and failing to ask deeper questions about the truth-content of political beliefs. The contributors of behavioral concepts of ideology at times engage in painstaking labor on trivial matters while ignoring political reality that is obvious. Christian Bay has described the situation well in his distinction between "politics" and "pseudo-politics." "A growing and now indeed a predominant proportion of leading American political scientists, the behavioralists, have become determined to achieve science. Yet, in the process, many of them remain open to the charge of strenuously avoiding that dangerous subject, politics."<sup>3</sup>

Allow me to outline more specifically however what I mean by "political." Perhaps by doing this I can then begin to demonstrate, not a comparison of the behavioral view with my own, but the very ambiguity as to "political" in the writers under discussion. In this exercise, I will, following Dooyeweerd, indicate that many political behavioralists, in a variety of ways, reduce a totality to one of its parts. My critique in this section centers around psychological reductionism. By "reductionism," I mean the re-duc-ing, the leading back, of one thing to something else.

On the concept of "political" I am indebted to the Christian philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, a twentieth century, Dutch political-legal theorist who like other classical and Christian thinkers is attempting to revive the status of normative theory. Dooyeweerd's thought can, I believe, assist in making apparent what I consider to be the proper focus of political theory and political science. From this provisional vantage point, my assessment of what I consider to be some of the shortcomings of behavioralism and a few of its conceptualizations of ideology can be clarified.

It is impossible here to summarize completely Dooyeweerd's systematic philosophy. This has been accomplished satisfactorily by others.<sup>4</sup> My focus is on Dooyeweerd's understanding of the concept "political," which is, of course, tied to his larger systematic philosophy.

In the present context, one way of describing the meaning of "political" lies in returning to a basic premise of the behavioral approach to the meaning of political science, when political institutions are rejected as the basic unit for research. Behavioralism identifies the "behavior" of individuals in political situations as the basic unit of analysis. I think this basic premise of the behavioral approach is erroneous. Granted, political science must focus on "the behavior of individuals in political situations," but a "political situation" already presupposes a defining or confining context which includes political institutions, and thus the political behavior of individuals manifests itself in that context. To abstract individual behavior without accounting for the identity of the whole context is like pulling doors and windows out of a house in order to define the house. Political science, therefore, cannot give an adequate account of the political behavior of individuals without a prior understanding of the nature of political institutions. The political character of individuals' behavior derives from the political nature of the institutions within which that behavior occurs.

What does this mean for contemporary political science? Dooyeweerd limits the use of "political" to the structure, processes and functions of the state and entities whose meaning lies in their relation to the state, such as a political party. Other political theorists have done likewise. If "political" is to have any specific meaning,

Dooyeweerd would indicate that it must be possible for us to distinguish a "structured" political context that differs from other structured societal relationships. That structured whole can be referred to as the "political community," the "state," the "political system," or whatever, but it has an identity of its own.

The identity of the state -- and hence the specific meaning of "political" -- depends upon the particular, identifiable, organized behavior of states. One way of explaining this is to look more closely at Dooyeweerd's understanding of the multi-dimensional character of social reality. For states, like other institutions, function in all kinds of ways, in all the modes of our experience. Dooyeweerd is here suggesting a basic distinction between dimensions and entities of reality. The concept of behavior therefore is linked by Dooyeweerd to the dimensions or "modalities" of behavior. One can distinguish the various dimensions of reality, but these dimensions never appear in isolation. The coherence of reality means that the task of isolating any one dimension involves considerable theoretical abstraction.

As I have said, Dooyeweerd's writings touch upon many academic disciplines, notably the areas of legal philosophy and political theory, which were his own areas of specialty. It is not necessary - nor possible within the limits of this study - to introduce the details of his entire social thought. For the present it is sufficient to refer to three basic categories of his thought: religion, dimensions of reality,

and societal structures. In the first place, for Dooyeweerd, religion is the all-encompassing relation between man and ultimate reality generally referred to as "God." In religion we find the fundamental motive operative in human behavior, since it is in terms of man's relation to ultimate reality that he sets the lasting priorities and goals of his life. The unity in human personality is founded on religion.<sup>5</sup> The underlying factors in the development of a civilization are thus for Dooyeweerd closely related to the impact of major religions. In western civilization these would primarily be the religion of classical Greece and Rome, Judaism, Christianity, and humanism (which Dooyeweerd describes as the religion of human personality).<sup>6</sup> This he treats under the theme of modal structure.

In the second place, while Dooyeweerd finds the central unity of human life in religion, he points to a great diversity of aspects in empirical reality within which human life functions. This is how he describes these aspects in one of his shorter publications:

Our temporal empirical horizon has a numerical aspect, a spatial aspect, an aspect of extensive movement, an aspect of energy in which we experience the physico-chemical relations of empirical reality, a biotic aspect, or that of organic life, an aspect of feeling and sensation, a logical aspect, i.e., the analytical manner of distinction in our temporal experience which lies at the foundation of all our concepts and logical judgments. Then there is a historical aspect in which we experience the cultural manner of development of our societal life. This is followed by the aspect of symbolical signification, lying at the foundation of all empirical linguistic phenomena. Furthermore there is the aspect of social intercourse,

with its rules of courtesy, politeness, good breeding, fashion, and so forth. This experiential mode is followed by the economic, aesthetic, juridical and moral aspects, and finally, by the aspect of faith or belief.<sup>7</sup>

Dooyeweerd views these aspects as the fundamental dimensions of diversity in temporal reality which is the foundation of human life. He uses the words modes or modalities as technical terms to describe these aspects, since for him they refer to the fundamental ways or modes of reality's functionings. Since they are basic ontological dimensions, in his view they cannot be reduced to one another. He also argues that these aspects appear in a hierarchic order in which "earlier" ones constitute the substrata for "later" ones. For instance, the biotic and sensitive aspects are substrata for the logical aspect of thought. He thus speaks of both the irreducibility and of the coherence of these fundamental modes of being. In his encyclopedia of the sciences, Dooyeweerd holds that the basic sciences take as the object of their investigation these basic aspects. Thus the science of biology focuses on the biotic aspect of living things, economics focuses on the economic behavior of human beings and social relationships, etc.

In the third place, next to the categories of religion and the basic dimensions of empirical reality, Dooyeweerd develops the notion of structures of individuality, i.e., the structures of concrete things, events and societal relationships. Individual entities and



events function in the above-mentioned modal dimensions in different ways. For instance, a stone functions as an active subject in the numerical, spatial and physico-chemical aspects of reality. A tree does this also, but in addition it functions in the biotic mode of being. Animals, in turn, actively function in these modes but do so in the sensitive or psychological dimension as well. Human beings, in distinction from physical, biotic and psychological entities, function as active agents in the entire range of fundamental modal dimensions: they think, they speak, they believe and so forth.

Dooyeweerd speaks of guiding functions with reference to that mode of reality in which an event or entity finds its distinctive quality. The guiding or qualifying function of a stone is found in the physicochemical aspect; that of a tree is present in the biotic aspect; and of an animal it is located in the psychological dimension. He does not carry this through with respect to human beings. Though he argues that concrete human experience in the final analysis is indeed guided by the dimension of belief, he further distinguishes between belief and religion. The former is one function in human life next to many other functions; the latter is the "depth dimension" of all of the functions. The diverse functions of human experience find their unity in religion.

Dooyeweerd's philosophical sociology is developed in the light of these fundamental categories. Empirical

societal structures or "social systems" function in every basic ontological dimension. For example, family sociology can deal with the numerical, spatial, energetic ("mobile"), psychical, cultural, economic, legal, moral, and belief dimensions of concrete family life in a multiplicity of different cultures. Political sociology and industrial sociology can do the same with political and economic systems. Thus, in his encyclopedia of the sciences, Dooyeweerd makes a fundamental distinction between the basic sciences, which focus on the fundamental aspects of reality, and the so-called individuality sciences, which deal with the concrete things, events and societal structures.

Political science belongs to the second type of science. Its basic "unit for research" is the political system - its structure, forms, processes, and relations. The fundamental political system is the state, though this is not the only one. International organizations like the UN, NATO, national organizations, and other actors including political parties, are also political institutions which belong to the domain of political science.

Since the structure, functions, forms, processes and relations constitute the primary "unit for research" of political science, it is not surprising that Dooyeweerd, as a philosopher, paid special attention to the ontic structure and basic functions of the state. If he would make a distinction between political theory and political science, he would probably assign ontic structure and

basic functions to theory, and forms, processes and relations to the more empirically oriented subdisciplines of political science. These subdisciplines focus on the variable forms of state life in different phases of history and in different cultures; on the complex and varying processes by means of which political decisions are made, executed and administered by politically relevant persons and agencies; and the numerous relations in political life. These relations are found within states in the connections between citizens and the respective levels of government, as well as in the interrelations between these levels and their branches. There are of course multiple interstate relations and also ties between states and nonstate entities like multinational corporations.

Dooyeweerd holds that political science, if it is to be theoretically adequate, can present the empirical data pertinent to the variable forms, complex processes and interdependent relations of political life, only when it proceeds from a proper view of the structure or nature of the state itself. As a matter of fact, he suggests that such a view, gathered from both God's revelation and human experience, provides the basic criterion as to what is relevant to political science and what is not, what is the proper "unit for research" of political science in distinction from the research areas of other social sciences. The state is an institution embracing both government and citizens, organized for the "administration of public justice," and based on the monopoly of coercive power over a particular territory. Theor-

etical insight into the structure of the state is obtained by understanding the typically normative, political manner in which the state functions in the basic ontological aspects of reality.<sup>8</sup>

We can see that the state as a structural entity is the focal point of politics. However, all social institutions, including the state, are multidimensional. So, for instance,

The juridical aspect appears to be intrinsically bound to the numerical aspect, to the spatial, the kinematic and the physico-energetic aspects, to the aspect of organic life, the psychical-sensory aspect, the logical-analytical aspect, the aspect of social intercourse, and to the economic and the esthetic aspects...Two further aspects, the moral and pistic (aspect of faith) follow upon the juridical.<sup>9</sup>

Dooyeweerd argues that all things, human acts, and societal relationships of the temporal world concretely function within these modes or dimensions of being.

For the purpose of the forthcoming criticisms of the behavioral view of reality and some of its conceptualizations of ideology, it is important to note how Dooyeweerd's structural analysis might prove helpful in a synthetic discipline like political science. This can be seen in two ways: by looking at the dimensions of reality that Dooyeweerd identifies as "political-legal analogies," or by looking at contemporary political science itself and the many sub-disciplines which in effect are "modally" delimited ways of looking at political behavior or "statelike" behavior.

Let us look first at the configurative model, or dimensional structure, of a science of politics using Dooyeweerd's paradigm of analysis. The numerical dimension of state life is political quantity which confronts us with the common phenomenon of multiplicity in unity. In the political realm we note many citizens, voters, representatives, organs, parties, and decentralized parts within a single political constellation. This multiplicity makes statistical quantification in political science possible and -- within limits -- meaningful. The criteria for selection of politically quantifiable factors presuppose prior insight into the structure of the state itself. For political quantifiability is inherently different from quantifiability of multiple factors in non-state relationships such as familial or economic entities.

The spatial dimension of state life is political territory, which is the domicile of legal persons, both individual and corporate, that are subject to the jurisdiction of the government of the state and its parts. The spatial dimension of reality is the object of the science of geometry, which is an abstract, "modal" science. In concrete human existence we never encounter space-in-the-abstract. We only encounter space in a great variety of immediate situations like a baseball game, room divisions in a house, travelling distances by car or plane, bird watching, job site for construction, or crossing a border

from one country to another. In concrete political life we encounter space as territoriality which determines the borderlines of political jurisdiction. Political space is not identical to geometric space in its original meaning. It extends to entities outside the geometric limits of a country to embrace ships on the seas and planes in the air. The old adage in international law -- "the law follows the flag" -- nicely hinted at this notion of political space.

The physical dimension of state life is political geography, which is the natural configuration of land, sea, rivers, mountains, deserts, and climate which codetermine the destinies of individual states and their mutual relations. The Nile, Euphrates, and Rhine rivers, the Alps, the North Sea Channel, the Panama isthmus are all of crucial significance in a 'geopolitical' sense. This physical dimension, in turn, is the basis for the political biomilieu -- the biological dimension of state life. Without this substratum in a specific territory a political system cannot exist.

On the basis of a specific territory, geography and biomilieu, the state integrates its citizenry into a single nation. Here the post-biological dimensions of the state comes to the fore. With respect to the psychical dimension, one can speak of national consensus, a feeling of belonging together within a single political entity. In a politically mature citizenry, this consensus -- which is

often emotionally loaded -- is the basis for public opinion, which Dooyeweerd relates to the logical dimension of state life because it entails a minimal analytical ability to distinguish normative from antinormative behavior. In the context of politics, public opinion must be directed to the public weal or woe, and implies insight into what is just or unjust for the commonwealth. In a democracy, political participation therefore requires political education on the part of the citizenry so that prerational feelings of national unity can be formed into intellectually responsible public opinion.

The historical aspect of the state is its political power. Under certain conditions it is possible to speak of a nation without a state. The Palestinian people can be defined as a nation in that sense. But if they are to maintain their nationhood, they will require territory in which their rights are protected. The allocation of rights, independent from other political systems, not only requires political space; it also requires political power necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a single regime over a specific territory. Political power can be functionally and territorially decentralized, especially in geographically large states, but decentralization cannot lead to a plurality of politically sovereign powers accountable only to themselves. That would amount to a balkanization of the public realm. Hence, Dooyeweerd speaks of the monopoly of coercive power by the state

within a single political territory as the cornerstone -- "foundational function" -- of a state's internal organization. Loss of this monopoly leads to the disintegration of state life.

Though Dooyeweerd insists on the indispensable nature of political power for the organization of states, he is careful to distinguish that political power is different from other types of societal powers which are not part of the public realm. Examples of nonstate power are the power of economic production, the familial power of parents over children, the power of the church to define its doctrines, and the power of the university to shape the direction of science. In his view, a free society is marked not only by the state's protection of the rights inherent in human personality but also by its protection of the rights of nonstate structures, that is, the right to use their power to pursue the ends they are fitted for.

In thus recognizing the link between political might and legal right, Dooyeweerd presents an empirico-normative view of the political process. He argues that it is impossible to study "empirical" political reality without including normative questions and decisions in that study. The state's monopoly of coercive power serves only one overriding intent: the administration of what its people and authorities judge to be the state's just interests as defined meticulously by certain legal processes and procedures. Here we are faced with the state's legal aspect. Every societal structure



functions in the legal aspect: there are rules for the internal life of industry, private clubs, and property transactions. But in the life of the state the legal aspect takes the leading role since the allocation of rights and duties within its territory gives direction to the entire life of the body politic. This allocation results in a public-legal system in which the rights and obligations of persons and nonstate societal structures are set forth. The legitimacy of a government depends in the final analysis upon its use of political power for the ends of justice.

Linking the aspect of political power to the legal aspect does not mean that states do not function in the lingual, social, economic and esthetic dimensions of reality. As a matter of fact, Dooyeweerd views the state's behavior in these aspects as bridges between its power base and the maintenance of a public-legal system. The state's lingual aspect is a variety of political symbols which serve as communicators between government and citizenry, between various levels and branches of government, and in interstate relations. The national flag is undoubtedly the most significant political symbol. But in this category we can also place uniforms and insignia worn by the police and the military. Among numerous political gestures the movements of armies and navies indicate a government's reactions to internal or external upheavals.

The state's social aspect is the entire process of political socialization and international diplomacy. An intricate network of social relations contributes to the cohesion of the body politic. In a democracy, the system

of representation between the governed and the governors is perhaps the most important facet of that network. In the relations between the states, the history of international law and international relations reveals the weight that has been given to what one might call political etiquette in maintaining the fragile balance of peace.

The state's economic aspect is political economy -- to use an old term in its strict meaning of describing the state's income and expenditures. A political economy is inherently different from the industrial economy. An industry produces its own economic resources; a state is dependent upon outside revenues to pay for the costs of maintaining a system of public justice.

The esthetic dimension of state life was more significant in Greek and Renaissance culture than it appears to be in our society, but Dooyeweerd finds vestiges of it in political equilibrium and harmony still present in proportionality of representation, balance of powers, and in the solemnity of outstanding political events. In the hierarchy of the aspects of being, the moral and faith dimensions transcend the legal aspect. Though the state's distinctiveness as a societal structure consists in its politico-legal nature, the legal aspect is not the final dimension of a state's empirical behavior. The state also functions in the moral and faith dimensions. Dooyeweerd employs the word moral not with reference to matters of right and wrong -- which is the more traditional meaning of morality -- but with respect to love and

trust operative within societal relationships such as the bond between husband and wife in marriage. The political expression of this moral aspect is love of country, patriotism and the trust ("credibility") between governments and their subjects. Especially in a democracy, trust relations are necessary for a proper functioning of political leadership. Their breakdown contributes to political confusion, apathy, disintegration and -- as twentieth-century politics has only too often shown -- the introduction of dictatorial regimes.

Finally, the state's faith aspect is political allegiance which ties a body politic together in the most basic sense. The basic components of this allegiance consist in a state's constitution -- in modern states generally written instead of based on custom or common law -- or its bill of rights. These function not only as the fundamental law of the political realm in question but in effect also as the political creed or belief system undergirding the political order. The political credo articulated in a constitution or a bill of rights is the most immediate link between the dominant religions and worldviews found within the citizenry and the public realm. Such a credo states the implications of the relevant religions and worldviews for the concrete administration of justice within the public realm. A forced rupture between the constitutional order and the political belief system, on the one hand, and the dominant reli-

gions and worldviews, on the other hand, will lead to oppression or to revolt.

In a society characterized by a variety of religions and concomitant worldviews, it is extremely important to make sure that the common political belief system guarantees not only freedom of religion but a constitutional order which makes possible a variety of inputs in the political decision-making process from the adherents of the different perspectives. In a constitutional democracy, a multiplicity of political parties streamlines the links between different views of justice and public policy within the citizenry on the one hand, and the state's parliamentary organs on the other hand. This is the original meaning of political party: it represents a part of the citizenry in the decision-making process for the entire commonwealth. One should therefore distinguish between the constitutional belief system, which articulates the common credo for the body politic as a whole, and the belief systems of political parties (or other politically influential groups). Contemporary terminology, made popular since Marx, Pareto and Sorel, generally describes especially the partial belief systems as ideologies. Both in Marx, and in the behavioral social sciences, the usage of this term reflects a particular view of the nature of religion, the structure of human personality, and the cohesion of the social order.

This brief sketch of Dooyeweerd's approach to the

political system and his conception of the contours of political science does not do justice to his elaborate philosophical and theoretical insights. He did not himself develop a detailed political theory since his writings, apart from general philosophical matters, focus primarily on a systematic theory of law and jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the framework he presented, set forth here in skeletal form, can prove fruitful for a new understanding of the nature of "the political" and for a balanced conception of the nature of political science and its numerous subdivisions. More particularly, with reference to the theme of this study, it can assist us in identifying certain shortcomings in the behavioral approaches to ideology.

In a very real sense, one could say that the sub-disciplines of political science considered, as Dooyeweerd would have it, the various aspects of politics or political behavior: political statistics, political geography, biopolitics, political psychology, political sociology, public opinion research, political power, political culture, political economy, the study of public law and administration, national identity, and political ideology, which is closely related to what Dooyeweerd called the faith-aspect of political behavior. Dooyeweerd did not develop a concept of ideology, but his understanding of "faith" shares certain of the elements typically considered to be "ideology." The basic difference between Dooyeweerd's understanding of "faith" and of what has been called "ideology" is tied to his Christian philosophic understanding of "belief" and "unbelief."

Dooyeweerd's conception of politics, then, makes more coherent the abundance of literature in the subdisciplines of political science. His structural and modal analysis makes the discipline appear less "balkanized." This paradigm also helps to show the need for a multidimensional approach to political research.

Behavioralism, we will find, has not provided political science with an appreciation of this multidimensionality of the State, or of political behavior. Using Dooyeweerd's analysis, the reduction in the behavioral conception of ideology takes three forms. Firstly, we detect psychologism because the non-psychical dimensions of experience are accounted for in terms of the psychical dimensions. Here multidimensionality is explained largely in terms of uni-dimensionality. Secondly, behavioralism tends to avoid the normative modes of being, in which human experience is inevitably confronted with given oughts. This is a result of scientism operative in behavioralism, which tends to employ the methods of the natural sciences for the human sciences. This is especially evidenced when behavioralism attempts to deal with political ideology. Thirdly, in behavioralism the concrete entity of the State, within which political processes occur, is largely reduced to a complex of functions. This third type of reductionism in the behavioral approach is a kind of functionalism.

Again, inherent in my argument is the distinctiveness and truthful accounting of politicality. Recall that, for Dooyeweerd, the qualifying function of "the political" is the public legal administration of justice. In the language of systems theory, this might be called "the allocation of values for an

entire society." But a genuinely scientific, even empirical study of this "allocation" should not be behavioralistically reduced to an analysis of psycho-social behaviors of public officials, citizens, or elites. The very possibility of studying psychological behavior politically presupposes the political context. That context is the structure of the state which, as Dooyeweerd has argued, behaves multidimensionally. The "psychological" and the ideological" should not be reduced to each other, as many behavioralists tend to do, because although related they issue forth from two distinctively different aspects of state life.

Before we commence our criticisms of the behavioral conceptualizations of ideology and their problematic view of political reality, as well as cases of obscurity in word and number, it may prove helpful to look more closely at Dooyeweerd's idea of the State. It is my argument that political science must return to this institutional setting to inform any empirical study of behavior.

Dooyeweerd's idea of politics is understood by appreciating the unique structure of the State. The State demonstrates an "invariable structure." It is characterized by the power of the sword, monopolized by governments, in their given territories. The state is an identifiable, territorially defined, legal community. But the foundation of the State is not solely the historical function of prevailing power or violence. The State has as well a "juridical function." The power of the State cannot be understood in itself but only in terms of its normative structure. In other words, political power is inseparable from the internal juridical destination of the State.

Dooyeweerd understand "public justice" to be the normative calling of the State, whose legitimate functions are established internally by public legal principles and limited externally by the tasks delegated to other social institutions. The proper task of the State is to bind together in a public legal community, all persons, groups, and institutions within a given territory. Again, it is the "juridical function" which guides the function of power.

Public law is what Dooyeweerd calls the "qualifying action" of the State. Government more specifically is the human authoritative activity within the political community which establishes, enforces, and adjudicates laws for the sake of public justice. Principally, public justice requires and demands of government equitable handling of the goods, services, welfare, protection and opportunity that it controls, without penalty or special advantage to any person, organization, institution, or community due to religious, social, linguistic, sexual, economic, or other social and individual differences.

The political system is not here defined as only the power relations between persons and groups, nor is it the psycho-social functioning of said individuals. Politics is the state-of-law, its making, and the ordering of justice. Therefore, political science and political theory employ the adjective "political" only if a proper content is given. That content is not simply the reduced power relations of persons in a system of behavioral inter-connections. It is the administration of public justice as the guiding function of statecraft.

In Dooyeweerd's paradigm for analysis, political science



has a clearer but more difficult meaning than we are accustomed to in contemporary American social science. It is worth noting that the Dutch word Wetenschap is analogous to the German word Wissenschaft. It includes all the sciences and always involves abstraction. Here, political science as a science lifts "the political" out of temporal coherence and examines it in a Gegenstand (subject-object) relation. Political science is not pre-theoretical knowledge found in everyday "naive experience." Political science always implies an abstraction of theory.

Dooyeweerd actually presents us with a comprehensive societal structural analysis. He argues that non-state structures have what he termed "non-judicial functions." This is his distinction between "public law" and "private law." The State is the only public, legally organized community of governance. The State includes, furthermore, both legal jurisdiction and legal protection. It is the specific task of both political science, and political theory to elucidate the internal structural principle of the State, and to investigate what Dooyeweerd calls the State's "enkaptic inter-lacements" or relationships with other structures of human society. Dooyeweerd's idea of the State presents us with a thorough and systematic theory of politics and the State. His idea of "politicality" can help to inform my criticisms of certain behavioral concepts of ideology.

Following Dooyeweerd, we can say that politics is not psychology. Recall that the behavioral orientation to political science has been said to: "(1) reject political in-

stitutions as the basic unit for research and identify the behavior of individuals in political situations as the basic unit of analysis; (2) identify the 'social sciences' as 'behavioral sciences,' and emphasize the unity of political science with the social sciences, so defined; (3) advocate the utilization and development of more precise techniques for observing, classifying, and measuring data and urge the use of statistical or quantitative formulations wherever possible; and (4) define the construction of systematic, empirical theory as the goal of political science."<sup>10</sup> The representative writers already described formulate behavioral concepts of ideology, accepting these four points, and further refer to themselves as behaviorists.<sup>11</sup>

f- Behavioral scientists who develop concepts of ideology are involved in what Dooyeweerd has called a "process of levelling." The political is made social. The social is made behavioral. And finally, behavior is made measurable in the most "rigorous" empirical fashion. Note that this levelling is of three types: functionalism, psychologism and natural scientism. The behaviorists' creed is the reduction of political structure to function. This is also implicit in making political science a social science. The focus on behavior then is the step to the second reduction: psychologism. I would suggest that "behavior" can, of course, be interpreted multi-dimensionally, but in contemporary scientific language it generally refers to the functional interaction of an organism with its environment. In the social

sciences, this interaction is largely of a psychological kind. The problem with functionalism is that it often considers the wrong qualifying function for a structure, or that it treats such a structure in terms of a few or one function. Dooyeweerd had no problem treating things in terms of their functions as such; he emphasized however, the variety and different roles of functioning. So my criticisms focus on a certain kind of "reductionistic" functionalism. Finally psychological behavior is reduced to what natural scientific method can measure. This is not to say that measurement need necessarily be equated with "natural scientism," but in the field of social and educational psychology this process has been evident in the techniques of behavior-modification, where the "measurable change" is more important than the ontology and meaning of the change. As we have seen proponents of certain behavioral concepts of ideology are dependent then on the discipline of psychology for their conceptualization and their methodology.

This is not to deny that there is a psychological dimension in all political things. But the issue of the methods of behavioral social psychology is severely restrictive. To use Eulau's phrase, the areas "most susceptible to behavioristic treatment" are actually those of minor significance. Many of the major problems of politics do not speak the language available to the behavioralist. Behaviorists, however, often "mistake technological proficiency for scientific intelligence; (i.e., 'pragmatism of hardware') . . . available computer hardware defines the goals of one's research."<sup>12</sup> In so doing, some behavioral political scientists have done more to test psycho-

logical hypotheses than to grapple with the realities of political life.

Though part of behavioralism is "wrong," the greater danger is that it may come to be true, that our interest in becoming a science in "achieving" and maintaining a behavioral paradigm, may blunt our sensibilities to any politics except the kind particularly suited for behavioral analysis.<sup>13</sup>

For example, the contribution of Sutton which conceptualizes ideology as "psychological strain" damages a fundamental distinction between action and behavior. This differentiation is clouded by a number of behaviorists. Action relates to persons: behavior to organisms. Action implies speech, thought, and activity which communicates about reality and further attempts to seek and state the truth. "Action," in classical literature implied more than the exerting of power; it implied both proper performance, and harmonious functioning or direction, both of which were judged by accepted normative standards. "Behavior" has lost many of these qualities as a scientific category.

The one-sided borrowing that takes place between political scientists and psychologists includes more than a concern for methodology. As a discipline, post-Freudian psychology has tended to be somewhat anti-philosophical, anti-historical, and means-oriented in character because of its psychologistic reduction in which the structure of human emotions was viewed as the key to understanding the nature of man. Political science has a long and venerable tradition that is based on a much richer view of human personality. In many ways, "psychologists

seem in general to be creating a body of knowledge on the basis of a rather simple and direct empiricism."<sup>14</sup> When political behavioralists adopt a psychological orientation to the study of politics, they bring with them implicit assumptions which are alien to the discipline of political science. Following Dooyeweerd's paradigm we could say that scientific behavioral psychology, when transferred to political science, sets itself up as the near sum-total of human reality. Other forms of knowledge which transcend the "psychological dimension" of behavior and supposedly do not have validity in a "hard" scientific sense are downgraded or discounted.

Because of behavioralism's ahistorical nature, comparative analysis can become cumbersome and difficult when the techniques of behavioral scientific psychology are employed. This is a significant point, for political scientists have typically been concerned with questions that are comparative in scope. Behavioral psychology's means-orientation is also obvious to any reader. This pre-occupation tends to tackle problems in bits and pieces rather than as meaningful wholes. A Dooyeweerdian approach to politics is quite different. It moves from generalities to specifics, thereby preserving the true nature of the given problem. Historically, political science has sought answers to problems of a foundational sort. It was occupied with the question of the just place of man as a person in the public realm, where rights and obligations of the members of the body are equitably allocated. Answers to questions of this kind, no matter how difficult to find, are the basis for meaningful empirical research. But many current behavioral

political analyses do not deal sufficiently with these major questions. Matters of epistemology, anthropology, ethics, and ontology are generally relegated to a second order because of the underlying skepticism, prevalent in the modern age, while behavioral scientific psychology increasingly imposes its body of knowledge on the discipline of political science. We notice in describing many of the various behavioral conceptualizations of ideology a dependence on psychological interpretation and methodology.

The limitations of behavioral theories of ideology can, I think, often be traced back to their original setting in behavioral scientific psychology. The reduction of an action to a conditioned response obliterates man as a creature of spirit, power, and creativity. It challenges the existence of a normative dimension. Behavioral scientific psychology, now embedded in some political scientists' conceptions of ideology,<sup>15</sup> has difficulty dealing with unique events, non-events, and questions that uncover "reasons" rather than "behavioral causes." Following Dooyeweerd we could say that the newer behavioral conceptions of ideology have seldom sought to raise legitimate normative questions that man has continually asked down through the centuries.<sup>16</sup> My argument is that political science, reduced to behavioral psychology, at times fails to make a proper reference to objective political reality. The full experience of politics as Dooyeweerd has described it has been to a large extent ignored.

The behavioral view of objectivity presents us with a paradox: If only the observable, the duplicable, and the measurable have validity, then the dimension of human "political" existence, namely experience, is somewhat removed from

the study of politics. This de-limiting is often suggested in the name of objectivity. But how could something like alienation, for example, convey any meaning if at some time someone had not undergone, that is experienced, it? A behavioral notion of objectivity implies that to be objective we must eliminate and deny what is really there. Being objective amounts to using operational definitions as methodological principles to de-limit the content of political inquiry. Using Dooyeweerd's analysis we can conclude that for behavioralism method has at times dictated content.

In the paradigm that I developed in the light of Dooyeweerd's approach, the multiple dimensions of reality do indeed have ample room for psychology, but only in terms of a single dimension of human action. The "supra-psychical" dimensions have a reality of their own which can only be grasped by means of theoretical methods adapted to the specificity of the dimensions in question. This implies that the scientific study of political belief systems requires a methodology that can indeed grasp the nature and relevance of belief. Since belief is not a feeling, the methodology relevant to the study of feelings are not suited to the study of beliefs. Beliefs according to Dooyeweerd pertain to allegiance, and thus belong to the normative order of rights. Allegiance is a matter of the human response to an ought; it does not belong simply to the realm of emotional preferences as in the survey research of Campbell and Converse, or the studies of elites by Putnam. A genuinely objective political science should proceed from

the inherent nature of belief systems; it does injustice to empirical reality when it reduces allegiance to subjective feelings. Thus the very view of objectivity in the behavioral sciences is at stake here. Authentic objectivity does justice to the many dimensions of reality, in which persons and institutions function. Behavioral psychology, in its "uni-dimensionality," is less than truly objective.

#### Obscurity by Word and Number

Morton Grodzins once jokingly said of a study of consumer preferences conducted by Paul Lazarsfeld, a pioneer in behavioral political science: "It must be said that this is a pretentious and awkward way to state the obvious . . . How large a foundation grant, how many runs on the IBM computer countersorter were needed to come to this conclusion?"<sup>17</sup> One is inclined to ask the behavioralist in political science whether he puts the technique before the problem. The technique in analysis must be one which is determined by the problem at hand. How does the behavioralist know how to select the problem? The answer is assumed: not argued, since arguments would require explicit statements of the political context within which problems arise that need analysis.

At times it seems as though the questions which some behaviorists ask are those which are easily handled by the tools social science presently has at its disposal. This seems particularly true in the case of certain behavioral treatments of the phenomenon of ideology. There are two forms



of obscurity at work here: one of word, the other of number. By "obscurity" I simply mean that the mind cannot clearly see or comprehend: the matter may be overly complicated, the expression may be ambiguous, or involved and confused in form. Words and numbers which I will call "obscure" are unintelligible inasmuch as they are either indistinct or dimly reasoned.

How does obscurity take place? "The hardworking empiricist is handicapped, in a way the armchair speculator is not, when it comes to interpreting the statistics he collects -- 'facts' do not speak for themselves, and especially 'facts' that at one stage are merely holes in punch cards."<sup>18</sup> When it comes to interpreting collected facts the behavioral scientist is at a loss because the technique which assisted in the management of data has little to say about the meaning of findings. Dooyeweerd, among others, has argued that the gap between interpretation and technique is always problematic. It is especially problematic in political behavioralism. For example, Putnam's conversations with British and Italian politicians turn up much interesting material that begs to be interpreted, or discussed in terms and categories familiar to the history of political thought.

In many ways, the political scientist has been superceded by the psychologist and statistician when it comes to interpreting data. Hopefully, the data, when thoroughly controlled for statistical regularity, will lend itself to the goal of behavioral political science, a theory of political behaviors.

One is, however, reminded of Lasswell's remark that "Americans respect technology and science: political scientists envy authority that can be based on experiment, not argument."<sup>19</sup>

Devotion to methodology has often times meant that the object studied be quantified, and this has tended to mean that the political character of the object is somewhat neglected, in that the interpretation of the objective data occurs in the light of non-political criteria -- criteria from psychology, or statistics; that is typically the methodology of the natural sciences, which is based on quantification of data.

Dooyeweerd has argued that political phenomena do indeed display a quantitative facet. This facet can be studied statistically, but first the criteria for statistical selection must be clearly of a politically qualitative kind, and second, the limited weight of statistical information should always be kept in mind. If this is not done obscurity results.

My thesis is that the development of some behavioral concepts of ideology have produced examples of technical (word and number) obscurity. At times this development has generated anomalous terminology. The language used to interpret facts is occasionally incongruous and technicized. There are numerous examples one could point to in the contribution of each author previously described. In many ways, the careful observer will note an increasing obscurity as behavioralism grew older and more sophisticated. My point is simply that some behavioralists are not willing to discuss questions of a genuinely political kind on a level transcending that of technique and quantification. The vague

generalizations and quantifications of behavioral political science avoid authentic political discourse. Such discourse, Dooyeweerd has argued, would aim at clarifying matters of political principles, structures, substance, and change.

A few examples are in order. Sutton, et al., the first contribution in this study of the behavioral concepts of ideology, is relatively straightforward. The language constructs are either sociological or economic in nature. This should not be unexpected, as Sutton calls himself a political sociologist and the other authors are trained in quantitative economics. A good deal of Parsonian jargon is evident in The American Business Creed. Ideology is considered in a "theory of strains." The reduction of ideology to a set of strains is an example of technical obscurity, in that it does not clarify the political effect of the strains.

With Lane, the concept is purposely vague enough to include many items. Lane's language, dependent on the techniques he employs, is heavily flavored by a psychological orientation, which covers a period from Freud to the more recent behavioral literature. Lane uses terms like "ideological political personality," "ideological self-analysis," "ideological performance functions," and "forensic-latent ideologies," without clarifying their meanings or contexts. The use of psychological tests, interviewing, and the scaling of data (dealing with political ideology) has its beginnings with Lane, even though Sutton et al. did employ some questionnaire surveys. In Sutton, et al. these were interpreted by the

authors and not presented as finished products to the readers. With Lane, political analysis seems to be reduced to the collection of data psychologically interpreted.

The voting studies, which are actually simultaneous with Lane's work, are the first important large-scale attempts in political science to use rigorous methodology based on a natural science paradigm. Arthur Bentley's desire to measure, evidenced in his famous dictum that "measurement conquers chaos," was, it has been noted, a very early suggestion of a physical-mathematical model for political science. This new model was not applied, however, until the financial support by government, large foundations, and industry sought the execution of quantitative studies. The work of Munro, Catlin, and Merriam in the construction of a new political science along the lines of the natural sciences was taken up with the advent of the voting studies, which quickly proliferated. It is interesting to note that Paul Lazarsfeld began studying voting, "not because he thought it was important, but because he could not get the money for a panel study of consumer preferences."<sup>20</sup>

Following Dooyeweerd, I would argue that voting is human "behavior" which receives its meaning from a particular context: a cultural tradition, a political structure, and voters' expectations. The quantitative voter studies are not clear unless their contextuality is accounted for. There is a quantifiable dimension to voting behavior, what Dooyeweerd termed a "numerical aspect." But this dimension

receives its meaning from the societal structure within which this type of behavior occurs. Only in the light of that structure can "ideology" be interpreted.

Campbell and Converse, in their study of voting, elaborate a concept of ideology which adds some amount of confusion to a concept already suffering from accumulated obscurity. The suggestion of alternative terms, such as "belief systems," or "attitude structure," does not clear the difficulties inherited with the term "ideology."

The use of "constraint" in reference to ideological functions of interdependence is designed to allow for quantification. The term states little, however, that is unique or original. Other new terms -- "funnel of causality," "political translation" - are offered to capture insights, most of which are dependent on the refinement of technique. Voting is assumed to be an interest based response to the social environment. The possibility that persons may vote for reasons of obligation, thought about the common good, or consideration of some political situation in the world is left unattended. Voting cannot be severed from its "social environment" because many other factors play a role in voting as well. Dooyeweerd would argue that if these factors are not taken into account, a study on voting behavior lacks scientific objectivity. The discussion of the concept of ideology in this contribution excludes many obvious political factors. The language used is rigorous and exacting, but at the same time narrow and almost non-political.

Stanislaw Andrzejewski has summed up this problem well. Apparently some theorists "seem to forget that ideas may be accepted or rejected simply because they seem to be true -- because they carry conviction. . . . There is, therefore, some kind of intrinsic dynamics in the ideological sphere: some sort of immanent logic . . . The spread and waning of ideas are not, then, independent of social circumstances, but evidently they cannot be considered as their mere by-product."<sup>21</sup> The "intrinsic dynamics" of ideology, in the measure that it is not a mere by-product of social circumstances, required more-than-quantifiable insight into the effect of ideology, on voting behavior. It requires treatment of the truth or un-truth of the ideology or ideologies under debate.

Apter is dependent on Erik Erikson for his conceptualization of ideology. However, he goes beyond the definition which sees ideology as a function of ego, to suggest various "linkages" between ideology and action. This means, of course, that willy-nilly Apter has to relate ideology to politics. The question remains, is "action" sufficiently specific? He also suggests that "political religion" is synonymous with ideology. But no distinctions are drawn between the political, the religious, and the philosophical modes of thought or types of activity. Apter adds linguistic confusion to a subject that is beset with problems. New terms are again rendered in an obscuring way.

Following Dooyeweerd it is important to note that

Apter's particular form of obscurity is definitely related to an implicit indifference to religion in human affairs. Apter's western liberalism looks down on "sacred collectivities" of the non-modern, developing areas. But he lacks a clear, theoretically-defined notion of what "sacred" implies. One could ask if Apter's ideal secular libertarianism is not as sacred, for him at least, as the ideology he wishes to discount. Is American liberalism not like a political religion? An ideology? These questions go unanswered in Apter's corpus of writings because it is not characteristic of liberals to subject their own assumptions to a radical critique. The saving truth -- that professionalism in science leads to the good life -- is an interesting although unoriginal proposal. Apter is reluctant to tell us what "professionalism" means in terms of this theory. The entire matter is further confused by the suggestion that science can itself be an ideology. Yet, is it better than any "vulgar" ideology which preceded it? One must indeed ask, what makes Marxism or Christianity so vulgar? Perhaps their unsuiteness to be quantified? Apter has a unique terminology, which does not always contribute to theoretical clarity. Could it be that the arbitrariness in terminology in some of these behavioral theories by itself is indicative that this approach has lost contact with relevant scientific criteria?

Putnam's contribution of a behavioral concept of ideology is the most recent and the most "sophisticated" in

terms of its behavioral methods. Realizing the need to be scientific about ideology, Putnam attempts to point out characteristics which are ideological variables and therefore manageable in a statistical sense. The list of a "hypothetical 'menu' of components" does not accomplish this "scientific sense." Not only is the list hypothetical, it is also like a restaurant menu -- a choice of possible selections. His list is indefinite rather than selective. Making everything ideology, in a way, tends to negate the concept altogether. The list appears to me as more akin to a grab bag than to a tight and rigorously exacting sample. The needs of empirical investigation are again sacrificed on the altar of theoretical analysis and understanding.

The idea of "political style," not original with Putnam, is an interesting and valuable contribution to political science. Yet I seriously doubt its applicability when intercorrelated, factor-analyzed, indexed, and measured into the forced notion of "syndrome." The very possibility of a syndrome implies disease or a medical disturbance. Does ideology then entail abnormality? The failure to discuss the concept of ideology in relation to truth content leads to a confusing state of affairs. "Hard research" and the technicized language it brings with it do not settle the underlying questions concerning ideology.

Putnam thinks that the concept of ideology can benefit from an empirical investigation, no matter "how murky



the swamp" (his phrase). At times it seems that Putnam gets bogged down in a swamp of his own creation. For Putnam has chosen his scientific methodology without reference to the field of study. Overdrawn categories, which seem forced, made operational and finally quantified, again obscure more than they uncover. Putnam has executed some interesting research without saying as much as could be said about politics. The sufficiency of exactness, which Putnam on his own terms falls short of, fails to provide criteria of relevance for the activity pursued. The legitimacy of politics is questioned by Putnam in his zealous effort to reduce the political to the non-political: he wraps what appears to be common sense findings in technical jargon.

In a very crucial sense, Dooyeweerd as well as others has argued, there is no methodology without logos, without thinking about thinking. And if a firm distinction is drawn -- as it should be -- between methodology and technique, the latter is no substitute for the former. Putnam falls short because he does not indicate how his methodology fits the criteria of political science. His methods are relevant only to quantifiable data. Like Dooyeweerd, I would argue that there is a "numerical" or "quantifiable" aspect to politics, but that this aspect is only one of the many aspects discernible through human understanding.

Moving from these individual behavioral scientists we must look at the broader question of natural scientific methodology, particularly of measurability. Actually the possibility of treating politics by means of mathematics is not a new one. Plato is said to have once commented, "God always geometrizes." In the pre-modern age, mathematics was held in high regard because the metaphysical order of the cosmos was said to have been reflected in numeration. The key concepts of mathematics were viewed as parallel to those of Greek political theory.

Dooyeweerd, as others, has argued that, in the modern age, mathematics, however, depends upon the "modern" view of nature which, because it is viewed as a mechanism of functional-causal relations, can only be understood scientifically by means of the mathematical-physical methods. Mathematics, as the basis of the modern natural sciences, became the method for measuring -- to pin numbers on things. This need to operationalize previously theoretical concepts in order to scientifically test, describe, and compare properties eventually found its way into the new political science. In the twentieth century, the use of statistics for political purposes presupposes the modern concept of nature and the reliance on natural-scientific methods. Many political scientists believed that laws of large numbers help to predict certain probabilities.

But mathematics is not a social science. And the problems of political life are more than mathematical

in nature. Therefore, the language of politics, if it is to be more precise with regard to political things, must be more than quantitative. Few behavioralists would argue that politics is essentially a numerical science. Yet some of the behavioral conceptions of ideology do give statistical analysis a primary place. Some however seem more anxious than others to quantify persons and things in the political realm that are not easily given to quantification. This is due to the fact that a number of behavioralists are at times not sufficiently self-critical with respect to the underlying assumptions about man, nature and social reality that are hidden in their conception of science.

Following Dooyeweerd's paradigm we can say that before one can measure, one must define the thing or action under study. There is indeed a place for statistical analysis in social theory. For the social sciences do indeed deal with social "things" and "relations" that display a quantifiable dimension. But this dimension can never be severed from the totality within which these "things" and "relations" need to be properly understood. Dooyeweerd has suggested that it is with the acceptance of an atomistic view of man -- correlative with the modern view of nature as a mechanism -- that the limited character of quantification and statistics in the social sciences is generally disregarded.

Without proper conceptualization and theoretical awareness, the quantitative comparison of things (often

not the same kind) is impossible. One must know what one is measuring. Otherwise, the activity of measuring tends to be arbitrary or mystifying. Eventually, poor conceptualization of the political effects even the accuracy of mathematical analysis. The "what" of what one claims to measure must be understood before one measures it. Giovanni Sartori realizes this problem when he says that "the more we advance technically, the more we leave a vast uncharted territory behind our backs."<sup>22</sup> In fact, "computer technology and facilities are bound to flood us with masses of data of which no human mind can have any substantive grasp."<sup>23</sup> By "substantive" is meant the asking of foundational questions -- on which traditional political thought was based. These perennial questions have been given constant attention in political thinking. Matters of anthropology and ontology should not be avoided but be made central to any discussion of ideology.

The problems of quantification are especially grave when the discussion concerns human beings. Humans are subjects, not just objects; they act. Persons cannot be properly treated as mere objects for they are not things. Persons must be listened to, conversed with, not simply observed and recorded. Robert Lane tried to take this seriously but on this ground alone, many of the behavioral treatments and conceptualizations of ideology are suspect. The understanding of human nature seems to be one substantive area where behavioral political science is somewhat deficient.

Implicit in the use of statistical technique is a certain theory of the cosmos and its nature. The ontology assumed is one of uncertainty. The nature of an uncertain universe is that of relativity. With this notion often comes a suggestion of control by means of science. Behavioral political science can be, in this sense, oriented toward the social control of human beings. Statistics deals with probabilities which political science turns into posited explanations of determined causality. Properties that are inherently different are added together in order to contribute to the realization of an end. In this sense, behavioral political science belies its confessed antiteleological and anormative nature. However, following Dooyeweerd we could say that the behavioral political scientist is, as scientist, always operating in a "value-laden" context, since he sets out to streamline qualitatively different entities into quantitatively similar means for the realization of a predetermined end (such as, for example, "modernization" of "underdeveloped" countries). The "weighing" of assigned value in any mathematical technique amounts to valuation. Many behavioralists avoid giving an account of this valuation, which is indispensable to social theory. Is this value not a "value judgment" by another name? And if this is the case, how is the basis of behavioral political science (the fact-value dichotomy) challenged? Can certain quantitative measures not be seen as subtle normative choices under the guise of scientific neutrality, which appear to be value-free?

In criticizing behavioralism, I do not mean to say that human nature cannot be studied scientifically. My criticism concerns the limited conceptions of scientific methodology which are explicit in the behavioral paradigm. Paradigmatically behavioralism entails the utilization and development of "more precise" techniques for observing behavior. This orientation replaces older scientific methods for the study of human affairs with the methods of the sciences of nature. This "transposition of methods," to use Dooyeweerd's term, means that things human are viewed as things natural. But human beings transcend the natural realm as natural science conceives it: they are persons acting in a multiplicity of modes [dimensions] of being that transcend the quantitative, physical, biological and psychological dimension of reality. Persons think, make tools, speak, respect their fellows, engage in production to fill their needs, create a world of art, to justice, and act in love and trust, believe and act in faith. All of these human acts occur in societal structures that display reciprocal dimensions to facilitate these variegated human acts. Political science studies human "behavior" in the political realm. But it is mistaken to think that methods suited to the study of nature can really give us insight into the non-natural, specifically human characteristics of "behavior" in the political realm.

To some degree this problem is evident in the behavioral conceptualizations of ideology. These concepts have

been directed to the "how" of behavior, hence the emphasis on the functional value of ideologies. Political behavioralists do not often admit a search for the "why" of behavior, although they do seek to provide causal explanations. Are such explanations not an answer to the question "why," in the form of determinants? A discussion of the nature of man, social causation, and epistemology, is then essential.<sup>24</sup> A scientist who explores the "why" of ideologies will sooner or later have to explain the difference between belief systems and emotional preferences. Following Dooyeweerd it could be said that difference is based on the nature of persons who believe and give allegiance as well as feel. Not distinguishing here leads to some confusion. These delicate areas are rarely entered into by behavioral political scientists. A reading of a few of the major behavioral treatments of ideology serves as a case in point.

Karl Mannheim, one major source for many of the behavioral concepts of ideology, once commented in a review of a quantitative political science textbook:

We must admit a very marked and painful disproportion between the vastness of the scientific machinery employed and the value of the ultimate results. Subjects and titles evoke the highest expectation, yet, after having reached their conclusions, one is tempted to ask, disappointedly: "Is this all?"<sup>25</sup>

Mannheim is making the point that American political science

has tended to treat proper philosophical questions as metaphysical escapes. His important argument is that subject matter ought to come before worries about exactness. One only wishes that certain behavioral writers who make contributions to the conceptualization of ideology had heeded the warnings given by the person to whom many of them are so indebted.

It seems, at times, that the supreme object of behavioral political science is to measure and control the world rather than to fully understand it in its many dimensions, or change it. One critic has put it well:

Accepting the fact as given, we observe it, experiment with it, verify it, classify it, measure it if possible, and reason about it as little as may be.<sup>26</sup>

The idea of science with which behaviorists labor has been so seductive of its practitioners in its narrow ways that they have become conditioned by its methods of understanding. "Understanding" requires more, however, as Dooyeweerd has suggested, than derived statements and statistical operations of a behavioral sort. It requires primarily a cognitive assessment of the interdimensional coherence of political reality. Simply, political behavioralism does not supply answers to many of the questions of political life -- on these it is severely limited.<sup>27</sup>

Each of the described behavioral treatments of the concept of ideology has as its goal, quantification, pre-



diction and finally control of what is seen as ideological extremism. Measurement is the tool employed to establish this predictability. Sutton et al. use survey techniques on an American business population. Lane employs numerous psychological tests, including Guttman scales. Campbell and Converse are dependent on the computer for their results, as well as for their public opinion models. Apter never gets around to the business of quantification; nevertheless, it remains, as I have demonstrated, his heartfelt commitment. With Putnam, behavioral political science has advanced to the apex of mathematical design. Statistics become the primary concern in the study of politicians, while there is little attention to what these persons "believe." With Putnam, there exists the "danger that sheer technical virtuosity and mathematical subtlety may become ends in themselves, as though brilliance of technique could atone for conceptual poverty or trivial subject matter."<sup>28</sup>

Technical hardware is capable of producing remarkable results, but it is as incapable of making conceptual confusion into conceptual clarity. Dooyeweerd, like other critics of "scientized cultural development" suggested on more than one occasion that conceptual clarity is central to informed analysis. Often times the behavioral concepts of ideology seem to obscure as much as they enlighten. By neglecting questions of an ontological and anthropological nature in deference for those with mathematical probability much is, in fact, forfeited.

For these reasons, the morphological approach used by a number of behavioral political scientists who formulate conceptions of ideology has a tendency to distort reality. Behavioralists have difficulty with the whole of reality -- which is more than the sum of its parts. As Dooyeweerd and many phenomenologists have argued, any codification of verbal responses inverts the relationship between form and facts because it destroys the unity of the creature. The linguistic symbols on which mathematical operations are performed have an ambiguity which should not be discounted.

The content of most political behavior is linguistic; bargaining, conciliating, threatening, exhorting, persuading, reporting. All this goes on somewhere between the two poles of violence, which is speechless, and contemplation; which is also speechless . . . . The aim of methodological precision drives us away from the figurative toward the literal in the hopes of finding a neutral language. But if political language is always contextual, and contextual language is never neutral, the price we pay for neutral language may be loss of touch with politics itself.<sup>29</sup>

One important difference between politics and pseudo-politics is worth remembering. Politics deals with conditions of human needs, pseudo-politics concerns a make-believe world in which politics is reduced to personal interests.

A forced response to a survey, a battery question, or even an interview, has a formalistic overtone. This bias toward the formal which can then be quantified leads to an overemphasis of static dimensions and an accentuation of the part over the whole. Human experience is much more complex and subtle than precisely categorized quan-

tification allows. The problem of the meaning of words, which therefore elicit different feelings and allegiances in people, is not accounted for in many behavioral designs. In this sense alone the work of Robert E. Lane is superior to that of other behavioral analysis.

In Dooyeweerd's perspective each person has a unique association with each symbol. These associations cannot be reduced to a category and assigned a numerical equivalent without losing their real content. The egalitarian and ahistorical bias for the "average" person or response means the loss of the distinctiveness of each individual. These problems are multiplied when a behavioralist seeks to probe the area of inner feeling, of foundational questions of the philosophical, religious or ideological type.<sup>30</sup>

Ideologies are less precise than activities referring to cognitive statements or actions. Overt activity is obvious and therefore easier to assess than ideological belief. In fact, ideologies contain symbols of experience in abstraction from experience. These experiences are more fundamental and elemental than the symbols themselves. Behavioral political science, in many cases, cannot illuminate this innermost experience, certainly not by way of a reductionistic mathematical equation or a factor analysis.

Behavioral methodology encourages the reification of symbols into categories which can be manipulated mathematically. This tendency on the part of behavioral political scientists precludes, as Dooyeweerd would put it,

a search for broader generalities and an enduring commitment to truth. The studies of ideology contributed by behavioral political scientists are somewhat problematic in that they are not based on as much clarity and precision as their methodologies suggest.

#### The Static Quality of Models

I intend in this section to demonstrate two points: first, that behavioralism, as a whole, tends to be static, and secondly, that its treatments of ideology are cases in point. The "static" quality does not necessarily correlate with conservatism but with a single paradigm of historical change: the change from "sacred" to "secular," communal to individualistic, religious or metaphysical to economic wealth, from spiritual to material; that which is implied in secularization and modernization.

Following Dooyeweerd we can say that precisely because the paradigm of behavioralism relinquishes the spiritual nature of personality, and reduces this personality to an aggregate of psychical responses to an environment, it parallels the fundamental change in our civilization from a classical and Christian past to secular modernity.

The models of behavioralism are "static" since they are caught within the premises of liberal modernity. Herbert Marcuse has described this as the "one-dimensionality" of modern social science. Behavioralism in this sense accepts technological change but not change in political power relations.

Dooyeweerd would suggest that behavioralism is a "scientism" then, which excludes or denies the scientific character of other forms of knowing. Thus, it is an instrument for social change that aims at eliminating the foundation of the other forms of knowing (religion, philosophy, and classical political theory that focused on the nature of the public realm) in order to further modernization, industrialization, and secularization.

As a matter of fact, American behavioral science, as it accompanies and guides American social practice, is a very vital contributor to social change, at home and abroad. This is, in part, due to the consequence of modernity's particular view of change, changes which are encouraged even in the behavioral concepts of ideology. Behavioralism's difficulty comes with interpreting change of other kinds, and with predicting changes that fall outside of what the western liberal regards as "progressive" change.

My argument, following the Dooyeweerdian paradigm, which has been cursorily outlined, is that behavioralism operates within the context of American liberalism. The modern, progressive notion of change is then both liberal and behavioral. Although it appears to be paradoxical, "American behavioral science could be called "conservative" in the sense of its preservation and expansion of western Liberalism. This conservatism is demonstrated in the way certain behaviorists treat ideology. A number of behaviorists, as has been described, assume that American

civilization is the vanguard -- nothing can, as it were, move faster than the pace of their science. And "ideology" must be neutralized if it stands in the way of that vanguard.

In many ways, the new science of politics is politics by other means. Ideology for the political behavioralists is closely related to the "ideology" of the end-of-ideologists. The "decline of political theory" and "status of metaphysics" debates both had an impact on the way certain behavioralists conceptualized ideology. Many of the assumptions of behavioral theory are hidden behind a veneer of scientific objectivity.

Recall that behavioral political science is based on the premise that social science can be like natural science. But the natural science paradigm contributes to a confined perspective on social change.

To apply this outlook to the social sciences is to incorporate a perspective on social change that is clearly confining. Change as development becomes mutatis mutandis incrementalism. Insofar as it does occur, change is viewed in terms of society's ongoing function, as a self-correcting and self-sustaining mechanism. The notion of deep and basic structural transformation that results from conscious human agency, from criticism and will, is foreign to an outlook taken over from the natural sciences.<sup>31</sup>

The behavioral conceptualizations of ideology partake of this view of science. It is my thesis that inasmuch as the behavioral concepts of ideology attempt to operate in this natural science paradigm they are falsifying or incomplete.

concepts, if we use the specialized notion of "false" as described by R. A. Strickland:

- (1) It predicts poorly (e.g., "Eating lettuce is the best remedy for melancholy")
- (2) It leaves out certain significant factors (e.g., "Gandhi was a lawyer")
- (3) It confounds entities (e.g., "Jupiter is the planet nearest the sun")
- (4) It fails to discriminate part and whole (e.g., "By that point, she was all eyes")
- (5) It is indistinct and vague (e.g., "We must wage war to prove our uncompromising love of peace")<sup>32</sup>

By false is meant inadequate.

Many of the behavioral concepts of ideology are inadequate, not only on account of their technical obscurity, their scientific psychological reductionism but, finally, because they are restrictive in a static methodological sense. The horizon of behavioralism is the modern, western notion of progress. Within this horizon behavioralism does have a concept of change and dysfunction. But to show this adequately, the notion of progress needs more clarification. By "progress," Dooyeweerd would argue that the behavioralist identifies with the forward march of western, "enlightened," scientific, consumption-oriented civilization, without inspecting its roots, its path, or its end.

Elsewhere I have, in my use of Dooyeweerd, suggested that the behaviorists have tended to ignore the fact that reality is multi-dimensional.<sup>33</sup> Reality sets the conditions in which particular societies and individuals change. Con-

tinuity is not inherent. The nature of "time" as the order for change is not considered in behavioral studies; rather the progress of American society including its techniques is assumed. Because of this, the behavioral conceptualizations of ideology often do not allow for a complete theory of political conflict. As Apter has argued, science as an ideology implies the end of other ideologies.

Likewise, behavioralism does not answer the question of how or why individuals or societies generate change. Here implied is a "systems ethics" in which the maintenance of a particular system is given ethical priority above all other values. The behavioral model further makes an unwarranted value statement by suggesting that existing social disorder or strain is rooted in a breakdown of the individual actors rather than being endemic to the system at large. For example, the "individualistic bias" is clearly present in the work of Campbell and Converse, as well as that of Putnam. Robert E. Lane suggests linkages between his interviews and democratic theory but does not make them.

The upshot of this is profoundly conservative, because it leads to reconciling people to the social order, and it does this by demonstrating to them that, contrary to their initial beliefs which had caused the breakdown in communication in the first place, actual social practice is inherently rational.<sup>34</sup>

Behavioralism supplies no theory to change the existing framework of things. It more frequently tends to support the developmental direction of a given system.



The problem of a proper conceptualization of ideology is not simply that of careful empirical observation by professional researchers; for the study of ideology inevitably leads its students into an area of personal interest and commitment. Ideology is an object which, properly studied assails detachment and beckons participation. The neutral claims of behavioral social science call for close scrutiny. The study of ideology is not a disinterested activity.

The archetype of the behavioral social scientist is deeply rooted in modern American culture. The intellectual and political milieu of behavioralism in political science is American liberalism. This liberal image of society is manifested and almost institutionalized in behavioral theories. Behavioralism generally, and its concepts of ideology specifically, have "legitimated what amounts to the dominant, operative ideology of the American elite, a sort of public philosophy of interest-group liberalism (in Lowi's terms)."<sup>35</sup> Christian Bay concurs when he says, "to put it bluntly, it appears that a good number of otherwise able political scientists confuse a vaguely stated conventional 'democratism' with scientific objectivity."<sup>36</sup> Overemphasizing the present reality, behavioralists shun questions of a normative order. The status quo tends to be legitimized while normative reflection is disclaimed as unscientific or even illegitimate.

Let us look more closely at a few of the behavioral concepts of ideology, because the conservatism of beha-

vioralism is particularly evident in its conceptualizations of ideology. Sutton, et al. produce a theory of ideology which is not significantly different from the American business ideology they purport to study. Science is upheld as neutral and objective while ideology is downgraded as bigoted and subjective. The social science method itself is offered as the final goal. This indicates a conservatism which places trust not in ideologies but in American social science, (i.e., pragmatism).

The argument presented by Lane suited the times. The 1960s was an era of the so-called affluent and knowledgeable society. Lane's was a convenient and believable analysis. It implied that things were about as acceptable as they could be and that ordinary citizens accepted it. We can even see in Lane's analysis a sort of liberal Burkeanism. "His study of the ideology of the common man, broad-gauge and deep as it was, failed to focus on the grievance these men felt. It emphasized instead how fully they had accepted both their own place in the social system and the workings of that system itself."<sup>37</sup> The wealth and prestige of the United States was accepted as a permanent model.

Campbell and Converse accept the same reality as Lane; a reality which at times seems unreal. The "constraint" for which they sought was limited to the questions they asked, and, more particularly, to the manner in which the questions were asked. Political dissent was not evidenced because the subtlety and deepness of individual responses

were obliterated by the techniques employed. The social science method of their day, American behavioralism, limited the questions, as well as the responses. The picture that Campbell and Converse present "leaves us with too vacant a picture of the non-views of the mass public."<sup>38</sup> The "silence" about political issues seems to relate more about the question than to the real problems that beset average people in everyday life. The issues and questions on which Campbell and Converse base their concept of ideology assume that the American political system works.

Social science, in the United States in this period, generally had as its aim the defense of the existing American order, and its expansion in world politics. Could it be however that the respondents, in these studies, actually said more than the researchers reported? Their non-comments can be seen as a reflection of the society in which they lived. The fact that the "level of radicalism" was low, which is a question that should be separated from the "level of ideology," does not mean that there was no dissent. The purported ideology of mass publics says a great deal about the ability of political scientists. It seems as though some political behavioralists miss the deeper levels of the reality for which they search. The implicit "system-maintaining" or even "system-expanding" attitude inhibits questions of meaning and structure and, in the end, prejudices not only the conceptualization but the outcome of the research as well. The questions themselves supply

many of the answers. A system's approach operates to preserve one particular system. Deep reflection and dissent are seen as troublesome, possibly even dysfunctional. In fact, "system maintenance" leads precisely to a treatment of ideology as if it were disruptive. Note for example the notion of a scientized society in the writings of Apter. For many political behavioralists, ideology stands in the way of upward mobility and the refinement of scientific technique.

Apter does recognize that ideology has something to do with meaning. Meaning implies structure, symbol, and function. However, meaning is viewed as "dogmatic," as a "defense mechanism." The possibility of an open, questioning ideological mind does not enter into Apter's conceptualization. Ideology instead always hinders modernization. Unless, of course, that ideology is science, which is not "ideology" after all.

Modernization theory is Apter's tour de force. The western, liberal, fully secular state is his final goal for mankind. The means of achieving this goal is scientific technocracy. Many critics have accused Apter of bias in his research on developing countries. American values seem to seep into the argument at every corner forming what has been called an "epithet of ethnocentrism" or an enculturated study. Again, many behavioralists presuppose one form of change and reject all others. The

only acceptable change is that which maintains the modernizing trends inherent in a scientific culture ruled by some form of technocracy.

The appropriateness of Apter's concepts must be questioned. The social science approach employed by Apter supports only those ideas and forms of government that are uniquely American. Apter's work has many unstated value preferences. For example, his descriptions of African politics are usually stated in terms of American preferences. Such is the case with the notion of ideology as rationalization, adopted in the contributions Apter has produced to date. The system adopted by Apter -- American liberalism -- is upheld as the model to which all other countries are to strive. For example, Apter's work on Ghana can be seen in this light. Only those things defined as functional for the system are approved. Ideology, when vulgar, is disapproved; when scientific, is applauded. "Robin Hoods" and "Ideologues" are dismissed, while professional career scientists are crowned as "problem solvers." Apter's behavioralism is not inherently conservative; it only conserves the "role of America" in world history -- and that requires some change in the United States and elsewhere.

For Putnam ideology is made a variable function of the greater political culture. But he gets carried away with the "hard" discipline of coding and counting. One wishes

that more time had been spent clarifying key concepts used in the research rather than analyzing the unclear data into tight and rigid categories.

Putnam's categories are actually predetermined by the paradigm he has chosen. Using Lane's "knowledgeable society" argument, Putnam forces certain categories that look for a waning of ideology. One must ask: when a respondent mentions one thing, does the response doom that same person to a "category" for all time? The responses seem actually to be much richer than content analysis and intercorrelated factor analysis allow. When a British politician gives an extended answer with many tangents, caveats, and exceptions, and we nevertheless find him categorized and factorized, the reader is cognizant that the category has probably come at the expense of the extensiveness and richness of response. If Putnam entered into dialogue with his politicians; if he forcibly questioned them; and if he took account of what they did not say as well as what they might have said -- the results would likely have been different and more in tune with reality. The reality would have been more than the world of the American social scientists, which is a selective world.

By behavioral standards Putnam's conceptualization is the most scientific of those covered in this treatment. It also distorts political reality to a greater degree than the accounts on which it is based. Putnam is the American

scientist par excellence. An experimental aura surrounds his entire research activity. Actually, the end-of-ideology argument is assumed. The pursuit of ideological goals is viewed as damaging to the political system as a whole. This pejorative definition renders a perfectly good central concept unworkable. Putnam further fails to recognize that his own American pragmatism is ideological. Because of his empirical positivism, he is not cognizant of the fact that, on many occasions, ideology may act as a leavening agent to clarify and help attain certain goals.<sup>39</sup> Putnam's unargued assumptions cogently portray the bias of American liberalism insofar as they favor only a certain kind of change.

In summary, I have attempted to demonstrate that many of the behavioral concepts of ideology suffer from problems in conceptualization. Drawing on Dooyeweerd's analysis, and the distinction between a functional versus a truth approach to ideology, I have tried to show that certain realities of political experience are at times ignored, because of an overdependence on behavioral scientific psychology. Three types of reductionism were noted: psychologism, functionalism, and a certain kind of scientism which often seeks to apply quantitative methods and mathematical analysis in the interpretation of data. Certain behavioral conceptualizations of ideology are found lacking in their reference to objective reality. Steeped in technical language (verbal and mathematical) to the point of obscurity, a number of behaviorists at times prove exacting but not always relevant. Finally, Western liberalism prevails as the model for analysis,

stressing only that which is functional. I find that some behavioral concepts of ideology reflect the image of American social science and its preferences.

Dooyeweerd's analytic framework provided for us both a criticism of some of the behavioral treatments of ideology and a number of corrective implications for a multi-dimensional science of politics.



NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup>William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse. Toronto: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974, 1. Connolly does a commendable job in the discussion of "essentially contested concepts in politics." He covers: "Politics," 2-22; "Interests," 45-84; "Power," 85-138; and "Freedom," 139-78.

<sup>2</sup>Henry Kariel quoted in, Ibid., 180.

<sup>3</sup>Christian Bay, "Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some Behavioral Literature," American Political Science Review, May, 1965, 59:1, 39. See also Christian Bay, "The Cheerful Science of Dismal Politics," in Theodore Roszak, eds., The Dissenting Academy. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, 208-203. The distinction between "political" which improves the conditions of human needs and "pseudopolitical" which resembles the political but is primarily concerned with personal neuroses or interest group advantage--therefore the counterfeit of true politics--is drawn, (213). A penetrating critique of the development theory of Almond, Powell, and Pye is offered, 216ff.

<sup>4</sup>See L. Kalsbeek, The Contours of a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd's Thought. Bernard and Josina Zylstra, eds. Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1975; J. M. Spier, An Introduction to Christian Philosophy. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1954, and James W. Skillen, "The Development of Calvinistic Political Theory in the Netherlands: With Special Reference to the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd." Phd. (unpublished) dissertation, Duke University, 1973.

<sup>5</sup>See also Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, 7. "Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit."

<sup>6</sup>See Christopher Dawson's view as expressed in "Religion and the Life of Civilization," in John J. Mulloy, ed. The Dynamics of World History, La Salle, Ill.: Sugden Company, 1978, 115ff.

<sup>7</sup>Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought. Nutley, N.J.: Craig Press, 1968, 7.

<sup>8</sup>Herman Dooyeweerd, The New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Philadelphia: Reformed Publishing Company, 1953, 469-68, Vol. III.

<sup>9</sup>H.J. van Eikema Hommes, Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy. New York: North Holland, 1979, 237.

<sup>10</sup>Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "The Impact of the Behavioral Approach on Traditional Political Science," in Austin Ranney, ed., Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962, 12. Kirkpatrick suggests that the basic postulate of behavioral political science is that "the concepts of social science, as well as the theoretical matrix for those concepts, are identical or ought to be made identical with those of the natural sciences.", 26.

<sup>11</sup>I am following: Herbert J. Spiro, "Critique of Behavioralism in Political Science," in Klaus Von Beyme, ed., Theory and Practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, 315. He suggests that the best way to decide whom one should classify as a behavioralist is to restrict classification to those who profess openly their commitment to behavioralism in political science. He refers to those persons as "self-styled behavioralists."

<sup>12</sup>Herbert J. Spiro, op. cit., 322; who with great vituperation said "The remarkable, apparently unprecedented thing about behavioralists is that they, unlike earlier political scientists, have actively contributed to reducing the scope of what legitimately comes under their discipline, almost as though they suffered from professional sadomasochism, a kind of academic self-loathing (possibly induced by and combined with regrets that they did not become economists, sociologists, psychologists, or computer programmers to begin with rather than half way through their careers.," 326-7. For an excellent summary of the critique of behavioralism from the viewpoint of humanistic psychology see Charles Hampden-Turner, Radical Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1970, 1-12.

<sup>13</sup>Peter J. Euben, "Political Science and Political Silence," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, eds., Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 45.

<sup>14</sup>Morris Janowitz, Political Conflict: Essays in Political Sociology. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 264. The root of the problem is traced back to rampant positivism which has not come to terms with the specific question of religious knowledge versus scientific knowledge.

<sup>15</sup>This scientific psychology so permeates the behavioral concept of ideology that one needs no introduction.

See the following pages in my descriptive analysis: Sutton, 67-91, Lane, 92-117, Campbell and Converse, 118-140, Apter, 141-167, and Putnam, 168-186.

<sup>16</sup>See K. W. Kim, "The Limits of Behavioral Explanation in Politics," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, August 1965, 31:3, 315-27. Legitimacy is claimed for non-behavioral methods such as: history, philosophy, and phenomenology of political experiences. See also Herbert Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella, "Political Science and the Post-Modern Critique of Scientism and Domination," The Review of Politics, July 1975, 37:3, 286-316 for the "beginnings of an alternative"--critical phenomenology.

<sup>17</sup>Morton Grodzins, "A Review of Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Theilens Jr., The Academic Mind," Ethics, April, 1959, 200.

<sup>18</sup>Walter Berns, "Voting Studies," Herbert J. Storing, ed., Essays the Scientific Study of Politics. New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, Inc., 1962, 37-8.

<sup>19</sup>Quoted in Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, xi.

<sup>20</sup>Berns, op. cit., 54. "Despairing of obtaining financial support for a panel study of consumer preferences, Lazarsfeld hit upon the idea of studying the impact of a presidential campaign upon a panel of voters. ... With this less commercial focus financial support was obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation for a panel survey. ..." Brodeck quoted in Berns, op. cit., 54-55; Berns also informs us that "of the 27 authors of essays in American Voting Behavior, only six are political scientists, most of the others being sociologists, social psychologists and psychiatrists." (39n.)

<sup>21</sup>Stanislaw Andrzejewski, "Are Ideas Social Forces?", American Sociology Review, 14:6, December, 1949, 760.

<sup>22</sup>Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science Review, 64:4, December 1970, 1033-53. The need for elementary logic skills is well argued. Without these, there is little doubt that data misgathering is inevitable. Statistical computerized sophistication is no remedy for misinformation.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 1033-36. Sartori realizes that "conceptual stretching" or "conceptual straining" leads to vague amorphous conceptualizations.

<sup>24</sup> See Thomas A. Spragens Jr., The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory: Toward a Post-Behavioral Science of Politics. New York: Dunellen Company, Inc., 1973. "Political Science did not manufacture the assumptions about epistemology and permissible scientific concepts out of whole cloth but rather adopted them from the more general intellectual climate of the time, specifically from philosophy and philosophy of science. As a consequence, unraveling our present dilemma calls for consideration of the relevant inquiry in these areas. Having been helped into some of its difficulties, political science can legitimately expect some help in extricating itself from them.", 2.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Crick, op. cit., 172-3. See also Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968. "Modern science's singular function: reflects the transcendental viewpoint of possible technical controls.", 99.

<sup>26</sup> Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. New York: Yale University Press, 1932, 15-16; The thesis of this work suggests that the modern philosophers demolished the city of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials. The story of man was rewritten, relegating the Christian story to the "limbo" of myths."

<sup>27</sup> See Mulford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," in James C. Charlesworth, ed., Contemporary Political Analysis. New York: The Free Press, 1967, 51-71. He suggests five basic limitations: "(1) the very selection of subjects for investigation is shaped by values which are not derivable from the investigation; (2) in the end, the concepts and values which do determine what and how one studies are related to one's judgments of the goals which one identifies with political life and to one's general 'life experience; (3) when the investigation is launched, there are definite limits to what one can expect from behavioral studies; (4) behaviorally oriented study will remove one from the stuff of everyday politics and cannot be related to that stuff except by means which would usually be regarded as non-behavioral; and (5) if clarification about policy-making is one objective of the politician, behavioralism, although destined to play a significant role, is restricted in what it can be expected to do.", (52-3); Sibley goes on to argue that behavioralism cannot supply answers to: the behavior of the behavioralist, (61); what we ought to value in political life, (62); and forecasting futures, (63).

<sup>28</sup> Spragens, op. cit., 17. The most insightful work to date on "technique" remains Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. London: Jonathan Cape, 1965. "Technique refers

to any complex of standardized means for attaining a pre-determined result. Thus, it converts spontaneous and un-reflective behavior into behavior that is deliberate and rationalized. 'Know-how' takes on ultimate value., " x.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>30</sup> Lee C. MacDonald, "Myth, Politics and Political Science," The Western Political Quarterly, March 1969, 22:1, 150.

<sup>31</sup> Bernard Susser, "The Behavioral Ideology: A Review and a Retrospect," Political Studies, September 1974, 22:3, 286.

<sup>32</sup> R. A. Strickland, "Defining 'Ideology' - A Reformulation," ResPublica, 1974, 16:1, 168.

<sup>33</sup> See Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Philadelphia: Reformed Publishing Company, 1953. The following meaning - nuclei are listed with their aspects:

<u>Aspects</u>	<u>Meaning Nuclei</u>
1 arithmetic (numerical) --	discrete quantity (number)
2 spatial --	continuous extension
3 kinematic --	motion
4 physical --	energy
5 biotic --	vitality (life)
6 sensitive (psychic) --	feeling
7 logical --	distinction
8 historical --	formative power
9 lingual --	symbolic meaning
10 social --	social intercourse
11 economic --	frugality in managing scarce
12 aesthetic --	harmony goods
13 juridical	retribution (recompensing)
14 moral --	love in temporal relationships
15 pistic --	faith, firm assurance

<sup>34</sup> Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1975, 91.

<sup>35</sup> Herbert Reid, "Contemporary American Political Science in the Crisis of Industrial Society," Midwest Journal of Political Science, August, 1972, 16:3, 342. Reid contends that "we must probe the roots of our justified suspicions that 'end of ideology' notions are sometimes a stage in the construction of an unacknowledged ideology of science- (i.e., Wolin and Hartz on Lockean Liberalism).." 350.

<sup>36</sup>Bay, op. cit., 42.

<sup>37</sup>Lewis Lipsitz, "On Political Belief: The Grievances of the Poor," in Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, eds. Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 150. Remember that in Lane's study all of the participants were men, white, upper working class, middle aged, from Connecticut, and it was the late 1950's. This is hardly a representative sample on which to base a lasting theory.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., 151.

<sup>39</sup>See Hans Toch, "Crisis Situations and Ideological Revaluation," Public Opinion Quarterly, (19) 1, Spring, 1955, 53-67. He relates many instances which produce ideological change and the mechanisms involved in these conversions or revaluations. The premise for the study is that "clear thinking about the ideology of individuals is a sine qua non for an understanding of the 'why' and 'how' of social movements.", 67.

## CHAPTER VIII

## PROBLEMS OF THE FACT-VALUE DICHOTOMY

We have surveyed a few key problems of conceptualization in some behavioral concepts of ideology. In this chapter I want to look more carefully at the milieu in which behavioral science operates. More precisely, I believe that the fact-value dichotomy is a central facet of behavioral political science in general and of its concepts of ideology in particular. A functional study of ideology to the exclusion of a discussion of truth content is enhanced by an epistemology which allows its adherents to study so-called "facts."

My argument in this chapter is linked, then, to that of the preceding chapter. Staying with the theme of ideology, I want to establish that the kind of discussion of ideology one finds among the behaviorists is a consequence of a much larger problem in American political science, namely, the separation of facts from values.

Ideology in behavioral political science is treated as belonging to a kind of reality that is inherently different from the reality described as "facts." Ideology is seen as a "value" by the behaviorists which can be observed as facts. Therefore, the problem on which I want to focus, recalling the descriptive materials of the middle chapters, is this: Can ideology be understood if it is interpreted as belonging to the "value" type of reality?

Because of the split between facts and values in behavioralism, this dichotomy is structurally important to a complete understanding of the behavioral conceptualizations.

of ideology. My argument in this chapter, following in the framework of Dooyeweerd already outlined; suggests that the problems of conceptualization are heavily dependent on the fact-value split and that it is informative to look more closely at the Weberian notion of science underlying these problems.

In many ways, the contemporary situation in which behavioral political science finds itself is a product of the positivistic separation of objective "facts" from subjective "values." Propositions about "facts" are related to the phenomena of the world, while propositions about "values" are discussed as normative argument about preferences. Facts are henceforth scientific and values increasingly reduced to personal preferences beyond verification.

In twentieth century American political science the fact-value split gained ascendancy. I am not concerned at this point with the history of American political science, but it is noteworthy that eventually

politics could no longer be understood as a science of the order in which human nature reaches its maximal actualization, (sic) was it possible for this realm of knowledge to become suspect as a field of subjective, uncritical opinion.<sup>1</sup>

The behavioral paradigm in political science clearly partakes of this strict division between facts and values. I think that its concepts of ideology served as evident cases in point. The contributors I have discussed develop their thoughts in a so-called "value-neutral" fashion. The so-called scientific basis of behavioralism which I



have outlined under the heading "Science" in discussing each author, allows its adherents to view the facts with a so-called objective and ethically neutral attitude.

For behavioralism, a "fact" is something observed with the senses, whereas a "value" is something intrinsically desirable, good, worthy, or estimable by the internal, subjective, moral, ethical, or esthetic standards of the person doing the valuing. Consensus is achievable in the realm of facts, but much more difficult, if not impossible to ever achieve in the world of values.

Behavioralists firmly believe that the scientific study of politics is possible by virtue of the researcher's ability to manage and subordinate human emotions and values in the interest of an objective assessment of behavior. Obviously the political scientist has many personal values. If these ever conflict with his science, he ought first to try to set them aside, and, in some cases, he may have to abandon his research altogether. Behavioralism does not think the latter likely. Instead, "value-free inquiry" is assumed possible in most circumstances. Personal preferences, interests, and bias can, in other words, be held in abeyance.

Let us now deal with the results of this dichotomization. In the first section I will trace the roots of this problem back to the influential work of Max Weber. It is his pronouncement concerning the relative nature of values and the suggestion of Wertfreiheit that should be investi-

gated in terms of its importance for the development of the behavioral concepts of ideology. In a second section, I will question behavioralism's supposed value-neutrality and criticize it on numerous counts.

#### The Legacy of Max Weber

One should not underestimate the magnitude of Weber's contribution to social science. His method has profoundly influenced several generations of students in each of the social sciences. All of the behavioralists discussed in this project pay homage to Weber. Some American social scientists, in fact, have suggested that Weber had anticipated the end of ideology by having transcended historicism, utilitarianism and Marxism.

Weber demanded that the social scientists keep "unconditionally separate" the establishment of facts from the evaluation of them, and maintain a clear distinction between the academic life and the political life. The conception of "purely scientific," socio-politically neutral research has given rise to an immense literature that could properly be called a "Weber industry."<sup>2</sup> His epistemological thesis, made into a methodological premise, has been particularly important for behavioral political science. In simple terms, Weber's estimate of the proper relationship between scientific facts and values proceeds along the following lines: Social scientists and natural scientists are both confronted with the same problem. The task before them is that of ordering a vast amount of em-

empirical knowledge into a system that does justice to the particulars of the gathered material. Both scientists (natural and social) are pressed to deal with certain regularities of data, which are properly called "laws" when cause and effect appear fixed. Empirical data furnish us with rules of probability.

Social scientists are preeminently concerned with human behavior. Through empirical observation they observe that changes in behavior are dependent upon changes in circumstances. Once causality is established, Weber insists that prediction is possible in the human sciences -- he calls this "rationality." Rational human actions are part of the pattern of experience. Understood as such, these facts are like any other set of observations; in empirical knowledge they are subject to scientific investigation. Science is, to use the term coined by Weber, "wertfrei" (value-free).

Empirical science does not aim for valid norms and truth in order to derive from them notions of practical conduct. Weber was convinced that he had developed a purely empirical basis for discovery: his was a methodology independent of value judgments. Values, in fact, themselves were understood merely as constituent material for proper empirical analysis. Weber's rule, in his own words, holds to a logical distinction between the "establishment of empirical facts (including the 'value-oriented' conduct of the empirical individual whom he is investigating) and his own practical evaluation, i.e.,

his evaluation of these facts as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including in these facts evaluations made by the empirical persons who are objects of the investigation.)"<sup>3</sup>

It is worth noting at this point, however, that in his actual doing of social science Weber did not stick to his distinction between facts and values. He had enough sense of the real "values" to go to the most important, even urgent issues in the history of society. This brings up the question: What really went into Weber's thinking?

We can look at Weber from two sides: First, he wanted to defend the "scientific" character of social science by confining it to "facts," and second, he wanted to defend the realm of "human values" as outside the realm of science, as free from the critique of science. Weber clearly experienced the crisis of humanistic values in his own life and sought a safe refuge for them. This inner dialectic led him to devise the separation between facts and values. Recall the historical and deeply disturbing personal setting in which Weber lived. One can conclude that he was as much interested in maintaining a realm of freedom (values) as in maintaining the sanctity of science (facts).

In the United States, Weber's notion of science has been exceedingly influential, but that is only half of what he had to say. Remembering that the realm of freedom of human personality, for Weber, depended on the existence of a realm of values free from the determinism and rationality

of science, we can see that herein lies the difference between Weber and the American political scientist's use of the fact-value dichotomy: they had less concern about the humanistic interest in the realm of freedom while thinking a contribution could be made to the study of politics by value-free science. There is, to use Dooyeweerd's phrase, thus an intensification of the "ideal of science" among American behavioral political scientists and a depreciation of the realm of values so highly esteemed by the Neo-Kantians among whom Weber developed his ideas around the turn of the century. We have noted this earlier in the various behavioral theories of ideology.

For Weber, as for earlier positivists, there existed no ultimate universal order which gives meaning to human life. But in the absence of the ancient deities, modern man can establish his own values which give dignity and meaning to the life of individual human beings. But since there is no ultimate universal order -- either an order of nature as the Greeks held, or an order of God as the Judeo-Christian tradition held -- there is no way to subject any values to a transcendental critique. Hence all values were seen as equal. (Here lies the Weberian origin of the end of ideology theme of the late nineteen fifties.) All values were seen as equal. On the one hand Weber appreciated the existence of extra-rationality; on the other, he strove to uphold objective science. There

exists, then, a dialectic in his use of value terms. He says

All research in the cultural sciences in an age of specialization, once it is oriented towards a given subject matter through particular settings of problems and has established its methodological principles, will consider the analysis of data as an end in itself. It will discontinue assessing the value of the individual facts in terms of their relationships to ultimate value-ideas. Indeed it will lose its awareness of its ultimate rootedness in the value-ideas in general. And it is well that it should be so.<sup>4</sup>

Given this pronouncement, social scientists should restrict their comments to steer clear of involvement in political controversy. But this is only one side of Weber. There is also an opposite tendency, he says: "An attitude of moral indifference has no connections with scientific objectivity."<sup>5</sup> Action is always meaningful and values are inevitably bound-up with action. Values in other words, are real; real at least for the individuals who hold them.

Weber poses for us then a dialectic oscillation. He both denies the objective import of value judgments and recognizes their importance. Value judgments are always human judgments. Hence they were important for Weber. But these judgments are not related to a given order of being (as facts are). The tension goes unresolved. Various biographical assessments of Weber's personal life serve as a testimony to the ambivalence of this experience.<sup>6</sup>

The commentary that Weber produced is read by American social scientists in only half of its context. The distinction between science and values is maintained without discussion of the other side of Weber -- the side that stressed the necessity for persons to maintain a value system as the source of meaning. There is then an erosion of the dignity of the human person (of classical humanism) in the way Weber's dichotomy was incorporated by the scientism of the American social scientist. Likewise, the analysis of social phenomena as an "ethically neutral" scientific task is executed with disregard for Weber's struggle with meaning and dignity.

The notion of Verstehen (total comprehension) is rightly taken as the trademark of the Weberian position. However, American behavioral political science has captured only half of Weber's solution, that scientific understanding might be obscured by the injection of personal evaluations. The behavioralist reads Weber as saying that as a professional scientist I must either hold my values in abeyance or relinquish my role as a scientist.<sup>7</sup> Weber clearly had more to say than this.

Interestingly, Weber's introduction to the United States in the 1920's was a very selective introduction. It is not surprising then, that the concepts of ideology developed later in this country built on a partial reading of Weber and his dichotomized version of facts and values. Sutton, et al., state bluntly their Weberian presupposi-

tions.<sup>8</sup> Lane,<sup>9</sup> as does Apter,<sup>10</sup> argue that science and professionalism, not subjective values, are the ultimate standard for mankind. Campbell and Converse,<sup>11</sup> as well as Putnam,<sup>12</sup> are busy acting on Weberian principles and do not state their assumptions. Science has become, it seems, in recent behavioral efforts what Dooyeweerd, as others, have referred to as the "refinement of technique." What is understood by the behavioralists as "ideology" was for Weber the realm of values from which individuals derive meaning. This concern for meaning is somewhat lost in recent developments.

The behavioral concepts of ideology are, then, not so much Weberian, as pseudo-Weberian, in their assumed division between factual knowledge and subjective value preference. Behavioralism is Weberian only in the context of the fact (science) side of Weber's thought, while it disregards the value (freedom) side. This side stood in the way of secularization, demythologizing, and modernization. The latter was enhanced by the objectivity of the social sciences. Historically, the fact-value dichotomy in recent social science did grow out of Weber, but what Dooyeweerd calls the "depth crisis" of humanism in Weber's thought, which led to the dichotomy in his own life, is almost completely missing in American social science. Political behavioralism is a glaring example of this oversight.



Value-Neutrality and Behavioral Political Science

In many ways, the misunderstood or partially accurate Weberian solution to social science research reached a new level of prominence with the rise of political behavioralism. The prominence is due not only to the number of persons associated with the paradigm of behavioralism, but also to its sheer dominance in the discipline of political science. I am not concerned with the interesting history of the development of behavioralism in the United States; others have traced that successful movement. I am concerned with the implicit attraction of such an approach to the study of politics.<sup>13</sup> As one commentator said in defense of the fact-value dichotomy:

All we know and, even more important, everything there is to be known about people's mental states can in principle be known from observing their bodies and their overt behavior, including of course, their speech. This is the common-sense core of behaviorism. Let me say explicitly then, that the idea of an exhaustive and comprehensive science of behavior offers in principle no difficulties whatsoever. Like physical science, behavioral science deals with facts and with facts only.<sup>14</sup>

Very clearly here we have an incomplete reading of Weber in which science does, in effect, depreciate the realm of values so dear to Weber. Following Dooyeweerd we can note what he called the intensification of the "science ideal" and a depreciation of values. This insight is structurally important to the point that this section's argument seeks to establish. Basically the

fact-value split divides the many empirical dimensions of human conduct, and puts what are in Dooyeweerd's hierarchy the "post-logical" dimensions in a realm of subjective "values," while the rest of reality is reserved as a realm of facts. The only way to scientifically "get at" values is to reduce them to the realm of natural facts. Two things are to be seen: First, ideology cannot be fully understood in terms of the split between facts and values; and second, the behavioral science of politics is on the wrong track in its depreciation of the realm of values, and expansion so as to include religions and worldviews.

In a nutshell, the behavioral notions of ideology, including its definitions, are too expansive and therefore too vague, in that they do not demarcate phenomena as mentioned above. This problem is, as Dooyeweerd would have it, the result of an incomplete understanding of the nature of both science and theory. Behavioralism fails to appreciate: first, that science or theory involves presuppositions; and second, that the "fact" known in science or theory has a context. In the social sciences every fact is correlative with norms.

Using a Dooyeweerdian paradigm to show certain inadequacies in the fact-value dichotomy leads one to at least three conclusions. First, Weber's rejection of a universal order (natural or divine) means that there are no longer any given criteria for human, subjective valuations; second the rupture in "intermedial coherence" at the point of the

logical/analytical dimension of reality means that the post-logical modalities (also dimensions of empirical behavior) are grouped by Weber into a realm of value, established by man; for Weber this was a haven of his "personality ideal," but unrelated to universal order; and finally the rupture between, norms and laws which structure facts. In the natural sciences, facts are conditioned by natural laws. In the realm of the human sciences, facts are structured by norms, which are both: the ontic bases for the diverse dimensions (justice, truth, allegiance, etc.); and which are articulated by man as principles for action and belief systems.

We must look more carefully now at the explicit and implicit presuppositions of the behavioralists, and begin to note that what they consider to be "empirical facts" are actually states of affairs whose scientific understanding requires insight into "normative contextuality." This contextuality embraces, if we are to follow Dooyeweerd, all of the dimensions of human experience, including those where indeed humans make evaluations, normative decisions (like all social, economic, esthetic, jural dimensions).

Holding to the view that the object of science is cognitive reality, behavioral science is limited to that which is observed and most readily accessible. We are told that cognitive reality is objective reality as it exists external to and independent of the perceiving subject. Objective reality can be located only when empirically veri-

fied or falsified by use of proper techniques and research designs. In this sense, according to the political behavioralists, all ideological statements are value judgments. But ideologies do more than express valuations. They also cloak valuation in the form of fact, thus imparting to it a claim of objective reality. Science and ideology are antithetical according to this view. Note for example the arguments of Sutton, Lane, and Apter in particular, where science and ideology are conceived to be at loggerheads. Science, of course, is objective and ideology subjective in the most extreme sense of the term.

The crux of the problem using Dooyeweerd's analysis is the confusion that surrounds the behavioral meaning of the word "value."

If we look at the origin of the word "valoir" we see that it conveys the common-sense notion "to count" or "to weigh," in the sense that A, if it "counts for" more than B, takes priority over B. We still say that so-and-so is a person "of no account" or a person "of great weight." It is obvious that no such utterance can be made without an intuitive-or-better idea of the criteria of value; and a basic understanding of the operation "measuring-something-against-some-criteria" provides enough for extropolating, applying other criteria to that criteria, or using the original "something" in turn as the criterion for separate measurement.<sup>15</sup>

To measure something implies that there is a standard against which such valuing can be appropriately matched or compared. Without such measures, statements or statistical codifications are illusive, if not question begging. There is of course a proper place for quantification in political science, but it is not the first or only dimension of poli-

tical reality:

Dooyeweerd, like others, has argued that, ultimately facts of human experience exist only in relation to so-called values. More precisely: The point is that "facts" not only have relations to "values," but that every empirical statement is simultaneously a "value" statement because the fact is selected out of a context. For example, what is: a voter, a judge, an election, a president, etc.? An answer to such questions presupposes the political contexts which give meaning to these words. The "political" refers to human decisions of justice or injustice; it cannot be approached apart from normativity.

• Science cannot function without values, criteria, standards, norms, or normativity. The very idea of a political science is dependent on the choice of the "political," which demands criteria. The selection of political criteria shapes the empirical world of politics, and thus each empirical world is a normative world as well.

Behavioralism has expressed a positivistic view which seeks to do away with value judgments,<sup>16</sup> or at least to hold "values" constant and explore relationships among facts. This eradication of values was not argued by Weber, and should therefore be seen as a particular movement within positivism. We are told by those who contribute behavioral conceptions of ideology that value judgments are ideological premises which distort the complex program of factual, scientific enterprise. Here

ethical or normative propositions are reduced to individual preferences which can be tested as facts of the behavioral world.

The very beginning of political science, however, involves its practitioners in a choice about the meaning of the word "political."

Defining political is therefore tantamount to taking a particular stand about the ends of human activity: it amounts to setting up a scale by which to judge man's relation to man. In short, it means making a choice of values and implies a particular view of the world and of man.<sup>17</sup>

Facticity does not exist without a reference to normativity. Dooyeweerd, along with persons like Michael Polanyi, has argued that every form of knowing including the knowing of human behavior, proceeds from three theoretical principles or tacit assumptions. In pretheoretical experience, there is no split between facts and values, and this interdependency of facts and values cannot be superceded in scientific knowing.

The problem we are dealing with here is first of all one of scientific knowledge. An unraveling of the fact-value dichotomy includes not only the bias of every scientist, but recognition that every fact-known-in-science is part of a system in which it is meaning. Every science abstracts from the whole of reality, the totality of meaning, and this abstraction presupposes the orderedness of the facts, from which the facts themselves can never be fully separated. This is the empirical problem of behavioralism.

There is also an ontological or what Dooyeweerd termed

a "depth-level" problem. At the base of every philosophical system lies a single question: what is the nature of man? A complete answer to this question -- a proper appraisal of man and the concept of nature -- is dependent on man's basic understanding of himself.<sup>18</sup> This understanding provides the matrix of philosophy, where the fundamental questions of the human predicament are systematically probed.

It is deceptive and misleading to insist that facts can be separated from their broader philosophical interpretation. Like other modes of analysis, the methodological assumptions of behavioral political analysis contain implicit judgments about the human condition.

The construction of behavioral analysis depends on setting boundaries. All theories have some criteria for considering certain behavior "political." Political behavior is distinguished and set aside from the more general mass of behavior. To designate certain behavior "political," one must have theoretical clarity about "the political." Otherwise, the statements made will not correspond with reality; they will not make much sense. The problem I am delineating has two sides to it: First, what does the knower bring with him before he can be understood scientifically? And second, what does the known bring with it before it can be understood scientifically? Both questions have been answered in an unsatisfactory manner by behavior-  
alists.

To insist, as political behaviorists do, on the prin-

principles of positivism -- the belief that natural-scientific knowledge is the only way to truth and that facts and values are separate and unrelated kinds of reality is to set up a definite point of departure. The opinion that facts are observed, verified, and proven, while values can only be preferred, is a statement of scientific value-relativism. I do not mean to say that doing political science based on the dichotomy of facts from values makes its adherents immediately into value-relativists. Yet, value-relativism is one likely result. The reason is that the basis for the dichotomizing of facts from values rests on the suggestion that only statements of empirical reference have meaning. Other statements are often seen as "metaphysical" and therefore meaningless. I do not mean to criticize a true empirical bent (i.e., focus on experience) but rather to show that behavioralism tends to accept a truncated view of the empirical (i.e., actual human experience) as real.

But, as we have suggested, theory is prior to empirical observation of facts. Facts mean something only within a frame of reference. The epistemological stance of behavioralism has proven problematic for political science and certain of its conceptualizations of ideology. Not only has behavioralism cut itself off from recent developments in philosophy, it has also engaged its adherents in an idealization of the actual. Operationalism has become synonymous with science, thereby narrowing the scope and nature of the discipline. Mainstream political science today is behavioral political science, which



restricts itself both to thorough positivism and strict empiricism. The concepts of ideology I have described are but one subject area of contemporary behavioralism.

Behavioralism exists as an apodictic product of a specific culture, the American culture in which technological efficiency is regarded as the ultimate value. American society is one of extreme pragmatism.<sup>19</sup> Positivism and empiricism are not unexpected traits in a culture where the "technocratic" is garbed in the guise of an anti-ideological, scientific view of the world, purged of all value judgments.<sup>20</sup> It is interesting to note that behavioral political science started, and is largely confined to the United States.

The question we must ask of behavioral political science and its concepts of ideology is: are exact measurements possible in a science of politics? Or is the study of political man possible if separated from a thorough examination of the options among which men choose? Is a behavioral study of minute, unconnected facts true science in its fullness? Or do we need a hermeneutical science of politics which puts an end to all aspirations of value-free and non-ideological political analysis?<sup>21</sup>

Another theme we must explore is the ideological subtlety of behavioralism which lurks under its supposed separation of facts from values. In one sense, it seems that behavioralism has itself become almost ideological in its service to the dominant institutions of American society.

Marvin Surkin has listed three interesting methodological tendencies in social science: (1) The New Mandarin, who is

a house ideologue for those in power; (2) The Public Advocate, who is a selfless servant of the people; and (3) The Persuasive Neutralist, who is a professional methodologist. Behaviorists have commonly played the third of these roles. Often we find the behaviorists!

. . . main function is to accumulate knowledge and interpret reality, not change it. . . Behavioral science is primarily concerned with theory construction and scientific testability rather than social tenability.<sup>22</sup>

Many critics believe that the realism of behavioralism's infatuation with "facts" becomes an unargued, implicit conservatism, which means, in the American context, a status quo liberalism. Incrementalism is often accepted as the only framework for political practice, with behavioral science as the method most privileged to provide information about coping with that system. Behavioralism does then have its own ideological bearings.

Behavioral political science, ideological as it may or may not be, has emphasized rigorous, empirical analysis, while trying to retain some of the earlier concepts important to the history of political thought. Ideology, we have seen, is one such concept. The growth of empirical behavioral science has included ideology, however, without enough thought to its identity. The old use of the term continues even as attempts are made to make it "scientific." Clearly, the "substitution of sociological for earlier philosophical treatments has not always transformed once-meta-

physical questions into clearly scientific ones."<sup>23</sup> This transferral of the old and new uses of the concept of ideology has been wrought with many difficulties. Vagueness, misuse, philosophical simplification, and statistical complexity are some of the most evident problems. These are problems because the behavioralists have not demarcated religion, worldview, philosophy, theory, and science in the context of the meaning of ideology. This necessary endeavor is ~~from~~ undertaken because it is not mandated by the dictates of behavioral science. One needs, however, to attempt a demarcation if one wishes to make coherent use of the concept of ideology. There are necessary distinctions to be made between ideology, philosophy, and religion which are lacking in the writing of many political behavioralists. The definition of ideology<sup>24</sup> by a number of behavioralists already surveyed makes no reference to this problem. Rather, certain beliefs are labelled "ideology," while a more accurate picture of reality is upheld in the doing of science. Because these differentiations are ignored in many behavioral concepts of ideology their completeness is somewhat suspect.<sup>25</sup>

In summary, I have argued that the behavioral concepts of ideology are problematic in their separation of facts from values. Echoing the positivist worldview, the dualism of objective-subjective or facts-values means that science must be kept pure from contamination by values. Behavioralists have, in this process, failed to understand that

statements of fact entail an act of appraisal. Following Dooyeweerd, I have argued that the factual world is correlative with the normative world; the two cannot and should not be separated. There are no pure facts because discourse itself implies evaluation. Descriptions do not exist apart from presuppositions. Knowing involves doing, and human activity is value-bound. The language that we speak is a structure of symbols which give meaning to our existence. Since this is the case there is a need for standards to which actions and thoughts can be held accountable. Value-neutrality is not a mythology; it is falsehood. Ideology cannot be fully understood in the separation of facts from values. The behavioral emphasis on the functional value of ideologies is in one sense misdirected, and in another sense incomplete without a discussion of the truth content of specific ideologies.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

<sup>1</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952, 11-12. Voegelin goes on to say that "(w)hen the episteme is ruined, men do not stop talking about politics; but they now must express themselves in the mode of doxa. The so-called value-judgments could become a serious concern for methodologists because, in philosophical language, they were doxai, uncritical opinions concerning the problem of order.", 12. And this development, or "abolition of the 'values' as constituents of science led to a theoretically impossible situation because the object of science has a 'constitution' after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving in our search for truth. Since the positivistic hangover, however, did not permit the admission of a science of essence, of a true episteme, the principles of order had to be introduced as historical facts.", 21. A discussion of Max Weber follows.

<sup>2</sup>The following works by Weber translated from the German into English are the most influential: Economy and Society. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968; From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. by H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, London: Oxford University Press, 1948; Politics As A Vocation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965; General Economic History. London: George Allen, 1923; Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York: Free Press, 1959; The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen and Unwin, 1930; and Basic Concepts in Sociology. New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. One could not begin to list the secondary sources that comment on Weber's life and work. The following is a list of the works I have found most useful: Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Anchor Books, 1962; David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1974; Ilse Dronberber, The Political Thought of Max Weber: In Quest of Statesmanship. New York: Meredith Corporation, 1971; Julien Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968; Ludwig Lachmann, The Legacy of Max Weber. London: Heineman, 1970; Marianne Weber, Ein Lebensbild. Tübingen: Mohr, 1926; Dennis Wrong, ed. Max Weber. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970; and Donald G. MacRae, Weber. London: Fontana, 1974.

<sup>3</sup>Max Weber, "Ethical Neutrality," in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (Trans. and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch.) New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, 6.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 112.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>6</sup>See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. New York: Anchor Books, 1962; Marianne Weber, Ein Lebensbild. Tubingen: Mohr, 1926; and Donald G. MacRae, Weber. London: Fontant, 1974. To say the least, his life was a struggle to overcome many forces of a personal and an academic sort.

<sup>7</sup>Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundation of Twentieth Century Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959, does a highly commendable job tracing the systematic, genetic, and polemic heritage of scientific value relativism.

<sup>8</sup>See Chapter II, pp. 67-91.

<sup>9</sup>See Chapter III, pp. 92-117.

<sup>10</sup>See Chapter IV, pp. 118-140.

<sup>11</sup>See Chapter V, pp. 141-167.

<sup>12</sup>See Chapter VI, pp. 168-186.

<sup>13</sup>To name only a few of the most prominent current philosophers: Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," Ethics, 1951, 61(1): 205-218; Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis, London: Stegens Ltd., 1960; Irving Louis Horowitz, Philosophy, Science, and the Sociology of Knowledge, Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1961; and Theodore Geiger, On Social Order and Mass Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

<sup>14</sup>Bergmann, op. cit., 206-7. He insists that the distinction between facts and values which explains subjectivity is "as clear and unproblematic as those between a physical object, a percept, and an illusion.", 212.

<sup>15</sup>D. A. Strickland, "Defining 'Ideology' - A Reformulation," Res Publica, 16:1, 1974, 176. As an example: "It might make sense to say that a luke-warm Christian is no Christian at all, just as it might make sense to say that 'Christianity' is defined by the articles of faith and not by the fervidness with which they are believed or espoused.", 176.

16 John H. Shaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State." in Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 276-327. Positivist skepticism is traced back to Hume.

17 A. P. D'Entreves, "On the Notion of Political Philosophy." In Klaus Von Beyme, (Ed.), Theory and Politics. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, 309. It is argued that traditional political philosophers attached a different meaning and importance to facts than we do. "The point that really matters is, that what seems to us to have been (or to have pretended being) 'proofs,' were not really proofs at all, but 'reasons.' Those philosophers in other words, did not intend to describe facts, but to recommend choices, to champion ideals or values. They know very well (perhaps better than do some of our contemporaries) that values cannot be 'proved' but may be 'argued,' or 'taught,' or 'testified,' by appealing not only (as we are inclined too easily to believe nowadays) to instinct, to emotions, to the irrational side of man, but to his capacity of reasoning and understanding, to the means that are given him of controlling his instincts, of mastering his emotions, so as to be able of making his choices, of passing judgment on existing political conditions, whether to accept them, or to improve them, or if necessary, to refuse and to change them."; 311.

18 I am indebted to Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Philadelphia: Reformed Publishing Company, 1953 for many of these insights. For an interesting comment on this problem, see Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come. New York: MacMillan Company, 1972. "But no matter how objective one may try to be (and some of us try very hard) most views of the future are almost necessarily founded upon some ideological preconceptions about the nature of man, the place of man in the universe, the inevitability or desirability of progress, national or class bias, or even ordinary optimism or pessimism. For example, in our attempts to elucidate even relatively simple and straightforward policy issues, we have been struck by the fundamental importance of the persistence of an ancient dispute between the Augustinian and Pelagian views of man. The dichotomy results from a theological squabble of the fifth century. The African bishop Augustine, author of the macro-history The City of God, vigorously accused the British theologian Pelagius of the heresy of believing that man could achieve salvation through his own efforts. In the modern world Augustinians tend to be conservatives. The liberal tradition (including Marxism) is Pelagian. To the best of our knowledge, neither of these positions can be proved. To some

extent, one position or the other is taken on faith." 276. See also Mary B. Hesse, Science and the Human Imagination. London: SCM Press, 1959.

<sup>19</sup>William Oliver Martin, Metaphysics and Ideology. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1959, 54. "The conclusion is, of course, that all ontology is really ideological. Since this proposition is not an ontological proposition, but one about 'knowledge,' then pragmatism must be accepted by the ideologist as a true philosophical statement about human knowledge. Hence, pragmatism is itself not an ideology, but rather is the philosophical foundation of ideology. This is a rather embarrassing position, for the ideologist's notion of ontological 'truth' presupposes a non-ideological notion of truth about the nature of knowledge.", 79. Political behavioralism is eminently pragmatic in its struggle against extremism of any kind. The behavioral concept of ideology provides a framework for bargaining and compromise. See for elaboration of this point Reo M. Christensen, "The Moral Imperative in Politics," Polity, I:2, Winter, 1968, 177-90. The philosophy of political science is American pragmatism. Relativity of values is the only acceptable truth. Christensen does a plausible job of defusing these assumptions and rationally persuading the reader of the case for natural law.

<sup>20</sup>See Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1968 and the many works by George P. Grant including especially "Ideology in Modern Empires," in John E. Flint and Glyndwr William, eds. Perspectives of Empire: Essays Presented to Gerald S. Graham. London: Longman, 1968, 189-97.

<sup>21</sup>This course is charted by Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of Man," The Review of Metaphysics, 25:1, September 1971, 3-51 and "Neutrality in Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, Philosophy, Politics, and Society, v. 3, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.

<sup>22</sup>Marvin Surkin, "Sense and Non-Sense in Politics," in Alan Wolfe, ed., An End to Political Science. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1970, 21-23. See also James Petras, "Ideology and United States Political Scientists," Science and Society, 29:1, 1965, 192-216.

<sup>23</sup>Whitaker T. Deininger, "Political Power and Ideological Analysis," Politico, 2:1, June 1961, 277.



<sup>24</sup>The definitions of ideology by the contributors to behavioral political science are listed in chapters two through six.

<sup>25</sup>Bernard Crick, "Ideology, Openness and Freedom," in Dante Germino and Klaus von Beyne, (Eds.), The Open Society in Theory and Practice. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. Bernard Crick, Political Theory and Practice. London: Allen Lane, 1973. For a much fuller description of ideology than that presented by many political behavioralists, I suggest these neglected sources: Paul Ricoeur, "Science et Ideologie," Revue Philosophique de Louvain. 72:4, May 1974, 328-56; Michael P. Fogartz, "The Rooting of Ideologies," Christian Democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, and Joseph S. Roucek, "The Component Parts of Ideological Forces," Sociologia Bratislava, 22: 30, 1960, 290-97. See also the concurring source, Hannah Arendt, "Religion and Politics," Confluence, 2:3, September, 1953, 105. This, perhaps, is the single most brilliant piece on the problem at hand. Arendt realizes from the start that "the approach of the social sciences, the identification of ideology and religion as functionally equivalent, has achieved much greater prominence in the present discussion. It is based on the fundamental assumption of the social sciences that they do not have to concern themselves with the substance of a historical and political phenomenon, such as religion, or ideology, or freedom, or totalitarianism, but only with the function it plays in society.", 113. For a discussion of Arendt, Oakshott, and others on this problem, see B. C. Parekh, "The Nature of Political Philosophy," in Preston King (ed.), Politics and Experience. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1968, 153-198.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Behavioral political science in general, and its concepts of ideology more specifically, are not possible without a foundation<sup>1</sup> in a philosophy of human society which is concerned with the basic problems of the place of men and women in the social order. I have suggested that the conceptualizations of ideology presented by a number of behavioralists are expressions of what Dooyeweerd, among others has called our "modern predicament." In a nutshell, political behavioralism has accepted the fact-value dichotomy and has obscured science at certain points as much as it has clarified reality in its various conceptualizations of ideology.

Unfortunately, as Henry Aiken has suggested, the

confusion, or ambiguity, (between visionary thinking and a system of common attitudes) is, I think, inherent in the ordinary sense of "ideology." It is also an ambiguity which lies at the very heart of the philosophizing which is most characteristic of the period with which we are here concerned.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, certain of the recent behavioral conceptions of ideology, I have suggested, have tended to appear as dogmatic conceptual tools for empirically explaining away or reducing prior philosophical and religious systems or modes of thought. I have analyzed six important and representa-

tive behavioral contributions to the study of ideology in light of the historical development of that concept. The critical treatment from a Dooyeweerdian perspective in the third and final section has dealt with problems of conceptualization -- lack of reference to objective reality, obscurity, and the static quality of the behavioral models as well as the underlying "fact-value dichotomy," and the implicit assumption of value neutrality.

My conclusion is that many of the behavioral concepts of ideology have interesting features but that they have a tendency to ignore and foreclose a number of important political and ontological questions. In my estimation, others who have similar outlooks as Dooyeweerd, including the political philosopher Eric Voegelin, offer a more accurate notion of ideology.

Voegelin, in his epic series Order and History, assails the "disorders" of our time. He holds that the remedy against the disorder of modernity is "philosophical inquiry." For Voegelin, and I believe Dooyeweerd would concur on this point,

(i)deology is existence in rebellion against God and man. It is the violation of the First and Tenth Commandments, if we want to use the language of the Israelite order; it is the nosos, the disease of the spirit, if we want to use the language of Aeschylus and Plato. Philosophy is the love of being through love of divine Being as the source of its order. The logos of being is the object proper of philosophical inquiry, and the search from truth concerning the order of being cannot be conducted without diagnosing the modes of existence in untruth. The truth of order has to be guided and regained in the perpetual struggle

against the fall from it; and the movement toward truth starts from a man's awareness of his existence in untruth. The diagnostic and therapeutic functions are inseparable in philosophy as a form of existence. And ever since Plato, the philosophical inquiry has been one of the means of establishing islands of order in the disorder of the age.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly what certain behavioralists refer to as ideology is not quite the same as what Voegelin means by ideology. I think this difference is primarily because Voegelin like Dooyeweerd, accepts revelation as one source of truth about man and the world. This revelation reaches man through his "spiritual dimension." Further, Voegelin accepts philosophy as another, parallel source of truth: the "noetic dimension's" grasp of the human predicament (man as existing in what he refers to as "the metaxy": in tension toward the ground and as capable of a full Being). I read Voegelin to say that basically all of modern thought is "ideological," but especially post-Kantian thought: Hegel, Darwin, Marx, positivism, pragmatism and behavioralism (scientism) itself, since these "views" consider themselves as adequate substitutes for classical religion (Israel) and classical philosophy (Plato and Aristotle).

Thus what Voegelin or Dooyeweerd would describe as authentic religion, philosophy and political theory is, described by the behavioralists as ideology, for which modern science is an adequate substitute. Voegelin, in turn, looks at behavioralism's view of science, and describes that as a part of modernity, scientism, gnosticism,

and ideology. Dooyeweerd has presented a similar argument.

The behavioral treatments of ideology in political science, one could say, partake of the ideology of scientism which Voegelin, like Dooyeweerd, has diagnosed and warned against. For Voegelin, the three principal dogmas of a "scientific creed" hold: (1) that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which all other sciences ought to conform; (2) that almost all realms of being are accessible to the methods of the sciences of phenomena; and (3) that whatever is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusory.<sup>4</sup> Scientism here, as in the writings of Dooyeweerd, although with different emphasis, entails denials of "the dignity of science to the quest for substance in nature, in man and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and in the more radical form, it denies the reality of substance."<sup>5</sup>

In many ways, behavioralism, which exhibits a kind of scientism, reflects a disorientation of existence evidenced by a number of problems I have suggested at some length in the preceding chapters dealing with six representative thinkers and their concepts of ideology. Most writers of the political behavioralist persuasion concede that their thought presupposes a rejection of the classical philosophies of pagan antiquity; and a rejection of the

Judaeo-Christian revelation in all of its interpretations as having any relevance for the nature of science; and an indiscriminate rejection of every tradition of natural law. Behavioralism accepts modernity.

The substitutes for traditional wisdom, of which behavioral political science is only one, have abandoned the search for philosophical truth in favor of the adoption of a method which appears to suit, in some way, the short-term conveniences and short-range horizon of modern man. So, as Pascal would say, there are men who have denied all the laws of God and nature and who are yet driven to invent an "eternal law" of their own which they seek rigorously to obey.

In ways that I have outlined, behavioral political science, even in its development of concepts of ideology, opposes what has been called politike episteme (political knowledge). The establishment of politike episteme implied a realization that being in the world was contingent on the transcendent source of being which is the source of its order. Before the modern period, politike episteme, authentic political knowledge, was based on the dependence of earthly being on transcendent Being. In the history of the modern age since the Renaissance, the acceptance of transcendent Being has been gradually but nonetheless radically eroded. This erosion had phenomenal implications for the nature of political knowledge. The classical natural law tradition, especially among Roman Catholic phil-

osophers in the Thomist tradition, attempted to maintain the basic components of classical politike episteme as intensely relevant for the modern political experience. But the dominant conceptions within the modern age attempted to define authentic politike episteme apart from man's dependence on transcendent Being. The dominant modern conceptions then had to develop a vocabulary to describe (a) the classical notion of politike episteme and (b) the dimensions of human experience in valuing or believing -- based on an acceptance of transcendent Being -- that do not meet the rigors of a natural-scientific notion of truth. Behavioral political science has chosen the vocabulary of ideology to describe both realms of discourse. But of course this is not merely a matter of vocabulary; for in the name of science, the science of philosophical questioning is itself challenged as non-science, and the human experience of a transcendent Being is challenged as superstition.

The essential concern of my argument is not simply to rework the familiar fact-value controversy but to point out that ideology is defined by certain behavioralists, precisely in terms of a fact-value dichotomy, and by means of a fact-value dichotomy. Hence many behavioralists suggest on the one hand that they will "do the facts" while the political philosophers "do the values," but then, on the other hand, the behavioralists claim the right to declare what the basis of "values" is, and hence try to exert dominance over the whole field of political science. Another implication of this problem is that certain behavioralists themselves, as

we have found, try to overcome the fact-value dichotomy, but do so by the means of "facts" (i.e., through their science) "swallowing" up "values" by turning them into psychology. This is another way in which science can become its own ideology.

As Voegelin has suggested, and as Dooyeweerd likewise argued in his "transcendental critique,"

(t)oday, just as two thousand years ago, 'politike episteme' deals with questions that concern everyone and that everyone asks. . . Only in one respect has the situation of political science changed. As indicated, there has emerged a phenomenon unknown to antiquity that permeates our modern societies so completely that its ubiquity scarcely leaves us any room to see it all: the prohibition of questioning. . . We are confronted here with persons who know that, and why, their opinions cannot stand up under critical analysis and who therefore make the prohibition of the examination of their premises part of their dogma. This position of a conscious, deliberate, and painstakingly elaborated obstruction of ratio constitutes the new phenomenon.<sup>6</sup>

If we are to move ahead in political science, we will have to seriously question -- to paraphrase Voegelin's words -- the behavioralists' dogmatic "prohibition of the examination of their premises." We have found that behavioral political science, in line with dominant trends in positivism, has insisted on the use of natural-scientific and, even more narrowly, what Dooyeweerd termed "mathematizing" methods. The use of such methods became the criterion of science, not only in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences. The result of this was the loss of the meaning of science as a truthful account of reality for understanding man's place in the world. The positivists'



insistence on methods derived from physics and mathematics in the human sciences inescapably led to the so-called division of facts from values since the latter detracted from the scientific nature of research. But this division means that judgments concerning the right order of the soul and its relation to the right social order were considered "subjective," that is, not related to objective truth which belongs to the realm of science.

The premises of behavioralism concerning the nature of scientific method, fact and value need thorough examination. Following the analysis of Dooyeweerd, these premises are dogmatic; that is, they are based on the belief that man's being is not dependent upon transcendent Being, is independent of transcendent Being. The reverse of the classical understanding of human nature is the belief that man's being is confined to immanent horizons -- horizons within which 'man' and 'nature' are the sole existents. Within these immanent horizons, the sophistication of science -- as defined by positivism's reliance on natural-scientific method -- allows modern man to increase his control over nature. This increase of man's control over nature parallels the decrease of man's dependence upon transcendent Being -- and ipso facto man's belief in transcendent Being. As both Voegelin and Dooyeweerd note, this positivistic scientism is the contemporary outgrowth of the Enlightenment faith that heaven will be built on earth, by man himself, equipped with the tools of science, in its control over nature in technological production. The modern notion of science is thus an expression of the post-

Christian notion of "self-salvation." Behavioralism is the dominant version of this notion of science in the American social sciences.

In the light of these premises of behavioralism, it is not in the least surprising that several of its more outstanding representatives have paid so much attention to "ideology." For the content of "ideology" -- revealed religion, classical philosophy, natural law, values based on a fixed given human nature -- is considered hostile to "self-salvation," control over nature, progress, modernization, and secularization. The behavioralist will not deny the existence of values. But he will only accept their functional utility in maintaining a social system or their ability to reduce personal strain. He will at all costs deny the truth of values since truth is limited to the realm of science. Behavioralism is thus caught in a circle of its own dogmatic reasoning: science is true because it declares itself to be true. That which lies beyond science -- beyond the immanent horizons of man and nature -- is untrue (or at best doubtful since we have no method of knowing its truth).<sup>7</sup> It is the nature of the claim to ontological truth that is unsettling to people accustomed to shun ontology and to settle for functional verification only. But normative convictions cannot be left out of sound political theory or political science.

Even with the ruin of the episteme, men go on talking about politics. However it is the expression of politics as doxa that characterizes the current period. According to Voegelin,

(t)oday theorists do not use the term doxa for this purpose, nor have they developed an equivalent -- the distinction is lost. Instead the term 'ideology' has come into vogue which in some respects is related to the Platonic doxa. But precisely this term has become a further source of confusion because under the pressure of what Mannheim has called the allgemeine Ideologieverdacht, the general suspicion of ideology; its meaning has been extended so far as to cover all types of symbols used in propositions as politics, including the symbols of theory themselves.<sup>8</sup>

Ideology surrounds us, but the behavioralists have not sufficiently grappled with its content.

It is not my purpose in this conclusion to suggest an alternative view of ideology, only to suggest that ideology seems to me to be a modern phenomenon linked to the breakdown of the deistic view of the world. In this sense recent behavioral contributions suffer from neglect of the fact that the term "ideology" must be linked with the religious context of its roots. For ideology is not applicable to Western civilization prior to the seventeenth century, in the same way that "society" and "intellectual" do not fit the premodern period either. I would argue that the substitution of "nature" for God is especially important for an understanding of ideology as a distinctively modern perspective. I would also insist on a necessary distinction between ideology, philosophy, and religion. Such a distinction is lacking in the writings of most political behavioralists.

Genuine advance in social science will require the admission of the behavioralist and the post-behavioralist -- or whatever stripe -- that the positivist notion of science

as value-free itself is a very doubtful premise. Not only neoclassical thinkers like Voegelin and Christian theorists like Dooyeweerd, but philosophers of science, and among them also Michael Polanyi, have begun to unfold a post-positivistic conception of science. Polanyi recognizes that every act of knowing -- including scientific knowing -- involves a personal, "tacit knowledge."<sup>9</sup> This recognition does not entail a corruption of science but its enrichment. It suggests a renewed appreciation of the Augustinian admonition that one must "believe in order to understand." Tacit acknowledgement does not call for an injunction to blind faith but indicates an awareness that one cannot begin thinking without any premises. Science, too, involves a fiduciary component of personal judgment. A harsh contrast between science and ideology cannot be maintained. Political science, like all science, is linked to commitment.

In conclusion, it follows from my general argument that the concept of ideology deserves a different and more comprehensive kind of treatment than that granted it by some writers of the political behaviorist persuasion. I have suggested some limitations of a few behavioral studies of ideology. This is not to say that the behavioral persuasion in political science is altogether irrelevant, uninformed, or unimportant. Certain of the conceptualizations of ideology in behavioral political science, however, shun important political questions; functional matters have taken precedence over a discussion of truth questions. Perennial, radical, insistent questioning is in the heart of political thinking.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER IX

<sup>1</sup>This is what Dooyeweerd calls the Cosmonomic Idea of each system of thought (in Dutch "Wetsidee" or the "transcendental ground idea.")

<sup>2</sup>Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology: The Nineteenth Century Philosophers, New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1958, 14.

<sup>3</sup>Eric Voegelin, Order and History, v. 1, "Israel and Revelation," Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956, xiv. See Dante Germino, "Eric Voegelin's Anamnesis," Southern Review, 7:1, January 1971, 68-88. "Ideology is the term which Voegelin uses most frequently to describe fundamental distortions of political reality leading to the derailment of political thought and the loss of order in human existence. Ideology lacks the suppleness to conceive of man as existing in tension toward the ground and as capable of a fall from Being; rather ideology pretends to have a grip on Being and to possess certain knowledge (gnosis) respecting the 'nature' or man, society, and history. Proponents of ideological thinking typically omit either the bodily, material side of human existence (as in Utopian speculation) or the noetic and spiritual dimension (as in utilitarian, materialistic, and 'social contract' theory).", 83-4.

<sup>4</sup>Eric Voegelin, "The Origins of Scientism," Social Research, 4:15, December 1948, 462-94.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid. For a divergent point of view that comes to the same conclusion, see Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947; especially p. 50-53; and Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, New York: Herder and Herder, 1972, 3-46.

<sup>6</sup>Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics, and Gnosticism, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1968, 21. See Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, 4-14. Horkheimer argues that the divorce of reason from religion weakened its objective aspect and led to a degree of formalization.

<sup>7</sup>The source here of my particular religious-philosophical orientation is Herman Dooyeweerd and the school of the "cosmonomic idea" associated with him. I hold to his definition of religion as "the innate impulse of human selfhood to direct itself toward the true or toward a pretended absolute Origin of all temporal diversity of meaning,

which it finds focused concentrically in itself," in A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 57. For a similar argument see Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, esp. 16-18; 68-72, and 185-87. Horkheimer's "critical theory" is not suggested to be identical in this regard, only compatible.

<sup>8</sup>Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952, 30.

<sup>9</sup>Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958.

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